

CLARE ELLIS

**THE
BLACKENING
OF EUROPE**

**VOLUME II. IMMIGRATION,
ISLAM, & THE MIGRANT CRISIS**

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7. Immigration: EU and Five Country Profiles

European nations were overwhelmingly ethnically homogeneous prior to the 1960s but due to rapid and high volumes of non-European immigration since this time they have become more ethnically diverse. In a 2012 report for the Migration Observatory, Oxford University demographer David Coleman states that

Migration has become the primary driver of demographic change in most high-income countries and may remain so. On current trends European populations will become more ethnically diverse, with the possibility that today's majority ethnic groups will no longer comprise a numerical majority in some countries.¹

Since the 1980s non-European ethnic immigrant communities have been steadily growing in all Western European nations. This is due to a mixture of factors, notably temporary foreign guest worker programs of the 1950s to early 1970s, which were 'strongly encouraged by Marshall Plan officials' and turned into permanent settlement, and the granting of citizenship to members of former colonies.² Subsequent developments, such as the Euro-Arab Dialogue that emphasised Arab manpower, as well as new labour agreements, illegal immigration, high birth rates of non-European immigrants, family reunification policies, and asylum laws, have continually contributed to the rapid growth of non-European immigrant populations in Europe over the last few decades.

Several Western European countries thought that immigration levels were too high in the 1970s,³ mainly due to repercussions of the oil embargo — economic recession and high unemployment — but also because of civil unrest and political violence, which were increasingly committed by migrants at this time.⁴ Various policies were introduced to restrict non-skilled non-European labour immigration and laws were enacted for the repatriation of 'guest workers'.⁵ However, many of the temporary 'guest workers' decided to stay in their host countries and began bringing over their families; they became what are known as 'first generation immigrants'. The courts granted guest workers and their families the right to residence and any attempts by '[e]xecutive and administrative authorities...to reverse the migration flows' were increasingly limited by 'legal and constitutional constraints'.⁶ This meant that immigration changed from a temporary and limited rights phenomenon to a permanent program of immigrant settlement embedded with human rights.⁷ As such, immigration at this time continued in the form of marriage migration, foreign students (those who then became permanent residents), Arab manpower and highly skilled workers (who settled), refugees and asylum seekers, illegal immigrants (who are naturalised in times of liberalisation of citizenship), and through family reunification.⁸

By the late 1990s various Left-wing governments came to power in many

EU member states, opening their doors to large-scale immigration once again. They liberalised naturalization and citizenship policies, including for illegal migrants. In addition, in order to offset low birth rates, ‘a shortage of highly skilled workers’, and ‘make their economies more competitive in a rapidly globalizing world’, they created new foreign labour recruitment programs. These included not just recruitment of highly skilled workers but also seasonal workers, particularly from Eastern Europe as these countries joined the EU.⁹ At this time human rights and refugee laws became increasingly enshrined in immigration practices in Europe, especially when a large influx of asylum seekers arrived, mostly produced by the Balkan and Middle East wars. Since the early 21st century, the populations of second and third generation non-European immigrants (children and grandchildren of first generation immigrants), and new immigrants (family members, marriage migrants, foreign students, economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants¹⁰ and their children) have rapidly increased in European nations.

Table 1 below shows the number and percentage of immigrants that were granted residency permits in the EU-28 between 2008 and 2015 based on one of four main categories of immigration: 1) Family, 2) Education, 3) Employment, and 4) Other. The category ‘Other’ involves reasons that include: ‘international protection [refugees], residence without the right to work (e.g. for pensioners), diplomatic duties, and people in the intermediate stages of a regularisation process’.¹¹ Excluding the category ‘Other’, it can be ascertained from the information that in the eight-year period between 2008 and 2015 people were given residency permits in the EU for reasons in the following order: family (36.3%), employment (19.6%), and education (4.8%). This means that over 41 percent of all residency permits granted in the EU between 2008 and 2015 were not given for economic reasons.

Table 1. Types of EU Granted Residency Permits, 2008–2015 (Numbers and Percent)

	Family	Education	Employment	Other	Total
2008	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299
2009	3,800,000	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	14,500,000
2010	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299
2011	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299
2012	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299
2013	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299
2014	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299
2015	6,308,299	1,000,000	3,800,000	5,900,000	16,908,299

Source: Data from Eurostat, ‘All Valid Permits by Reason.’

On 1 January 2015 the total population of the EU was 508.2 million; it had grown by one million people in just one year, most of it coming from net migration.¹² In the 1980s net migration levels were around 200,000 people per year and almost quadrupled in the 1990s to around 750,000 per year.¹³ According to a 2009 EU report, since 2002 net migration to the EU has

‘tripled to between 1.6 million and two million people per year’,¹⁴ and according to a European Commission press release in April 2013, net migration has ‘tripled since 1960’.¹⁵ In 2015 a European Commission report projected that net migration between 2015 and 2060 will remain between 1 million and 1.5 million a year, peaking around 2040 and declining thereafter.¹⁶

The foreign-born population in the EU in 2010 amounted to 47.3 million, which was 9.4 percent of the total population. Out of this foreign-born population 31.4 million or 66.4 percent were ‘born outside the EU’. The total non-EU foreign-born population would likely be much higher if the many Eastern European countries with smaller foreign-born populations compared to Western European members of the EU were excluded from the calculation. In Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, and Greece foreign-born residents ‘exceeded one million people’ in 2010.¹⁷ In 2011, out of 780,000 new citizenships awarded in the EU, 49 percent were given to Africans and Asians; the two largest groups from these regions were Moroccans (64,300) and Turks (48,900).¹⁸ In 2014 non EU-born residents of EU member states amounted to 33.5 million, representing an increase of 2.1 million non-EU born residents since 2010. Overall, many immigrants arriving into EU member states are much younger than the national populations, with the median age of immigrants in 2014 standing at 28 years of age compared to the median age of nationals at 42 years of age.¹⁹

For many Western European countries,²⁰ the first and second generations of post-war immigrants now constitute between 10 and 20 percent of the total population and, as trends will inevitably continue, it has been projected that by 2050 the ‘post-war immigrant population’ will amount between 20 and 40 percent. Eventually the majority ethnic groups (indigenous Europeans) of these nations will become a minority in their homelands due to their low birth rates (the total fertility rate for the EU-28 in 2013 was 1.52 whereas it was 2.43 in the 1970s), large-scale sustained immigration, and the high birth rates of non-European immigrants.²¹

7.1 Belgium

Belgium has a current population of 11.2 million and a landmass of 30,528 km². In 1960 the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.94. By 2012 it had dropped to 1.79, and a year later had dropped further to 1.76. This means that Belgians now have below replacement fertility (2.1 children).²² There is also a negative correlation between the amount of young and the amount of the elderly over time in Belgium. Persons aged 0–15 years in 1970 accounted for 23.6 percent of the total population and by 2014 this age group accounted for only 17 percent of the population. Persons over the age of 65 constituted

13.39 percent of the population in 1970, but by 2014 increased to 17.94 percent.²³ This means that Belgium is aging *and* not producing enough children to replace its population. This scenario is a central concern for economic theorists and others who argue large-scale immigration into Europe is a necessary practice for the survival of European nation states. Their argument is that native population decline is not conducive to the longevity of the current needs of the economic system (labour power and tax base of welfare states) or the successful participation of Belgium in the global capitalist economy, therefore mass-immigration of actual and potential labourers and tax-payers is necessary. In fact, most (almost 75%) of the population growth in Belgium in the last couple of decades has been from net immigration.²⁴

Figure 3 below shows that in the 1960s net migration in Belgium ranged between 498 (1968) and 43,823 (1964) persons per year. In the early and mid-1970s the net migration rate dropped to below 20,000 and by the late 1970s and into the late 1980s it had decreased into negative numbers (-17,682 in 1983 and -34 in 1988), meaning there were more emigrants than immigrants. Beginning in 1989 net migration once again increased, ranging between 10,000 and 25,000 per year until 2001. At the turn of the century net migration showed a steady overall increase, jumping from 35,000 in 2001 to 79,500 in 2010. Between 2010 and 2013 there was a marked decrease of net migration, but it rose again in 2014, reaching almost 48,000 in 2015.²⁵




Figure 3. Net Migration 1962–2015, Belgium.

Sources: Data for 1962–2010 from DEMIG (2015) DEMIG TOTAL and data for 2011–2015 from Statistics Belgium, 'Population — Chiffres population 2010–2016.'

Like many Western European countries in the post-World War II era of 'economic miracles' and growth, Belgium made bilateral agreements with several countries to bring in a cheap foreign-labour supply. Most migrants came from Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco, and Yugoslavia, but, especially beginning in the mid-1960s, many others were recruited from Asia (Turkey) and Africa (the Republic of Congo). By the 1970s, as a response to the Arab instigated oil-embargo economic crisis and the eruptions of violent migrant conflict, Belgium began to halt unskilled labour immigration (1974), especially of Third Country Nationals. However, immigration continued in the form of non-economic migrants, particularly foreign students, next of kin (family reunification), marriage migration (marriage abroad, immigration of spouses, and possibly their relatives), and EU migrant labour flows,²⁶ with family reunification constituting around half of all immigrant intakes.²⁷

Table 2 below shows the amount of valid residence permits that were granted in Belgium per year (2010–2015) by reason given. As can be ascertained from the information, only nine percent or less of all valid permits were given for reasons of employment; family reasons have consistently been over 50 percent, and have showed a steady increase from 51.5 percent in 2010 to 62.5 percent in 2015.

Table 2. Types of Granted Residency Permits in Belgium, 2010–2015 (Numbers and Percentage of Total)

[illegible]

Since the turn of the 20th century African and Asian migration into Belgium has increased steadily.³⁰ In 2011 the two largest non-European foreign-born populations came from Africa and Asia amounting to 6 percent of the total population.³¹ Between 1991 and 2010 immigration from Morocco increased from below 4,000 a year to over 10,000 a year and Turkish immigration increased from 3,000 to 4,000 per year.³² In 2001 Moroccan nationals amounted to 88,813 individuals or 10.3 percent of the total foreign national population and in 2014 they accounted for only 6.6 percent of all foreign nationals. In 2001 Turkish nationals amounted to 56,172 or 6.5 percent of the total foreign national population and by 2014 they accounted for only 3.3 percent. This can be explained by the ‘significant’ rates of naturalization of Moroccans and Turks compared to all other foreign nationals, standing at first and second place in 2005 and first and third place in 2013.³³

Table 1. *Continued*

[illegible]

As can be seen, the three largest non-European foreign-born groups in 2011 were from Morocco at 189,137 persons, Turkey at 96,999 and the Democratic Republic of Congo at 81,291. The percentage of those who were under the age of 30 was 23 percent, with Cameroon (44%), Rwanda (43%), India (41%), China (39%), and Pakistan (32%) having the most share of their population under 30 compared to all other foreign-born groups listed. Four out of the ten foreign-born populations listed above had higher proportions of under-30-year-olds compared to the national percentage in Belgium, which stood at 37 percent in 2011.³⁴

7.2 United Kingdom

The UK has a population of 63.4 million and a landmass of 243,610 km². The total fertility rate in 2013 was 1.83, which is comparable to 2.43 in 1970. This means that the UK, like Belgium, has below replacement fertility. There is also a negative correlation between the percentage of young and the percentage of the elderly over time. Persons aged between 0–15 years of age in 1970 accounted for 24.1 percent of the total population and by 2014 this age group accounted for only 17.8 percent. Persons over the age of 65 constituted 13.03 percent of the population in 1970, but by 2014 increased to 17.26 percent.³⁵ The UK is aging *and* not producing enough children to replace its population.

In the 1960s and up until the early 1980s more people left the United Kingdom than entered. But, as figure 4 below shows, by 1983 net migration was 17,100 and steadily climbed to 77,000 in 1994. Since the late 1990s net migration has risen to over 100,000 per year, ranging from 140,000 in 1998 to 323,000 in 2015. Over half (53%) of the population growth in the UK is from net immigration and is projected to contribute more than 5 million to population growth in the next 25 years.³⁶




Figure 4. Net Migration 1983–2015, UK

Sources: Data for 1983–2011 from DEMIG (2015) DEMIG TOTAL and data for 2012–2015 from Office for National Statistics, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: February 2016

As mentioned in chapter 3, after WWII the Labour government in postwar Britain recruited cheap labour from former colonies in the Commonwealth, namely the West Indies, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. Between the British Nationality Act of 1948 and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, citizens of Commonwealth countries were granted the ‘right of entry’ or the right to settle and work in the United Kingdom. As a response to the large volumes of immigrants arriving from the Commonwealth, alongside the closure of many industrial sites, the economic recession, and violent ethnic conflicts, by the 1970s this ‘right of entry’ was replaced with temporary work permits, which restricted Commonwealth immigration. But, like Belgium and elsewhere in Europe, the initial post-war labour migrants became permanently settled and, with the enactment of temporary work permits, as well as family reunification and refugee laws, immigrant populations continued to grow in the UK.

Illegal immigrants also make up a large portion of non-British peoples in the UK; it is estimated that they constitute around 800,000 to 910,000 or 1.4 percent of the total population.³⁷ As discussed in chapter 2, in the late 1990s Labour initiated an open-door policy of mass-immigration, particularly in terms of family reunification, refugee laws, and other liberal immigration policies. Unlike Belgium and the EU as a whole, the majority of immigrants in the UK over the last decade have arrived for work or educational reasons, although the work category also includes those looking for work and not just those who have been guaranteed work, the latter of which are generally

understood as highly-skilled workers. Table 4 below shows the main reasons for long-term international immigration to the UK per year between 2005 and 2015 (year ending in September).

Table 4. Types of Granted Residency Permits in the UK, 2005–2015 (Numbers and Percentages of Total)

				EU/EEA citizen		
2005						285,090
2006						283,090
2007						283,090
2008						283,790
2009						298,090
2010						288,090
2011						284,790
2012						188,790
2013						244,990
2014						288,990
2015						290,790

Source: Data from Office for National Statistics, 'Long-Term International Migration estimates of immigration to the UK.'

In 2008 the population of foreign born (including European nationals) amounted to 6.9 million people, or 11 percent of the UK’s total population, up from 4.9 million in 2001. *UN Data* shows that in 2011 the total native population of the UK was 55,188,698 and the total foreign-born population was 7,993,480 or about 13 percent of the total population. The two regions of the world that constituted the largest percentages of the foreign-population were from Asia at 2,889,436 and Africa at 1,364,954, constituting around 7 percent of the total population. Table 5 below is a break-down of seventeen of the largest (over 60,000) non-European groups by country of origin that formed the foreign-born population of the UK in 2011 (this does not include their descendants who are born on British soil, illegal immigrants, or those who previously held a foreign nationality but have since been naturalised). It also shows the amount of under 30-year-olds by country and their percentage per country total and relative to the size of the total top 17 foreign-born populations.

Table 5. Population of Top Seventeen Non-European Foreign-Born Populations and Under 30 Years, UK 2011

Country							Nurillof
							26829
India							730,000
Pakistan							500,000
China							200,000
Bangladesh							200,000
Nigeria							200,000
Jamaica							100,000
Kenya							140,000
Philippines							130,000
Sri Lanka							110,000
Zimbabwe							100,000
Somalia							100,000
Ghana							90,000
Turkey							90,000
Iran							80,000
Iraq							70,000
Malaysia							60,000
Afghanistan							60,000
Total							3,000,000

Source: Data from UNSD: 'Native and Foreign-born Population by Age, Sex and Urban/Rural Residence' and 'Foreign-born Population by Country/Area of Birth, Age, and Sex.'

The three largest non-European foreign-born groups in 2011 were from India at 722,433 persons, Pakistan at 502,796, and China at 294,771. Twenty-nine percent of the foreign-born people from the 17 most popular countries of origin were under the age of 30, with Afghanistan (52%), China (49%), Somalia (44%), Zimbabwe (34%), and Iraq (34%) having the most share of their population under 30 compared to all other foreign-born groups listed. Only three out of the 17 foreign-born populations listed above had higher proportions of under 30-year-olds than the national percentage in the UK, which stood at 37.5 percent in 2011.³⁸

Since Labour came to power in 1997 and opened the borders of Britain to mass-immigration the foreign-born population has risen by around 50 percent. By 2014 the foreign-born population was over 8.3 million or around 13.1 percent of the total population,³⁹ which is an increase of 1.4 million since 2008. Since at least 1991 the majority of immigrants to the UK have been non-EU nationals. In 2014 over half of all immigrants came from outside of the EU: 287,000 non EU nationals, and 264,000 EU nationals.⁴⁰ Around half were residing in inner and outer London (36.9% or 3,090,000) and the South East (13.6% or 1,109,000).⁴¹ By 2015, the foreign-born population stood at 8,411,000 or 13 percent of the total population, with non-EU foreign-born accounting for the majority (5,320,400 or 8.2 percent of the population).⁴²

According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) the non-White British population in 2001 was 6.6 million and by 2009 it was 9.1 million.⁴³ In 1991 non-Whites accounted for just less than six percent of the British

population but 20 years later, in 2011, the non-White population was 13 percent as is shown in table 6 below. Based on these figures and the increase in net migration over the last 20+ years, a conservative estimate for the non-White population of Britain in 2016 is 20 percent.

Table 6. Main Ethnicities in the UK, 1991–2016 (percent)

Main Ethnicities	1991	2001	2008	2011	2016 est
White	89.0	86.0	84.0	80.5	70.0
Asian	2.0	3.0	4.0	6.0	10.0
Black	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	3.0
Chinese	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5
Other	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5

Sources: Data for 1991, 2001, and 2008 from Sommerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre, ‘United Kingdom’ and data for 2011 from the Office for National Statistics, ‘2011 Census: Key Statistics and Quick Statistics for Local Authorities in the United Kingdom.’ 2016 estimate by author.

In the 2011 UK census ‘White British’ was used as an ethnic classification. The total White British population in 2011 was 80.5 percent in England and Wales.⁴⁴ By 2013 White Britons were already a minority in London, Leicester, Luton, and Slough. Birmingham is projected to quickly follow suit. In 2011 Birmingham was 53.1 percent White British, which is a decrease by 12.5 percent in just ten years, and less than a third of school age children were White.⁴⁵

Table 7. White British Population in English Cities, 2011/2013 (percent)

White British (%)	2011	2013
Birmingham	53.1	40.6
Bradford	63.0	50.0
Cambridge	66.0	50.0
Coventry	66.0	50.0
Leicester	45.2	32.7
London	45.2	32.7
Luton	44.0	31.0
Manchester	44.0	31.0
Nottingham	44.0	31.0
Oxford	68.0	50.0
Sandwell	66.0	50.0
Slough	34.0	21.0
Watford	62.0	50.0
Wolverhampton	64.0	50.0

Sources: Data on Leicester, London, Luton, and Slough from Doughty, ‘White Britons are Now a Minority.’ Data on Birmingham from Birmingham City Council (2013). Data for Bradford, Cambridge, Coventry, Manchester, Nottingham, Oxford, Sandwell, Watford, and Wolverhampton from the Office for National Statistics, ‘2011 Census: Table CT0010 Ethnic group.’

Coleman has stated that ‘On current trends European populations will become more ethnically diverse, with the possibility that today’s majority ethnic groups will no longer comprise a numerical majority’ and that ‘white Britons will be in a minority by 2066’ in their own country.⁴⁶ In addition, ethnic minorities are increasingly advancing into majority White parts of the country, including rural areas of England. In 2001 there were over 5,000

wards out of 8,850 that were over 98 percent White, by 2011 there were less than 800.⁴⁷

7.3 France

The population of France currently stands at 66 million and its landmass is 643,801 km². The total fertility rate of France was 1.98 in 2014 which, compared to 2.48 in 1970, means that France, like Belgium and the UK, has below replacement fertility. There is also a negative correlation between the percentage of young and the percentage of elderly over time. Persons between 0–15 years of age in 1970 accounted for 24.8 percent of the total population and by 2013 this age group accounted for only 18.4 percent. Persons over the age of 65 constituted 12.87 percent of the population in 1970, but by 2013 their numbers increased to 17.95 percent.⁴⁸ France is aging *and* not producing enough children to reproduce its population.

Like Britain and Belgium, population growth in France is driven by net migration. But net migration of non-French immigrants has remained around 140,000 since 2007. As figure 5 shows below, between 2006 and 2013 the total net migration in France was 1,144,000. Although the inflow of non-French immigrants into France increased significantly between 2006 and 2013, standing at 193,000 and 235,000 respectively, the outflow of non-French immigrants reveals a positive correlation. This is possibly due to an increase in short-term labour mobility throughout the EU, but it may also be related to sharp increases in immigrant influxes and high net migration levels in Britain and Germany due to greater economic opportunities and/or certain social benefits in these nations.




Figure 5. Immigration, Emigration, and Net Migration of Non-French Immigrants,

Source: Data from INSEE, 'L'analyse des flux migratoires entre la France et l'étranger entre 2006 et 2013.'

As mentioned in chapter 3, after WWI France provided citizenship and/or recruited foreign labour from its colonies and protectorates, specifically Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. At this time, labourers were also recruited from Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Poland. After WWII recruitment from the Maghreb region picked up and was supplemented by labourers from other areas of Africa as well as from Portugal and from Turkey.⁴⁹ But, like other Western European countries that experienced economic recession and rising unemployment from the 1970s Arab oil embargo as well as rising ethnic violence,⁵⁰ in 1974 France officially stopped its 'unskilled' labour migration program. However, immigration did not stop, and continued in the form of family reunification and illegal migration. Illegal immigration into France has been primarily from West Africa and the Maghreb; the amount of illegal immigrants in France was estimated for 2005 to be between 200,000 and 400,000⁵¹ or more.⁵² Table 8 below shows the amount of valid residence permits that were granted in France per year (2008–2015) by reason given. Less than four percent every year were given for work related reasons.

Table 8. Types of Granted Residency Permits in France, 2008–2015 (Numbers and Percentages of Total)

									employment	family
2008									1,373,943	1,373,943
2009									1,368,933	1,368,933
2010									1,063,633	1,063,633
2011									1,038,032	1,038,032
2012									1,941,392	1,941,392
2013									1,966,632	1,966,632
2014									1,068,432	1,068,432
2015									1,068,032	1,068,032

Source: Data from Eurostat, 'All Valid Permits by Reason.'

According to UN Statistical Data, in 1999⁵³ the total native population of France was 54,215,232 and the total foreign-born population was 5,971,853 or 10 percent of the total population. Of this foreign born population, 48.2 percent came from Africa (2,877,434) and 10.9 percent came from Asia (650,902), together constituting 59.1 percent of the foreign-born population and around six percent of the total population of France. The top ten countries of the largest (over 43,000) non-European foreign-born populations in France in 1999 are listed in table 9 below (this does not include their descendants who are born on French soil, illegal immigrants, or those who previously held a foreign nationality but have since been naturalised). It also shows the amount of under 30-year-olds by country and their percentage per country total and relative to the size of the total top ten foreign-born population.

Table 9. Population of Top Ten Non-European Foreign-Born Populations and Under

Country	Population
	266,290
Algeria	1,250,282
Morocco	711,520
Tunisia	341,632
Turkey	179,888
Vietnam	176,888
Madagascar	86,888
Senegal	84,888
Cambodia	56,288
Côte d'Ivoire	44,888
Congo	43,888
Total	2,980,033

Source: Data from UNSD: 'Native and Foreign-born Population by Age, Sex and Urban/Rural Residence' and 'Foreign-born Population by Country/Area of Birth, Age, and Sex.'

As can be seen the three largest non-European foreign-born groups in 1999 were from Algeria at 1,250,282 persons, Morocco at 711,520, and Tunisia at 341,632. The percentage of foreign-born people who were under the age of 30 was 18 percent, with Côte d'Ivoire (47%), Turkey (42%), and Congo (35%) having the most share of their population under 30 compared to all other foreign-born groups listed.

The National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) provides statistical information derived from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) on the non-European foreign-born population of France by country of birth in 2013, as shown in table 10 below, which does not include descendants, naturalised immigrants, foreigners born in France, or illegal immigrants. It also does not include information on foreign-born populations aged 29 and under. This data will be used for comparison purposes in the summary section below.

According to INED, the population of France in 2013 stood at 63,652,034⁵⁴ and the total foreign-born population was 5,719,761, or nine percent of the general population.⁵⁵ This contrasts with data published by the OECD that relied on INSEE annual census data, which stated that the total foreign-born population in France in 2012 was already 7,538,000 or 11.9 percent of the generation population.⁵⁶ Of the INED reported foreign-born population, 44.1 percent came from Africa (2,523,946) and 14.6 percent came from Asia (835,195), together constituting 58.7 percent of the foreign-born population and around 5.3 percent of the total population of France. The top ten countries of the largest (over 70,000) non-European foreign-born population in France in 2013 are shown in table 10 below. Like figures shown in 1999, the three largest non-European foreign-born populations in France in 2013 were from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Table 10. Population of Top Ten Non-European Foreign-Born Populations, France 2013

Country of Origin	Population

Algeria	759,757
Morocco	709,001
Tunisia	258,597
Turkey	248,616
China	98,039
Senegal	88,848
Vietnam	74,910
Côte d'Ivoire	74,374
Cameroon	73,841
DR Congo	70,463
Total	2,456,446

Source: Data from INED, 'Immigrants by Sex, Age, and Country of Birth 2013.'

According to French conservative think-tank *Institut Montaigne*, in 2004 Whites amounted to 85 percent of the population of metropolitan areas in France, North Africans 10 percent, Blacks 3.5 percent, and Asians 1.5 percent.⁵⁷ By 2008 foreign-born immigrants and their descendants (this only includes the second generation) aged between 18 and 50 made up 30 percent of France's metropolitan areas. According to INSEE, in 2008 immigrants and their direct descendants amounted to 12 million or 20 percent of the total population of France⁵⁸ and over 1.5 million direct descendants were 30 years old or younger, meaning that they were, overall, younger than the general population.⁵⁹ In the Paris region alone, 37 percent of 18–20-year-olds were the descendants of immigrants.⁶⁰ Also according to INSEE, in 2010 the proportion of African-born immigrants residing in the metropolitan area amounted to 43.4 percent and the proportion of Asian-born immigrants residing in the same area amounted to 14.5 percent.⁶¹ According to *Eurostat* on 1 January 2015, the foreign-born population of France stood at 7,908,600 or 11.9 percent of the total population, which included the non-EU foreign-born population, which stood at 5,724,000 or 8.6 percent of the total population.⁶²

7.4 Sweden

Sweden has a landmass of 449,964 km² and a total population of 9,845,155 in 2015. The total fertility rate in Sweden for 2014 was 1.88 which is comparable to 2.17 in 1960 and means that Swedes have below replacement level fertility.⁶³ Persons aged between 0 and 15 in 1970 amounted to 20.8 percent of the population, but by 2013 they only amounted to 16.5 percent. Persons aged over 65 amounted to 13.67 percent of the population in 1970, but by 2013 increased to 19.91 percent.⁶⁴ This shows a negative correlation between the percentage of young and percentage of elderly in Sweden's total population over time. Sweden is aging *and* not producing enough children to replace its population.

Like Belgium, France, and the UK, population growth in Sweden comes from net migration.⁶⁵ Between 1998 and 2015 net migration in Sweden

amounted to 780,275 and has shown a steady increase from 10,873 in 1998 to an overall high in 2015 at 78,410, as shown in figure 6.




Figure 6. Net Migration 1998–2015, Sweden

Source: Data from Statistics Sweden, 'Preliminary Population Statistics, by month, 2016.'

In contrast to other European countries, labour recruitment in the postwar era for Sweden was for the most part intra-European and considered permanent, in that workers were considered future citizens and derived mainly from Finland and other Nordic countries, as well as from Yugoslavia and Greece. There were few immigrants from Africa and Asia who came as refugees.⁶⁶ It wasn't until the late 1960s and early 1970s that Sweden began to accept large influxes of non-Europeans as labourers (from Turkey and other countries) and refugees from other regions in Asia (Iran and Iraq) and Africa (Somalia and Ethiopia). Similar to other European countries responding to the oil crisis, however, Sweden ended unskilled labour immigration from non-Nordic countries in 1972.⁶⁷ Yet immigration continued from these non-Nordic countries in the form of family reunification and even more so in the form of asylum seekers from the Balkan and Middle East wars. In the late 1980s an overwhelming mass influx of Bulgarian Turks entered Sweden, causing crises. In response, PM Ingvar Carlsson, leader of the Social Democrat party, enforced the Lucia decision in December 1989, which effectively halted all asylum seekers aside from those who could be identified as refugees under the UN Refugee Convention. However, in 1991 the Christian Democrats were elected, and under PM Carl Bildt, the Lucia Decision was repealed, which coincided with the large inflows fleeing the Balkan war.⁶⁸

Most immigrants today (68.4%) continue to come to Sweden in the form

of refugees and under family reunification laws; they are not economic migrants who have secured a job in Sweden before arrival. Only 14.3 percent arrive in Sweden as labour market immigrants.⁶⁹ Table 11 shows the amount of valid residence permits that were granted in Sweden per year (2008–2015) by reason given; between 53.5 percent and 80.6 percent every year have been given for family related reasons.

Table 11. Types of Granted Residency Permits in Sweden, 2008–2015 (Numbers and Percentages of Total)

	Employment								Number
2008									1 914 300
2009									1 065 800
2010									1 067 300
2011									1 746 000
2012									1 357 000
2013									1 391 000
2014									2 000 000
2015									2 300 000

Source: Data from Eurostat, ‘All Valid Permits by Reason.’

In 1960 the number of foreign-born citizens was almost 300,000 or four percent of the total population. By 2014, this number had increased by 500 percent to 1,603,551 or 16.5 percent of the total population. In 2015 the non-EU foreign-born made up the majority of the total foreign-born population, accounting for 1,083,300 or 11.1 percent of the total population.⁷⁰ Table 12 below shows the size of the foreign national and foreign background populations of Sweden’s three largest cities in 2011.

Table 12. Size of Foreign Populations in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, 2011 (Numbers and Percent)

Stockholm									
Total Population									900 000
Foreign Background									230 000
Foreign-Born									600 000
Swedish-born with two foreign parents									100 000
Foreign Nationals									100 000
Total Foreign									100 000

Source: Data from Statistics Sweden, ‘Sveriges befolkning.’

In 2008, 55.9 percent of children in Malmö, 40.5 percent in Gothenburg, and 39.3 percent in Stockholm had a foreign background. Two years later these percentages had increased to 57.6, 42.0, and 40.1 respectively.⁷¹

Table 13 shows the 12 largest non-European foreign-born population groups in Sweden in 2011 by country of origin (this does not include their descendants who are born on Swedish soil, illegal immigrants, or those who previously held a foreign nationality but have since been naturalised) and the amount and percentage of under-30-year-olds by country.

Table 13. Population of Top Twelve Non-European Foreign-Born Populations and

Under 30 Years, Sweden 2011

Country	Age				Number			
								20629
Iraq								125,902
Iran								63,982
Turkey								44,041
Somalia								26,380
Thailand								11,980
Chile								28,385
China								24,980
Lebanon								23,980
Syria								22,880
India								18,980
Afghanistan								10,980
Ethiopia								14,980
Total								400,980

Source: Data from UNSD: 'Native and Foreign-born Population by Age, Sex and Urban/Rural Residence' and 'Foreign-born Population by Country/Area of Birth, Age, and Sex.'

As can be seen, in 2011 the largest non-European foreign-born population in Sweden was Iraqi at 125,902 persons, followed by Iranian at 63,982, and Turkish at 44,041. The percentage of those who were under the age of 30 was 36%, with Afghanistan (61%), Somalia (56%), China (54%), India (44%), and Iraq (43%) having the largest share of their population under 30 compared to all other foreign-born groups listed. Six out of the 12 foreign-born populations listed above had higher proportions of under-30-year-olds than the national percentage in Sweden, which stood at 35 percent in 2011.⁷²

In 2014, just over 43,500 foreign citizens were granted citizenship in Sweden with Iraqis (7,293) accounting for most of the naturalizations; 37 percent came from a country in Asia and about 16 percent came from a country in Africa.⁷³ In the same year, the amount of residents with a foreign background, which includes 'foreign-born and swedish-born with two foreign-born parents' and excludes those born in Nordic countries, amounted to 2,092,206 or 21.5 percent of the population, which is an increase of 803,959 persons since 2000.⁷⁴ According to public policy consultant, F. Leslie Seidle, Sweden now 'has a higher proportion of foreign born than most European countries'⁷⁵ and according to Statistics Sweden in 2014

one-fifth of the persons aged 25–64 were born abroad. This percentage is expected to increase to one-fourth in 2020, and close to one-third in 2030....[In 2060] it is expected that one-fourth of those who are age 80 and older will be foreign-born.⁷⁶

In 2015, the amount of residents with a foreign background (including Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents but excluding Nordics) had increased to 22.2 percent. This means that nearly one quarter of Sweden's population are already of foreign background. If trends continue, by 2030 foreigners in Sweden will make up over one-third of the Swedish population.⁷⁷

7.5 Germany

Germany has a landmass of 357,168 km² and had a total population of 81.5 million in 2015. The total fertility rate in Germany for 2013 was 1.41 which is comparable to 2.03 in 1970 and means that the Germans along with the Swedes, British, French, and Belgians have below replacement level fertility. Persons aged between 0 and 15 in 1970 amounted to 23.2 percent of the population, but by 2014 they only amounted to 13.1 percent. Persons aged over 65 amounted to 13.2 percent of the population in 1970, but by 2014 they amounted to 21.5 percent.⁷⁸ This shows a negative correlation between the percentage of young and elderly in German's total population over time. Germany is aging *and* not producing enough children to replace itself.

Like Belgium, the UK, Sweden, and France, population growth in Germany comes from net migration.⁷⁹ Foreign net migration between 2005 and 2014 for Germany totalled 2,178,924, and in this same time period net migration of nationals was -346,751, meaning more nationals departed than arrived in Germany, a phenomenon not witnessed for decades. In 2015, Germany received over two million foreigners while just under 860,000 foreigners emigrated, meaning that net migration of foreigners amounted to over 1.1 million, the highest amount in the history of Germany. In just two years (2014–2015) Germany received over 1.7 million foreigners. Net foreign migration has fluctuated since 1991 at rates between +596,392 (1992) and -33,455 (1998). Figure 7 shows net foreign migration between 1991 and 2015.




Figure 7. Foreign Net Migration 1991–2015, Germany

Source: Data from Destatis, 'Migration between Germany and foreign countries 1991 to 2015.'

As discussed in chapter 3, like most Western European countries in the post-war era, Germany initially recruited labourers from high unemployment countries in Europe, then turned to cheap foreign labour from outside of Europe in the 1960s. In 1961, Germany signed a bilateral labour recruitment treaty with Turkey, which introduced temporary work permits and the arrival of large numbers of Turks as ‘guest workers’. Germany also signed recruitment treaties with Morocco in 1963 and Tunisia in 1965.⁸⁰ These temporary foreign workers, instead of leaving after their set time of employment (at first two years, later extended in 1964), stayed and established diasporic communities in Germany.⁸¹ By the early 1970s, with rising unemployment, an economic recession, and rising migrant violence, Germany officially stopped foreign labour recruitment programs.⁸² But, just like other European countries, immigration continued in the form of family reunification, refugees, and so on, with the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers coming from Muslim-majority nations.⁸³

We [Germans] must make sure that in these times of globalization we don't suffer from a lack of cosmopolitanism...There's a huge amount of international competition for the best people, and Germany would be making a big mistake if it didn't take part.⁸⁴

Table 14. Types of Granted Residency Permits in Germany, 2008–2015 (Numbers and Percentages of Total)

2010										2,068,338
2011										1,900,890
2012										1,829,000
2013										1,690,000
2014										1,600,000
2015										1,538,000

Source: Data from Eurostat, 'All Valid Permits by Reason.'

According to UN Data, the total native population of Germany in 2011 was 67,234,125 and the total foreign-born population was 11,805,690 or 15 percent of the total population; over a quarter (3,308,608) came from Asia while 368,608 came from Africa, together constituting about 5.5 percent of the total population. Table 15 shows the 12 largest (over 55,000) non-European foreign-born population groups in Germany in 2011 by country of origin (this does not include their German-born descendants, illegal immigrants, or those who have since been naturalised) and the amount and percentage of under-30-year-olds by country.

Table 15. Population of Top Twelve Non-European Foreign-Born Populations and Under 30 Years, Germany 2011

Country	Age	Number
		26629
Turkey		1,348,340
Kazakhstan		828,802
Iran		112,561
Iraq		94,880
Morocco		93,630
Vietnam		91,996
China		90,900
Afghanistan		87,883
Kyrgyzstan		80,930
Lebanon		60,853
Thailand		61,880
India		50,900
Total		2,908,855

Source: Data from UNSD: 'Native and Foreign-born Population by Age, Sex and Urban/Rural Residence' and 'Foreign-born Population by Country/Area of Birth, Age, and Sex.'

As can be seen, the three largest non-European foreign-born groups in Germany in 2011 were from Turkey at 1,348,340 persons, Kazakhstan at 828,802, and Iran at 112,561. The percentage of those who are under the age of 30 is 23 percent, with Iraq (44%), China (41%), Afghanistan (39%), Kyrgyzstan (39%), Kazakhstan (34%), and India (33%) having the most share of their population under 30 compared to all other foreign-born groups listed. Half (six) of the foreign-born populations listed above had a higher proportion of under-30-year-olds compared to the national percentage in Germany, which stood at 30.1 percent in 2011.⁸⁷

In 2014 about 16.4 million people had a migrant background in Germany, constituting 20.3 percent of the total population and representing an increase of three percent since 2013.⁸⁸ About two-thirds were foreign-born and a third are second and third generations.⁸⁹ According to *Destatis*, the total population of foreign citizens was 8.2 million in 2014, the highest number ever recorded, and showed an increase of 6.8 percent or 519,300 from 2013; this number does not include naturalised citizens who are counted as Germans (between 2004 and 2014 over 100,000 naturalisations occurred on average per year).⁹⁰ On 1 January 2015, the total foreign-born population was 10,220,400 or 12.6 percent of the total population, with the non-EU foreign-born population standing at 6,210,100 or 7.6 percent of the total population.⁹¹

7.6 Summary

The size of foreign-born populations, not including naturalisations, illegal immigrants, or descendants, in 2011 as a percentage of the national population were: 15 percent for Belgium, 13 percent for the UK, 15 percent

for Sweden, and 15 percent for Germany. For France, the total foreign-born population was 10 percent in 1999 and between nine and 11.9 percent in 2012/2013. Between these five countries, there were 10 main non-European countries of origin that provided the bulk (7,119,367 out of 9,616,735) of the foreign-born population in 2011 (again, this does not include naturalizations, illegal immigrants, or descendants). This information is outlined in table 16 with data for France from 2013.

Table 16. Top Ten Foreign-born Populations in Five EU Countries, 2011/2013

Turkey	1,831,912
Morocco	991,742
Kazakhstan	828,802
India	814,171
Algeria	784,012
China	527,095
Pakistan	513,142
Iraq	296,556
Tunisia	270,657
Iran	261,278

The total African and Asian foreign-born populations in 2011 for three of the five countries (Belgium, United Kingdom, and Germany) amounted to 8,590,057. If we included conservative estimates for Sweden (1.2 million) and France (4 million) then the total foreign-born population from Africa and Asia in 2011 for all five of the countries would be 13,790,057 or between five and seven percent of the national populations. In regards to the total EU-28 population in 2011, which stood at nearly 505 million, the African and Asian populations in these five countries alone accounted for almost three percent of the total EU population. One would assume that such figures have increased significantly since 2011 from continued large-scale immigration, high birth rates of immigrants, as well as the large influx of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers in 2015/2016, most of whom are from Muslim countries in Asia and Africa.⁹² In addition, if one estimated the foreign-born descendants beyond the second generation and added this to official non-native population figures, then the non-European populations could constitute as much as 20 to 30 percent of the total national populations already.

All five countries profiled experienced population growth from net migration and all but France have seen a steady increase in net migration since the 1990s. France showed a relatively stable net migration rate since 2006, possibly due to immigrant labour mobility within the EU. Net-migration is also decidedly non-European. In 2015, the foreign-born populations of the five countries were between 12.6 and 16.4 percent of the total national populations, with non-EU foreign-borns accounting for the majority, standing between 7.6 and 16.1 percent of the national populations. In addition, all five countries have very low fertility levels and all are aging. Only 19 of the 51 top non-European foreign-born populations in four of the

countries profiled (not including France) had a higher proportion of under-30-year-olds compared to the national population in 2011, which challenges the idea that immigration is necessary to off-set ageism and increase labour force numbers. This correlates with the reasons given for immigration, which, for four of the countries profiled (not the UK) and the EU-28 as a whole, has overwhelmingly been for family and not economic reasons, as shown in table 17.

Table 17. Average Percentage of Residential Permits Given by Reason in Five EU Countries, 2010–2015

	Employment	Family	Other
Belgium		59.0%	
UK		46.9%	
France		43.9%	
Sweden		79.9%	
Germany		51.6%	
EU-28		38.3%	

As shown in table 18, the majority of the top countries of origin for non-European foreign-born populations in Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and Germany, are Muslim-majority countries. What is significant is that Muslim populations in Europe have a higher fertility rate than native populations.⁹³ This means that the Muslim populations are increasing quite rapidly in comparison to the national populations, a trend that is found throughout all Western European countries. Islam is also the fastest growing religion in Europe.⁹⁴ Such population growth and the spread of Islam has enormous bearing on the identity and security of European nation-states and the EU, issues that are fully explored in the following chapters.

Table 18. Muslim Majority Countries out of the Thirty-Six Top Countries of Origin

Muslim Majority	1,831,912	Turkey
Muslim Majority	991,742	Morocco
Muslim Majority	828,802	Kazakhstan
14.2% Muslim	814,171	India
Muslim Majority	784,012	Algeria
Chinese Religion/Communist	527,095	China
Muslim Majority	513,142	Pakistan
Muslim Majority	296,556	Iraq
Muslim Majority	270,657	Tunisia
Muslim Majority	261,278	Iran
Muslim Majority	240,091	Bangladesh
50% Muslim	201,184	Nigeria
Mixed/Socialist	167,304	Vietnam
Muslim Majority	162,803	Afghanistan
Christian Majority	160,776	Jamaica
10–12% Muslim	151,754	DR Congo
Muslim Majority	143,699	Somalia
10% Muslim	140,536	Kenya
11% Muslim	129,836	Philippines
10% Muslims	129,076	Sri Lanka
Christian Majority	123,671	Zimbabwe
18% Muslim	95,666	Ghana

6% Muslim	95,564	Thailand
Muslim Majority	89,565	Lebanon
Muslim Majority	88,848	Senegal
20.9% Muslim	85,915	Cameroon
40% Muslim	74,374	Côte d'Ivoire
Muslim Majority	69,939	Malaysia
Muslim Majority	68,274	Kyrgyzstan
Christian Majority	28,172	Chile
Muslim Majority	22,367	Syria
34% Muslim	14,466	Ethiopia
4.8% Muslim	13,488	Rwanda

Sources: Data from *Wikipedia*: s.v. 'Islam by Country,' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_by_country; s.v. 'Democratic Republic of Congo,' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo; s.v. 'Vietnam,' <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam>; and s.v. 'China,' <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China> (all retrieved June 2016).

8. Islam and Islamism

Islam was founded by Mohammed, a political and military leader, in the seventh century in what is now known as Saudi Arabia. Mohammed preached his religious message for 21 years before he died in 632AD, but within this timeframe he had conquered the entire Arabian Peninsula. After his death Muslims expanded from Saudi Arabia and by 710 had conquered and dominated all of North Africa, as well as Syria, Egypt, Persia, Iraq, and Armenia. In 711 they conquered Spain and by 721 they dominated almost all of the Iberian Peninsula. By 732 Islam had conquered Palestine and also spread into France, being stopped at Tours, near Paris, in the Battle of Poitiers. In just over a century Islam had come to dominate the Middle East, North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), and parts of France. By the eighth century Islam had established a caliphate in Baghdad and by the tenth century secondary caliphates had been developed in Cairo and Cordoba.⁹⁵

In the 15th century the Ottoman Turks conquered Byzantium, the Balkans, and in 1453 had captured Constantinople and converted the Hagia Sophia (which had been built as a symbol of eastern Christianity) into a mosque. In 1492 the Reconquista expelled the Moors from Spain and the Iberian Peninsula was re-conquered by the Christians. In 1529 Muslims attacked Europe a second time; the Ottoman Turks advanced into Austria and attempted to capture Vienna, but failed. In 1571 they engaged in a fierce naval battle with the Hapsburgs of Spain in the Mediterranean, the Battle of Lepanto, which they lost. More than 100 years later (1683), they attempted to take Vienna a second time but again failed, being stopped at the ‘gates’ of Vienna (the Battle of Vienna), which ended the Ottoman expansion into Europe. At this time Western civilization rose to military supremacy and global dominance, essentially undermining Muslim imperialism and depoliticising Islam. By the early 20th century almost the entire Middle East was subjected to Western control and the Ottoman Empire had been dismantled; in 1920 only four Muslim countries — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan — remained independent.⁹⁶

8.1 Re-Politicisation of Islam

Over the last century, the re-politicisation of Islam has gained ground by the spread of the political philosophy, doctrines, and groups founded and inspired by Islamists. A key figure is Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB or Ikhwan-movement) in 1928. Al-Banna sought to reconstruct an Islamic society governed by Sharia law in Egypt and expand Islam to the world.⁹⁷ He declared that ‘[I]t is our duty to

establish sovereignty over the world and to guide all of humanity to the sound precepts of Islam and to its teachings, without which mankind cannot attain happiness.’⁹⁸ He was highly critical of the West, its colonialism, materialism, decadence, secularism, and Westernisation and was foundational to jihad totalitarianism. He declared that

jihad is a communal obligation imposed upon the Islamic *umma* in order to broadcast the summons [to embrace Islam], and that it is an individual obligation to repulse the attack of unbelievers upon it. Today the Muslims, as you know, are compelled to humble themselves before non-Muslims, and are ruled by unbelievers....Hence it has become an individual obligation, which there is no evading, on every Muslim to prepare his equipment, to make up his mind to engage in *jihad*, and to get ready for it until the time is ripe.⁹⁹

Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 for plotting a coup against the westernised Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi Pasha. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) replaced al-Banna as the main leader of the MB. He advocated freedom from Western dictatorship via jihad, which involved the abolishment of the *Jahili* (ignorance of divine law) secular system within the Islamic world that had been endorsed by westernised Muslim leaders. He said, ‘Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of the Jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its Jahili characteristics, is not worthy to be compromised with.’¹⁰⁰ Qutb himself was executed in 1966 for plotting to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood found strong footholds in the Islamic world from the mid-20th century and is today composed of Sunni Muslims that seek a fundamentalist and political revival of Islam, otherwise known as Islamism.¹⁰¹ According to the Netherlands General Security Service, radical Islam is ‘the politico-religious pursuit of establishing — if necessary by extreme means — a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.’¹⁰² Along with the MB, other Sunni Islamist movements (such as the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami,¹⁰³ Wahhabi-Salafism of Saudi Arabia,¹⁰⁴ and the South Asian Tablighi Jamaat¹⁰⁵) helped spread political Islam back into the Muslim popular mainstream.

Over the past 50 years both Shia and Sunni Muslim-majority nations (most notably Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Egypt) have undergone radical transformations in their national identity and systems of governance with the rejection of secularism and westernisation and the establishment of a political-religious Islamic regime. For example, the Islamic (Shia) revolution of Iran led to the Supreme leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and a fundamentalist Islamic Regime defended by what is known as ‘Iran’s Hezbollah’ (the Sepah Pasdaran or Islamic Revolutionary Guard that helped Lebanese Shia to establish Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based militant-military organisation)¹⁰⁶; the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a Sunni Muslim

Islamist group influenced by Osama bin Laden (al Qaeda); the Sunni Islamic Regime of Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq and Jamaat-e-Islami (founded in British India by India-Pakistani Abul A’la Maududi); and the ascendancy of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Today there is ISIS/ISIL or *Daesh* in Iraq and Syria (and Libya), which has become adept at using social media, online propaganda, and other forms of ICTs to recruit and disseminate their message. According to a book review written by Malise Ruthven of *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate* (2015) by the editor-in-chief of *Rai al-Youm* (an Arab world digital news website) Abdel Bari Atwan, ISIS has its ‘beginnings in the branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq dominated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,’ who was killed in 2006; his successors ‘joined with other Sunni groups to form the umbrella Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the nucleus of ISIS.’¹⁰⁷ ISIS is led by Iraqi-born Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and has two main goals as outlined in table 19.

Table 19. The Goals and Objectives of ISIS

Primary Goal	National Caliphate	
Objective	Global Allegiance to Promote Establishment of Global Caliphate	
Objective	Caliphate of Infidels and Apostates	
Secondary Goal	Committed by Western States ¹⁰⁸	
Objective	Terrorist Attacks in Western States	
Objective	U.S.A.	

Source: Information adapted from Leggiero, ‘Countering ISIS Recruitment in Western Nations.’

ISIS has formal military allies in at least 11 countries according to the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), and they have support, allegiance, and affiliations from up to 60 jihadist groups spanning 30 countries.¹⁰⁹ ISIS seeks to create an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant (hence ISIL), but ultimately aims to expand this into Europe and elsewhere:



Map 1. Proposed ISIS Caliphate Region, 2014

The various Islamist-Jihadist terrorist¹¹⁰ movements that are currently operating in the Muslim world have re-sacralised and de-westernised Islamic politics and globalized jihad. They have expressed political violence within the Islamic world directed at the West, such as violent riots targeting American embassies, flag burning, hostage taking, executions and other killings, destruction of non-Islamic ancient cultural monuments and churches, and so on.¹¹¹ As most are aware, Islamist-jihadist ideology is not confined to a single country and is not restricted to changing just the Islamic world; it seeks to change the whole world, especially the West. Qutb advocated the notion of 'jihad as a permanent Islamic world revolution...in pursuit of establishing global *Hakimiyyat Allah*' (God's rule).¹¹² His ideas are not new to Islam; traditional Islam is based on waging war against non-believers and spreading Islam to the whole world. The late scholar of Islamic governance and Law professor Emile Tyan wrote that

[O]ne of the basic principles of Islam is that it must be extended to the whole world by conversion or at the least by submission to Islamic authority. The caliph has an obligation to promote and fulfill this universalism, if necessary by the force of arms. This is the meaning of holy war or jihad.¹¹³

Taken directly from the Quran itself, one can read that traditional Islam perceives nonbelievers or those who do not embrace Islam as 'infidels', who are essentially sinners or 'friends of Satan' that 'fight for the devil', and are therefore the 'inveterate foe' of Muslims. As such, Muslims cannot make friends with nonbelievers, including Jews and Christians: 'Let not believers make friends with infidels in preference to the faithful' and 'Believers, take neither the Jews nor the Christians for your friends'. In fact, it is imperative, a duty, for Muslims to fight a holy war or jihad against the infidels: 'Fighting is obligatory for you, much as you dislike it' because 'If you do not go to war, He will punish you sternly, and will replace you by other men' for it is 'The true believers [that] fight for the cause of God', which includes 'mak[ing] war on the infidels who dwell around you'. Mohammed himself was ordered by God to commit jihad against infidels: 'Prophet, make war on the unbelievers and the hypocrites and deal rigorously with them. Hell shall be their home: an evil fate'. The 'cause of God' for Muslims is the establishment of the religion of Islam, Islamic rule, over the whole world (Caliphate) through jihad: 'Make war on them [infidels] until their idolatry shall cease and God's religion shall reign supreme.'¹¹⁴ Such traditional Islam is at the heart of violent Islamist terror groups today.

8.2 Islamism: Counter-Hegemonic Global Ideology

The current form of Islamist-jihadism is not merely a defensive reaction against previous western colonialism or the current War on Terror, but is an

emergent or revivalist Muslim identity that began in the early 1920s involving the re-politicisation of Islam.¹¹⁵ Such Islamism takes the form of a counter-hegemonic global ideology that is opposed to the culturally modern Westphalian, neoconservative and neo-liberal global world order. It transcends national boundaries and mobilises and unites thousands of Muslim militants, insurgents, and resistance forces across the globe in solidarity as a Pan-Islamic counter-hegemonic movement against the West.¹¹⁶ According to Thomas Butko, terrorism and security expert and Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, terrorism can be defined as ‘counter-hegemonic political violence.’¹¹⁷ This type of violence is not conventional warfare, which is based on ‘organised state armies’ and governed by a set of international laws, rather, it is a ‘new pattern of warfare’ — ‘an irregular war’ committed by non-state actors following ‘laws’ that violate the international system.¹¹⁸ It is in these ways that the Islamist political ideology — and their irregular war-waging strategies that target Western civilization, citizens, and Western-influenced governments in the world in an effort to subvert Western hegemony — can be understood as terrorism, i.e., counter-hegemonic political violence. What this means is that there is an ideologically-driven global conflict occurring between two global hegemonies and their *Weltanschauungen* — between the worldviews and globalization strategies of the West and of Islam — that has led to conventional and irregular strategies of physical and psychological warfare.

In Gramscian terms, Islamists are in a ‘war of position’ *and* a ‘war of movement’. According to Richard Howson, associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Wollongong in Australia, the ‘war of position’ is rooted in hegemonic principles of a subordinated or marginalised/subaltern group that is ‘struggl[ing] for emancipation from [an] invading force.’¹¹⁹ This position

enables the opposition forces to break down the dominating group’s socio-cultural influence and, simultaneously, works to disperse their military strength, giving the opposition the spatial and temporal conditions to develop a collective consciousness and a determined will to construct and employ their own strikeforce,

what is called a ‘war of movement’.¹²⁰ According to Butko, the ability of an ideology ‘to cement and unify’ the ‘entire social bloc’ in ‘confrontation with the dominant hegemonic group’ is ‘the most important measure of a successful revolutionary ideology.’¹²¹ Although militant Islamists make up a relatively small group of the global Muslim population, Islamism is actually a ‘highly efficient movement based on the complex social networks of a transnational religion.’¹²² It is a transnational movement based on transnational networks spanning the globe. In this case, Islamists, considered as a dominated and thus marginalised subaltern alliance group, are in a ‘war of position’ as a counter-hegemonic ideological force that aims to free the ‘Islamic world’ and the rest of the globe of hegemonic Western influences by

mobilising as a 'war of movement', the physical manifestation of the ideological, i.e., violent global jihad directed against the power structures of the West.

Bassam Tibi, a liberal Muslim scholar and Professor emeritus of International Relations at the University of Göttingen in Germany, considers Islamist jihadism 'a declaration of war on the existing world order.'¹²³ This global jihadism is expressed by the brutal political violence and terrorism of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Salafi-Jihadi-Wahhabi global networks,¹²⁴ whose calls for global jihad are based in the 'intellectual and political' ideology of al-Banna and Qutb.¹²⁵ The revelation of overt Islamic counter-hegemony against the West occurred in militaristic form with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and then the second attack by al-Qaeda in 2011 on Washington and the Twin Towers in New York (9/11). Then there were the Islamist bombing attacks in France in 1995, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 (M-11), in London in 2005 (7/7), in Boston in 2013, in Paris and Saint-Denis in France in January and November 2015, in Brussels in March 2016, and numerous other attacks (mass shootings, beheadings, stabbings, assassinations, etc.) and thwarted attacks on British, European, and Western soil. Such bloody events, as well as the ongoing efforts to dismantle terrorist cells throughout Europe (since at least the 1990s) and the implementation of widespread programs to de-radicalise neighbourhoods, schools, prisons, and mosques, have revealed the magnitude and influence of jihadist ideology and the breadth of radical Muslim networks in the West.

8.3 Three Types of Islamists and Three Types of Activities

Apart from the Islamist terrorist attacks on Western soils, the Islamist 'war of position' (ideological) and 'war of movement' (physical) has played out in other pervasive and influential ways. A central tactic of Islamists to create a global caliphate involves stealth or non-violent forms of jihad rooted in political Islam (*Islam-ism*) and includes various strategies: Islamic expansionism through migration or the demographic colonisation of non-Islamic lands (increasing the number of Muslims through conversion, high birth-rates, high immigration rate, high family reunification, high illegal immigration, and marriage migration); *da'wa* or the proselytising of Islam (and conversion) in non-Islamic lands; separatism or remaining distinct or separate in non-Islamic societies by clear disassociation from disbelievers (not assimilating or integrating) through the use of minority rights, i.e., multiculturalism; development of transnational Muslim networks; overseas funding and support from conservative Muslim countries for the establishment of Islamic institutions such as madrassas, mosques, and political organizations in non-Muslim countries; use of demographics and

democracy as strategies for power tipping and power transition (see chapter 15.2); entry into the educational, political, and social institutions of non-Islamic countries with the aim of the eventual establishment of an Islamic political order (government, political and social institutions, and legal system) based on Sharia law; claims of Islamophobia resulting in suppression of indigenes' criticism of Islamisation; and agitation and social instability (can be seen as soft jihad) that includes riots, arson, other petty crimes, and high welfare dependency.¹²⁶

Security analyst and senior fellow at the US think tank International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC), Alex Alexiev argues in his policy research paper 'Wages of Extremism' (2011) that Islamist networks invest in three main types of activity: 1) proselytism (*da'wa*) and indoctrination (*tarbiyah*); 2) radicalisation; and 3) infiltration.¹²⁷ He describes *da'wa* as 'the Muslim obligation to work for the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam and also to encourage Muslims to greater piousness and orthodoxy in practicing their faith' and explains that such 'proselytism is a weapon as powerful as jihad in the arsenal of the Islamic movement'. *Tarbiyah* is taken to mean the 'inculcating' and 'imparting' of a specific value system by 'upbringing'. Used by the Wahhabi-Salafi Brotherhood, *tarbiyah* 'serves' as 'an instrument for ideological indoctrination'. Islamists reject the Western value system (popular sovereignty, democracy, freedom of religion, secularism, rule of law), relying instead on *tarbiyah*, which represents 'the indoctrination of individuals in the proper Islamist value system'. In addition to proselytism and indoctrination Islamists also attempt to radicalise¹²⁸ moderate Muslims and infiltrate 'non-Muslim societies and their political and social institutions' with the aim of Islamizing them.¹²⁹

These three types of activity are closely associated with what Lorenzo Vidino, Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University and a security expert who specialises in Islamism and political violence in Europe and North America, identifies as three types of Islamists in Europe: 'violent rejectionists, non-violent rejectionists and participationists'. The first category, violent rejectionists, are the jihadists, the 'individuals and networks that, often linked to or inspired by al Qaeda, reject participation in the democratic system and use violence to advance their goals'. They appeared on the European scene in the 1980s and early 1990s in the form of 'Afghan Arabs' who had been involved in the Afghanistan-Soviet war, and others who had been accepted and settled in Europe as refugees, escaping persecution from their governments in the MENA region for their extreme political views. They focused on supporting radical Islamist groups in their home countries through 'propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment' and set up various Muslim organizations in Europe.¹³⁰ At this time global jihad was being preached by leading Islamists in the Muslim world and began to be proselytised in various radical mosques throughout Europe.¹³¹

for a counter-hegemonic force to be successful there must be present a small ‘inner circle’ of individuals who are willing to lead the movement in all facets of its ideological teachings, organisational structure, and strategic planning.¹³²

These individuals form ‘the vanguard’, the counter-elite, the Islamic imams, muftis, ayatollahs, and mullahs¹³³ whose Islamist views of ‘jihad against the West’ are disseminated to the Muslim diaspora in Europe and the West through various channels such as mosques, neighbourhoods, schools, prisons, social media, the internet, and satellite television.¹³⁴ According to Political Science professor at Duke University, Alex Schulman, ‘radical and anti-Western imams’ who are ‘openly imperialistic and antagonistic’ were given political asylum in Europe and granted citizenship within European nations.¹³⁵ These Muslims were central to the development of mosques and schools over the last few decades in Europe, developments that were and continue to be ‘Saudi-financed and Wahhabist-oriented’.¹³⁶ These schools and mosques are, according to Tibi, ‘safe havens [...] for Jihadism in the West itself.’¹³⁷ Tibi argues that Islamists were granted citizenship and civil rights and this allowed them ‘to turn Europe into the battlefield of Islamism’; they have established themselves as imams, ‘holy’ leaders, counter-elites, and Islamist activists and are preaching and teaching the Islamist counter-hegemonic ideology in mosques and Islamic schools across European lands.¹³⁸ Such Islamist figures include Omar Bakri Muhammad, Khalil El-Moumi, Mohammed Fizazi, Shahid Mehdi, Abu Qatada, Mohammad al-Massari, Saad al-Faqih, and many others.

After being banned from most of the Muslim world for his radical views, Syrian Islamist Omar Bakri was granted asylum in Great Britain in the 1980s. Along with the infamous British-born Pakistani hate-preacher, Anjem Choudary, he proceeded to set up a ‘radical splinter group of the already radical Hizb ut-Tahrir’ (Liberation Party, HT) — the Salafi-Wahhabi organization *al-Muhajiroun* (the Emigrants), which was banned as a terrorist organization in 2010. He then became involved with the ‘Islamist circles radiating around the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque’¹³⁹ and revealed his support for the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and Sharia law. He has openly incited Muslims to kill Jews, supported the terrorist attacks on Western embassies and the bombings of London and Madrid by al-Qaeda, and advocated the Beslan schoolhouse massacre as ‘the type of attack’ that would be ‘legitimate for British Muslims to carry out.’¹⁴⁰ Bakri and other Islamists who are preaching hatred of the West in some mosques, Islamic schools, and other Islamist-based organisations in Europe are effectively influencing the European Muslim diaspora, facilitating their further separatism from the European community.¹⁴¹

After the onset of the Afghanistan war in 2001, jihadist networks in Europe have continued to be part of the global jihadist movement but have

begun to focus on their ‘immediate environment’: Europe. Many violent rejectionists are made up of the children of first-generation Muslim immigrants (1950–70s) in Europe, and they seek to inflict change on the non-Islamic constitutions of European nations as well as influence European foreign policy directed at various Muslim countries, particularly military intervention policies. They range from small ‘homegrown groups’, which are constituted by ‘mostly European-born radicals’ who ‘act with absolute operational independence’, to ‘compartmentalized cells’, which are ‘contained in a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchical structure.’¹⁴² For the last several years some of these European-born Muslims have gone overseas to join militant Islamic groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, to fight alongside them, receive training, and return to Europe to recruit, enlarge, and commit terrorism in the name of Islam. According to a report by various specialists and analysts in European affairs, many known terrorist groups active in Europe ‘use Europe as a fundraising and logistics base, and seek to recruit Europeans for terrorist activities elsewhere in the world’; these groups include al-Qaeda and offshoots, Islamic Jihad Union, Hamas, Hezbollah, Ansar al-Islam, al Shabaab, [and now ISIS].¹⁴³ In April 2015, EU Justice Commissioner Vera Jouriva stated that ‘At the European level, we estimate that 5,000–6,000 individuals have left for Syria’, but this estimate was quite conservative.¹⁴⁴

Like the jihadists or violent rejectionists, the second category that Vidino identifies, non-violent rejectionists, utterly reject ‘Western values’ and aim to establish a global Islamic state.¹⁴⁵ These non-violent rejectionists have formed movements and organizations throughout Europe based on Salafist and Wahhabist ideology, both of which rest on a traditional interpretation of Islam through the Quran, hadith, and Sunnah. They have formed ‘groups and networks that openly express their opposition to any system of government that does not strictly conform to *shari’a* (Islamic law),’ but this opposition is presented peacefully. Many of these Islamists are either born in Europe and travel to conservative Islamic countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to attend Islamic universities and then return to spread their Salafism, or are religious teachers from these countries who have travelled to Europe to spread their Islamist message.¹⁴⁶

Like the violent rejectionists, non-violent rejectionists use the media in its various forms — websites, publications, leaflets, mainstream mosques, YouTube videos, conferences, and other forms of media and information communication technologies (ICTs) — to spread and radicalise Muslims with their Islamist message of salvation. One such movement is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which was established in East Jerusalem in the 1950s and has since become a global movement. The central view of HT is that

all the solutions to man’s political, economic, cultural, and social problems are to be found in Islam, and the only way for humanity to achieve justice is to abandon any man-made system (including democracy) and establish a Caliphate encompassing not

They think that 'Islam is under attack,' that 'Muslims have a duty to defend their fellow Muslims worldwide,' and that in order to defend Islam, Muslims 'must establish the Caliphate.' Shiraz Maher, a former HT regional director in England, said that 'Hizb ut-Tahrir despises democracy and believes *shari'a* law must be imposed over the whole world, by force if necessary' and Maajid Nawaz, a former senior HT member, said that HT are prepared 'to fight other countries and to kill people in the pursuit of unifying this state into one state.'¹⁴⁸

By propagandizing its message through 'websites and publications...leaflets...and conferences' HT has actively attracted 'thousands of sympathizers' from both 'the disaffected masses of unassimilated European Muslims' and the 'highly educated young [Muslim] professionals' throughout Europe.¹⁴⁹ Such non-violent rejectionist groups, which are highly political in nature, are seen by some, such as Turkish-American scholar Zeyno Baran, as having a direct link to terrorism, in that they act like a 'conveyor belt.'¹⁵⁰ For example, HT was involved in the creation of the now defunct London-based group al-Muhajiroun, which in turn created a network of Islamist groups that have 'provocative initiatives and [the] ability to manipulate the media', particularly Sharia4Belgium and other similarly named groups in European nations, which have been since shut-down and their members prosecuted as jihadists.¹⁵¹

The third Islamist group that Vidino identifies, the participationists, are 'the numerically most significant component of political Islam in Europe'. They are so-called moderates, but are in fact radical-izers that have adopted a 'clever and flexible' tactic: 'engagement with the European establishment.'¹⁵² These particular Islamist groups in Europe are extensions of various Islamist groups outside of Europe, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), Jamaat-e Islami (South Asia), and Millî Görüş (Turkey),¹⁵³ and were mostly set up as student organizations in the late 1960s and 1970s by early Muslim refugees. Various Muslim organizations in Europe with such ties to Islamism have been termed the 'European Brotherhood' and include the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), the Islamic Society of Germany (IGD), and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). Despite their seemingly 'integrative', 'moderate', and 'participationist' approach, these Islamist organizations have a fundamentalist agenda and are practicing *taqiyya*, or deception, which is encouraged 'as a strategy of religious conquest'. They are, according to Vidino, 'engaged in a slow but steady social engineering program, aimed at Islamizing European Muslim populations and ultimately at competing with European governments for their allegiance.'¹⁵⁴ These Islamists are 'modern-day Trojan horses, engaged in a sort of stealth subversion aimed at weakening European societies from within' to initiate societal transformation and create the socio-political conditions to eventually replace European order

with Islamism.¹⁵⁵ Such stealthy subversion through infiltration has become ever more evident with documents such as *Operation Trojan Horse*, which aimed at the Islamization of British schools,¹⁵⁶ and the infiltration of political parties by Islamists.¹⁵⁷

Alexiev makes the case that such strategies of infiltration by Islamists in Europe are best represented by a Muslim Brotherhood (MB) manifesto called ‘The Project’ (1982),¹⁵⁸ which was written by Sa’id Ramadan,¹⁵⁹ son-in-law of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. This ‘Project’ aims to Islamize ‘non-Muslim societies and their political and social institutions’ through peaceful infiltration. Citing ‘The Project’, Alexiev states that it was a strategic program that envisioned:

‘Progressive efforts targeted at controlling the local centers of power through institutional action’ and ‘placing them in the service of Islam’. Engaging in ‘temporary cooperation’ between the Islamic movement and other political movements that espouse causes conducive to Islamic objectives. Avoiding ‘confrontation with adversaries at the local or the global level’. ‘Working within various influential institutions and using them in the service of Islam’. Encouraging Muslims ‘to take part in parliament, municipal councils, labor unions and other institutions of which the membership is chosen by the people in the interest of Islam and of Muslims’.¹⁶⁰

The European Brotherhood describes Europe as the ‘land of preaching’ (*dar al dawa*) rather than a land of war or land of Islam,¹⁶¹ hence its emphasis on peaceful infiltration. Leading MB ideologue, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, advocated the radical but peaceful proliferation of Islam in Europe through *da’wa* and *tarbiyah* in his 1990 book *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*. He pushed for the establishment of ‘a web of Islamic centers, think tanks, magazines, mosques, and conferences so that the Islamist movements can spread its politicized version of Islam among Western Muslims.’¹⁶² This was already happening due to the Euro-Arab Dialogue in the 1970s, with its political views on Israel and Palestine and its pressure for Europe to accept Arab manpower, spread and advocate Islam in European nations, and provide political rights to Arab labourers (see chapter 3.2). Qaradawi thought that the Brotherhood could groom (indoctrinate and radicalise) the minds of Muslim immigrants by taking on ‘the role of the missing leadership of the Muslim Nation with all its trends and groups.’¹⁶³ Islamists like Qaradawi essentially thought integration into a secular, atheistic, rule-of-law society, such as liberal-democratic European nations based on Western human rights, to be akin to apostasy,¹⁶⁴ in that Islamists are not secular, liberal democratic, or atheistic, and do not abide by universal human rights, but rather rights based on Sharia Law. He thus appealed to Muslim immigrants to ‘Try to have your own small society within the larger society...your own Muslim ghetto’, hence the emergence of Muslim enclaves in Europe.¹⁶⁵

Although many Muslims coming to the West may not intend to subvert their new places of residence and alter them to make them theocratic like their homelands, many are, however, influenced by the views of radical

Islamic scholars, imams, and leaders. Sometimes they are radicalised by Islamists who have become the ‘*de facto* representatives of the Muslim community’ and promote a strict, theocratic, traditional Islamic teaching.¹⁶⁶ As stated by Vidino, Alexiev, and others, Islamists such as Qaradawi strive to become ‘partners of European governments and elites’ to then gain ‘financial and political capital’, which in turn ‘would allow them to significantly expand their reach and influence inside the community’ and grant them power to administer ‘all aspects of Muslim life’ in European nations involving education, institutions, and social life. And, by ‘[h]ighlighting common values’, they can encourage ‘Muslims to simultaneously participate in society and spread their Islamic principles.’¹⁶⁷ In other words, Islamists encourage Muslims in Europe to remain distinct yet become politically and socially engaged, press for the Islamist point of view, and alter the existing non-Islamic European system with the Islamic way of life, including Sharia Law.

8.4 Demographic Conquest and Islamisation of Europe

Jihad today is often in terms of migration (associated with *hijrah*) or the spreading of Islam to where it is not, i.e. non-Muslim societies (the land of the *Kufr*). Filip Dewinter, a notable Flemish politician (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, has argued that by 2100 Europe will be an Islamic continent. He has said that

mass-immigration and multiculturalism have become the Trojan horse of Islamisation. Millions of Muslims and their families come to live in Europe and multiculturalism encourages Islam and under the guise of freedom of religion put it on equal terms with European religions. Europe will be colonised by Islam.¹⁶⁸

In March 2015, Aldo Carcaci, Belgian MP for the Belgian People’s Party, stated that ‘It’s an invasion, it’s a Trojan horse...It is for us, we are in the end of civilisation. Because if we continue to accept the Muslim immigration, for us, it’s a big problem.’¹⁶⁹ Leading Islamists themselves have stated explicitly their aim of eventually dominating Europe through demographic colonization and Islamisation — using immigration as a Trojan horse method. As far back as 1974, Algerian President Houari Boumedienne addressed the assembly of the UN and said that

One day millions of men will leave the southern hemisphere to go to the northern hemisphere and they will not go there as friends. Because they will go there to conquer it. And they will conquer it with their sons. The wombs of our women will give us victory.¹⁷⁰

In 2006, former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi stated on Arabic T.V.

that

We have fifty million Muslims in Europe. There are signs that Allah will grant Islam victory in Europe without swords, without guns, without conquests. The fifty million Muslims in Europe will turn it into a Muslim continent within a few decades

and in 2010 he speculated that ‘Islam will become the religion of the whole of Europe’.¹⁷¹ Abu Imran a.k.a Fouad Belkacem, an Islamic leader of Sharia4Belgium, stated on 15 June 2010, that

We won’t rest until Europe has become an Islamic state and then we will march on towards the white house and the Vatican, we will carry out the promise of our dear prophet in the peaceful way, and we will continue until the lord grants us victory.¹⁷²

Imam Abu Baseer, a leading supporter of al-Qaeda, stated that

One of the goals of immigration is the revival of the duty of Jihad and enforcement of power over the infidels. Immigration and Jihad go together. One is the consequence of the other and dependent upon it.¹⁷³

Omar Bakri said ‘It is our duty to establish an Islamic State in every part of the world, even in Great Britain’ and in 2015, in the context of the migrant crisis, Sheikh Muhammad Ayed from al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem urged Muslim asylum seekers to ‘give [Europeans] fertility. We will breed children with them, because we shall conquer their countries.’¹⁷⁴

The British Channel 4 documentaries *Undercover Mosque Dispatches* reveal that demographic-jihad aims of Islamisation are indeed being taught in mosques throughout the UK and also by the leaders of the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE).¹⁷⁵ Even British Labour politicians are promoting the Islamisation of London, such as Ken Livingstone, who said in 2012 while speaking at Finsbury Park Mosque,

I want to spend the next four years making sure that every non-Muslim in London knows and understands [Mohammed’s] words and message. That will help to cement our city as a beacon that demonstrates the meaning of the words of the Prophet.¹⁷⁶

Then, in 2013, the prime minister of Britain, David Cameron, pronounced his aspiration for making London the world capital of Islamic finance.¹⁷⁷

In mid-February 2015, Charles Winter, a senior researcher at the Quilliam Foundation, wrote that ISIS was thinking of using Libya as ‘a gateway to Europe’. His evidence comes from Islamist propaganda written by online recruiter Abu Arhim al-Libim, which he translated and analyzed in a document called ‘Libya: The Strategist Gateway for the Islamist State.’¹⁷⁸ According to this document and several newspaper reports, jihadists were planning to take over Libya and had united ‘a panoply of militant factions under a single banner’ there. They had taken the port city of Derna (October 2014, but lost this in July 2015); Tripoli, the capital of Libya; Sirte; and Benghazi — which are all along the Mediterranean coastline. They then wanted to monopolize the already booming human smuggling industry¹⁷⁹

operating out of Libyan ports, which sees hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants from Africa traversing the Mediterranean to reach the southern coast of Europe each year.¹⁸⁰ They would then flood Libya with Syrian and Iraqi militia who would go to Europe by boat, ‘posing as migrants on people trafficking vessels,’ who would then wage war in southern Europe. Winter writes that

The risks Europe faces from Isil pre-eminence in Libya are substantial. Talk of terrorist infiltration into European cities through illegal trafficking is not, it seems, just found in the rhetoric of politicians in Brussels. For the Isil enthusiast, Libya is a ‘strategic gateway’, a launching pad for the disruption of ‘Crusader’ shipping lines and a means of wreaking ‘pandemonium’ in Europe’s southern cities.¹⁸¹

The Daily Mail reported in February 2015 that ISIS was also threatening to send hundreds of boats carrying 500,000 migrants all at once as a ‘psychological weapon’ of war against Europe if Western powers intervened in Libya. Italian Minister for the Interior Angelino Alfano said that ‘If the militias of the Caliphate advance faster than the decisions of the international community, how can we put out the fire in Libya and stem the migration flows? We are at risk of an exodus without precedent.’¹⁸² Certainly in 2015 and into 2016 we have seen a ‘migrant crisis’ of unprecedented proportions in Europe, with the majority of migrants being young Muslim males (see chapter 11.2). We have to therefore ask if such large-scale illegal immigration is indeed being used as a weapon of war against Europe. Is Islam in Europe today a third attempt to conquer Europe by jihad (violent, non-violent, or participatory), demographics, and the imposition, spread, and practice of Islamic law?

In September 2015, the UN estimated that by the end of the year around 700,000 illegal migrants/asylum seekers would have crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe and the same amount was projected for 2016.¹⁸³ This does not include the hundreds of thousands that reached Europe via land (through Turkey into Greece and Bulgaria or from Russia into Norway).¹⁸⁴ Europe’s border agency, Frontex, declared in April 2016 that there were over 1.8 million illegal border crossings into the EU that were detected in 2015¹⁸⁵ (this number does not include those who were *not* detected). Out of all EU-28 countries, Germany alone accepted between 1 and 1.5 million refugees/migrants.¹⁸⁶ German Federal Minister Gerd Müller predicted that Europe is set to receive between 8–10 million asylum seekers in the near future.¹⁸⁷ A more detailed discussion on the ‘migrant crisis’ is found in Part IV.

9. Muslim Immigration: EU and Five Country Profiles

Mass-immigration into Europe has been predominantly from Muslim majority countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia since the 1960s. Despite the end of labour-recruitment agreements in the 1970s, which coincided with the Arab oil embargos, the EAD, and the rise of Pan-Islamism in the Muslim world, mass-immigration continued into Europe. Today, in 27 of the largest cities in 11 member states of the European Union, Muslims make up between six and 32.4 percent of the population, as shown in table 20.

Table 20. Estimated Muslim Populations of European Cities, 2016

European City	Est. Muslim Population (%)
Amsterdam	14.0–24.0
Antwerp	16.9
Barcelona	17.5
Berlin	6.0–9.0
Birmingham	14.3–26.9
Blackburn	28.4
Bradford	15.0–32.4
Brussels	15.0–25.5
Cologne	12
Copenhagen	10
Frankfurt	11.8
Haskovo	20
Leicester	18.6
London	8.3–13.1
Luton	24.6
Malmö	20
Manchester	15.8
Marseille	20.0–25.0
Milan	7.0–10.0
Paris	10.0–15.0
Rotterdam	13.0–25.0
Roubaix	20
Slough	23.3
Stockholm	20
The Hague	14.2
Utrecht	13.2
Vienna	8.0–10.0

Source: Data from *Wikipedia*, s.v. 'List of Cities in the European Union by Muslim Population', http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cities_in_the_European_Union_by_Muslim_population (retrieved March 2016).

There are differing estimations and projections about the size and growth of the Muslim population in Europe. In 2005, Robert S. Leiken, writing for *Foreign Affairs*, estimated that the Muslim population in Western Europe was between 15 and 20 million or between four and five percent of the total population.¹⁸⁸ The *Telegraph* newspaper reported that in 2008

five per cent of the total population of the 27 countries was Muslim. But rising levels of immigration from Muslim countries and low birth rates among Europe’s indigenous population mean that, by 2050, the figure will be 20 per cent according to forecasts. Other predictions indicate that by the middle of the century, Western Europe will already count more Muslims than non-Muslims.¹⁸⁹

According to an article titled ‘Muslim Population in Europe: 1950–2020’ by Houssain Kettani, a Professor with the Department of Computer Science and Information Systems Engineering at Fort Hays State University, there were nearly 49 million Muslims in Europe in 2009, making up around seven percent of the total population.¹⁹⁰ According to the Pew Research Center, Europe’s Muslim population was 43 million people or six percent of the total population in 2010, with about 19 million in the European Union. They predicted that by 2030, the Muslim population would constitute eight percent of the European population and provided estimates for the percentage increase in several European countries. For example, by 2030 Ireland is expected to triple its population of Muslims, Finland and Norway are expected to more than double their populations of Muslims, and Italy is expected to double their population of Muslims. For Sweden the estimated Muslim population for 2030 was 993,000, for the UK it was 5,567,000, for Belgium it was 1,149,000, for France it was 6.9 million, and for Germany it was 5.5 million.¹⁹¹ Table 21 shows the estimated percentage increase by 2030 of the Muslim population for the five EU countries mentioned above and Europe as a whole.

Table 21. Pew Estimated Increase in Muslim Population for Five EU Countries (%)

Country	Population (2010)	Population (2030)
Belgium		10.8%
United Kingdom		8.6%
France		10.3%
Sweden		9.9%
Germany		7.5%
Europe		8%

Source: Data from Pew Research Center, *The Future of the Global Muslim Population*.

A new study by the Pew Forum in 2015 predicted that the Muslim population of Europe will have increased to more than 71 million people or 10 percent of the total population by 2050.¹⁹² Similarly, according to Filip Dewinter, in 2009 there were 55 million Muslims in Europe (including Russia), with 20 million of these in Western Europe. However, unlike the Pew Forum, he claimed in 2011 that the ‘Muslim population will grow by nearly one-third...to 73 million’ by 2030 rather than by 2050.¹⁹³ The *National Intelligence Council* predicted that the Muslim population in Western Europe will ‘double by 2025.’¹⁹⁴ Historian Philip Jenkins estimates that by 2100 Muslims in Europe would be around 25 percent of the total population.¹⁹⁵ Numerous writers have claimed that Islam is the fastest growing religion in Europe.¹⁹⁶

Since the onset of mass Muslim immigration and the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the secular public sphere of Europe has become increasingly inundated by the foreign political theology and law of Islam. Islam in contemporary Europe is the re-insertion of an ultra-conservative patriarchal religion into European politics and public life after a long process of separating the traditionalist Christian religion from Western foundations conducive to individual rights and rule of law. But Islamism, with its literal reading of the Quran, its emphasis on collective religious identity, its insistence on the unity of public and private realms, and its anti-Westernism, is now pushing its way into mainstream Europe.

Islam is a unified system of belief that qualifies as a creed; it is a political religion.¹⁹⁷ It does not recognise the division of the public and private spheres, the separation of religion and state, and the equality of men and women. For Islam, Sharia, and not rule of law, is considered the only legitimate law. According to the Islamic Supreme Council of America, 'Islam is a complete package — a complete message and way of life' and Sharia law is

the Islamic Law — the disciplines and principles that govern the behavior of a Muslim individual towards his or herself, family, neighbors, community, city, nation and the Muslim polity as a whole, the Ummah. Similarly Shariah governs the interactions between communities, groups and social and economic organizations. Shariah establishes the criteria by which all social actions are classified, categorized and administered within the overall governance of the state.¹⁹⁸

In comparison, the Clarion Project against extremism writes that Sharia is

A legal framework to regulate public and private aspects of life based upon specific Islamic teachings. Sharia is a strict system which views non-Muslims as second-class citizens, sanctions inequality between men and women and prescribes cruel and unusual punishments for crimes.¹⁹⁹

Alexiev defines the Islamist interpretation of Sharia law in the following way:

Sharia is sacred Islamic law as revealed by God, the essence of the Muslim faith, and its imposition is the solution to all problems of the Muslim community (ummah). Sharia is the constitution of the Islamic state that guarantees the unity of religion and state (din wa dawla). Belief in the sacrosanct nature of sharia and the imperative to impose it in all Muslim communities is the sine qua non of the radical Islamist ideology.²⁰⁰

Sharia law is distinct from Western rule of law in two main ways according to *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. One, 'it regulates an individual's relationship' with neighbours, the state, God, and with 'one's own conscience'. And two, Islamic law 'precedes and controls society', i.e., 'the Islamic concept of law [is] the expression of the divine will.'²⁰¹ Today Sharia Law is practiced in various degrees in 70 Muslim countries across the world, as outlined in map 2.



Map 2. Seventy Countries Under Some Form of Sharia Law

Source: Map from *Wikipedia*, s.v. 'Application of Sharia Law by Country,' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_of_sharia_law_by_country (retrieved June 2015).

In 2003, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that 'the institution of Sharia law and a theocratic regime' are not compatible with democracy and a Sharia legal system is not compatible with the European Convention in regards to 'the rules of criminal law and procedure, the place given to women in the legal order and its interference in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts.'²⁰² Although Sharia Law was deemed incompatible with the fundamentals of the EU (democracy and Human Rights), numerous Sharia Law Courts (which offer a parallel legal [and political] system regarding family matters, such as divorce, marriage, child custody and support, and inheritance-related issues), Muslim Arbitration Tribunals, and Islamic Sharia Councils have been established in some secular member states of the European Union over the last decade and Sharia Law has come to be officially practiced in various degrees. For example, in 2008 it was reported that Islamic Law and Sharia judges in Sharia courts were already set up in the UK, particularly London, Birmingham, Bradford, and Manchester, and two more courts were planned for Glasgow and Edinburgh.²⁰³ There were also dozens of unofficial Sharia Courts that were already operating in association with mosques, of which there were an estimated 22 in the West Midlands alone.²⁰⁴ In late December 2015, it was estimated that there were at least 85 Islamic Courts operating in the UK.²⁰⁵

Machteld Zee, a Dutch writer, researcher, and PhD candidate at the Department Encyclopedia of Law at the University of Leiden, has said that

these ‘Sharia councils uphold the theory and practice of the strong hold men have over women’ and they ‘operate in the shadow of the law.’²⁰⁶ Elham Manea, a Muslim professor and expert on human rights, concurs, saying that these Sharia Courts are run by extremists who support child marriage, gender inequality, wife beatings, marital rape, and dismemberment for certain crimes, and only serve to ‘increase “segregation, inequality and discrimination” and can encourage “political instability and home-grown terrorism”’.²⁰⁷ Despite these and other warnings,²⁰⁸ Sharia Law is now becoming part of the UK legal system thanks to the British Law Society.²⁰⁹

The Muslim population in Europe is growing and in conjunction with this growth there is an increasing impact on local politics. Omer Taspinar, senior fellow at the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence, professor at the National War College, and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, writes in his 2003 essay ‘Europe’s Muslim Street’:

Islam may still be a faraway religion for millions of Americans. But for Europeans it is local politics. The 15 million Muslims of the European Union (EU)—up to three times as many as live in the United States—are becoming a more powerful political force than the fabled Arab street. Europe’s Muslims hail from different countries and display diverse religious tendencies, but the common denominator that links them to the Muslim world is their sympathy for Palestine and Palestinians. And unlike most of their Arab brethren, growing numbers of Europe’s Muslims can vote in elections that count.²¹⁰

What this means is that the aspiration for the imposition of Sharia law will also increase and become a more pressing issue for the European political landscape.

Today, as a result of a combination of government-mandated multicultural policies that have actively encouraged and funded immigrants to remain distinct peoples in European nations²¹¹ and the influences of various Muslim leaders and public figures that insist Muslims remain separate and not integrate into the mainstream, some key geographical areas in Europe, particularly in suburbs around major cities and some cities themselves, have become separated from mainstream society in terms of ethno-religious and political characteristics and challenge existing social and political orders. Criminal gangs are rife, Islam is often the main religion, political and violent Islamism has a significant presence, youths are subject to radicalism, and national authorities have little control.²¹²

In these often called Sharia-controlled areas²¹³ Muslims strongly assert their identity and people of other minority groups and from the indigenous population, particularly the native working-classes who are their neighbours, are not welcome or are threatened if they enter these places. According to senior fellow at National Review Institute and contributing editor at *National Review*, Andrew C. McCarthy:

no sensible person is saying that state authorities are *prohibited* from entering no-go

zones as a *matter of law*. The point is that they are *severely discouraged* from entering as a *matter of fact* — and the degree of discouragement varies directly with the density of the Muslim population and its radical component. Ditto for non-Muslim lay people: It is not that they are *not permitted* to enter these enclaves; it is that they *avoid entering* because doing so is dangerous if they are flaunting Western modes of dress and conduct.²¹⁴

Muslim no-go zones in Europe are also places that radicalise youth²¹⁵ and harbour violent and non-violent Islamists who incite sedition and culture war and commit violent terrorist acts in their plot to conquer Europe.²¹⁶ Many non-Muslims have fled these areas, particularly native Europeans and Jews, in a process some have called ‘White flight’ and ‘Jewish flight’.

Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Equality Standard and former chairman of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), Trevor Phillips, calls White flight in Britain a ‘majority retreat’ where ‘white people [are] leaving minority-led areas and [are] not being replaced’. Instead, according to the think tank *Demos*, they are being ‘replaced’ by immigrants and ethnic minority population growth. This means ‘a spiral of white British demographic decline.’²¹⁷ Similarly, in France, thousands of Jews every year are leaving to take up residence in Israel and elsewhere, mostly as a reaction to the increase of Muslim anti-Semitism and Islamist terrorist attacks against Jews in France,²¹⁸ a direct result of large-scale Muslim immigration into Europe.²¹⁹ This also corresponds with what is called ‘millionaire migration’ by the global wealth intelligence and market research company, *New World Wealth*. This wealth consultant company reports that a ‘large outflow of millionaires from France’ (10,000) in 2015 was due to ‘rising religious tensions’ in the country; Israel had the fourth largest inflow (4,000) of millionaires in 2015, after Australia, the United States, and Canada. The same phenomenon is already occurring in other European nations affected by rising ‘religious tensions’, such as Belgium, the UK, Sweden, and Germany.²²⁰

Writing for the Jewish Policy Center in the fall of 2014, Dr. Mitchell Bard, an American foreign policy analyst, Executive Director of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE), and director of the Jewish Virtual Library, states that all across Europe Jews are fleeing to Israel and the USA (and other ‘safe’ countries) in correlation to the growth of the Muslim population in Europe and subsequent rise in anti-Semitism and terrorist activities. He cites former Jewish historian Robert Wistrich who declared that ‘Jewish communities have become the targets of militant Muslim rage in much of Western Europe’ and that ‘any clear-sighted and sensible Jew who has a sense of history would understand that this is the time to get out’. Bard also cites former Dutch defense minister, Frits Bolkestein, who said that ‘Jews have to realize...that there is no future for them’ in European nations with large Muslim populations and ‘they best advise their children to leave for the United States or Israel.’²²¹ In October 2015 Frans Timmermans, first vice-president of the European Commission, stated that Jews were leaving

Europe because ‘they no longer see, as Jews, a future for themselves here.’²²² For Europeans, unfortunately, Muslim anti-European rhetoric, radicalism, and terrorism is in their traditional homelands and as such they don’t have the opportunity to leave and travel to a ‘safe’ homeland.

Let us now turn to some startling demographics and statistics regarding the Muslim populations of five European countries: Belgium, UK, France, Sweden, and Germany.

9.1 Belgium

Belgium has the second highest Muslim population per capita in the European Union (after France)²²³ and Islam is the second largest faith group, after Roman Catholicism.²²⁴ In 1950, it was estimated that around 8,500 Muslims lived in Belgium and by 2010 there were over 640,000, which is an increase of 7,429 percent in just 60 years.²²⁵ In 2014/2015, the Muslim population of Belgium was estimated to be around seven²²⁶ or eight percent²²⁷ of the total population, which is an increase of at least 50 percent since 2005.²²⁸ It is projected that by 2030 Muslims will make up 10.2 percent of the total population of Belgium.²²⁹ Many Muslims reside in the Flemish region (over 300,000 or 5.1% of the local population), and in the second largest city, Antwerp, Muslims comprise between 7.5 and 17 percent of the population. In the capital region, Muslims constitute between 280,000 and 300,000 or between 23.6% and 26% of the metropolitan area,²³⁰ which has led some people to call Brussels ‘the Muslim capital of Europe.’²³¹ According to sociologist Felice Dassetto, Muslims will comprise the majority of the population of Brussels by 2030.²³² Table 22 below shows several areas in Belgium that had a Muslim population in 2010 of between 12.5 and 48.8 percent, and their projected populations for 2030.

Table 22. Muslim Population in Belgium, 2010–2030

2030				
195,401	Flemish Region			
31,090	East-Ten-Noode			
50,800	Ans-Molenbeek			
89,800	beek			
27,886	is			
26,040	echt			
31,808	illis			
10,608	berg			
10,899				
14,860				
199,716	Walloon Region			
26,008	ep			
11,666	len			
1,918	en			
14,070	gen			
68,693				
120,000	Brussels Region			

Belgium				
1998				
2002				
2006				
2010				
2014				

Source: Data from Hertogen, 'Brussel 2030.'

In mid-2000, the fertility rate of the two largest Muslim groups in Belgium, Turkish and Moroccan, were double the national average: 3.57 and 3.03 versus 1.57 respectively.²³³ In 2004, over one-third of Muslims in Belgium were under the age of fifteen.²³⁴ A high fertility rate coupled with high immigration, led to Mohammed²³⁵ being the most popular baby boy name in Brussels in 2007.²³⁶ In 2013, Mohammed was the most popular name for males aged between 0 and 64 years of age in Brussels, and it was the seventh most popular name for males 65 years old and older. According to the economic ministry of Belgium, over the last 20 years the most popular names in Brussels have been Arab names.²³⁷ Since 2008, Mohammed has been the most popular name for baby boys in Antwerp.²³⁸ In March 2016, statistics revealed that more than half (52.4%) of pupils at elementary schools in Antwerp were Muslim and in Kiel, a southern district of the city, 83 percent of middle-schoolers were Muslim.²³⁹ In Belgium as a whole, 2013 saw Mohamed as the tenth most popular name for under-18-year-olds, or 2.3 percent of the national population in that age range.²⁴⁰

Compared to native Belgians, tertiary educational attainment, which is vital for success in the labour market, for working-age Turkish and Moroccan foreign-nationals in Belgium is low. In 2002–2003, only 10 percent of Moroccans and Turks had post-secondary education compared to 35 percent of native Belgians. Between 2005 and 2012, only 10.8 percent of Moroccans and 5.6 percent of Turks had tertiary education compared to 28.3 percent of native Belgians. In terms of school enrollment, 66 percent of native Belgians aged 15 to 25 years were enrolled, compared to 58 percent of Moroccans and 31 percent of Turks.²⁴¹ In mid-2000, the employment rate for Moroccans and Turks was ‘three times lower’ than the native Belgian population; the average employment rate for native Belgians was 61 percent, and for foreign-born Moroccans and Turks it was 26 percent.²⁴² Several years later, employment for Moroccans stood at 40.6 percent, for Turks at 43.5 percent, and for native Belgians at 63.8 percent. The unemployment rate for each of these groups was 27.2 percent, 18.7 percent, and 6.6 percent respectively.²⁴³

As far back as the late 1990s, prison statistics show Moroccans are overrepresented in Belgian prisons. There were 132,831 Moroccans in Belgium in 1998 constituting 1.3 percent of the total population, yet they made up 12.8 percent of the prison population and had a detention rate of 821 per 100,000, compared to the detention rate of native Belgians of 58 per 100,000, which is an index of overrepresentation of 14.2. Turks were also

disproportionately represented; there were 73,818 Turks in Belgium in 1998 standing at 0.7 percent of the population, but they constituted 3.1 percent of the prison population and had a detention rate of 364 per 100,000, which is an index of overrepresentation of 6.3.²⁴⁴ In several studies undertaken by Steven De Ridder and Kristel Beyens of the Criminology Department of Vrije Universiteit van Brussel (VUB), it has been shown that since 1995 the foreign prison population in Belgium has remained stable at about 40–42 percent, but since the 1980s it sharply increased in comparison to native Belgian incarceration levels. For example, in 1980 the prison index for both foreign national prisoners and native Belgian prisoners was 100, but by 2013 it was 460 for foreign nationals compared to 175 for native Belgians. In comparison to Western European, Eastern European, and ‘Other’ foreign prisoners, which had populations of under 1,000 in Belgian prisons, Turks and North Africans (Maghreb) made up the largest number of the foreign national prison population (over 1,250), a trend that has continued since 1993. The size of the Turkish and North African prison population in Belgian prisons continually increased between 1993 and 2013, from 1,250 to 2,500 persons, and since 2003 has increased from 40 to 44 percent of the total foreign national prison population.²⁴⁵ Sieghild Lacoere, Ministry spokeswoman, has said that about 20–30 percent of all prisoners in Belgium are Muslim.²⁴⁶

There is a serious problem with Islamic or jihadist radicalism and recruitment in Belgian prisons (and prisons in the EU at large), which are seen as ‘a massive incubator for radicalisation’ according to EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove.²⁴⁷ Denis Bosquet, president of the Oversight Commission of Forest Prison in Belgium, stated that ‘All the prisons in Belgium have a problem with radicalization.’²⁴⁸ For example, several of the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris and March 2016 Brussels terrorist attacks had spent time in Belgium prisons.²⁴⁹ There is also a phenomenon of known Muslim radicals embracing prison sentences in the context of anticipating radicalising others inside, such as Fouad Belkacem (Abu Imran), militant preacher and leader of the infamous Sharia4Belgium group who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in early 2015.²⁵⁰ He said, ‘Everyone in prison is against the system. Infidels and Muslims alike. There is work to be done. It will be awesome’.²⁵¹ In March 2015 Belgium’s minister of justice, Koen Geens, outlined plans for isolating prisoners who may radicalise others: ‘Those who are incorrigible and therefore could tempt others to become radical like them...we will isolate them’.²⁵² As such, Belkacem has been put under special security and is isolated from the rest of the prison population.²⁵³

Outside of the prisons, radicalisation in mosques, neighbourhoods, and schools, as well as through social media, is an increasing problem in Belgium, as it is for the rest of Europe.²⁵⁴ Belgium as a whole is now seen as a ‘major hotbed for radicalisation’.²⁵⁵ According to Sarah Teich, writing for

the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in August 2015, at minimum 380 Belgian nationals were foreign-fighters in Syria, which means that Belgium has ‘the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents’.²⁵⁶ Already in 2013, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation suggested that the number of Belgians fighting in Syria was ‘the highest rate per capita of any European country’.²⁵⁷ According to Pieter Van Ostaeyen, an independent researcher, by October 2015 there were 516 Belgian foreign-fighters in Iraq or Syria.²⁵⁸ The Royal Institute for International Relations asserts that the majority of Belgian nationals fighting in Syria are of Moroccan descent²⁵⁹ and most are from Molenbeek.²⁶⁰

In Belgium, there are fears about radicalism among staff at major airports and also fears of an impending nuclear terrorist attack. For example, upon hearing about the Paris terror attacks in November 2015, baggage handlers at Brussels airport apparently cheered the attacks, according to the president of the Police trade union, Vincent Gilles.²⁶¹ In 2012, two nuclear power plant employees left Belgium and joined ISIS in Syria, then in 2016, it was found that two of the Brussels attackers, Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, had ‘secretly filmed the daily routine of Belgium’s nuclear programme chief’ and two days after the attack, a security guard who worked at the Tihange nuclear power plant in Belgium was found murdered with his badge stolen. Eleven workers at the nuclear plant had their site access revoked due to concern they had helped the Brussels attackers.²⁶²

Muslim radicalisation in Belgium has been partly due to Islamist organizations like Sharia4Belgium, which the federal Belgian prosecutor described in 2013 as ‘a clear Salafist and jihadist organization which aims to overthrow the democratic institutions and replace it with an Islamic state’ and was ‘part of a wider international jihadi movement’.²⁶³ This group was operated by Belkacem under the guidance of Anjem Choudary.²⁶⁴ In early spring 2013, the daily newspaper *De Standaard* reported that ‘at least 70 former members and sympathisers of *Sharia4Belgium* were actively fighting in Syria. Most of them were young (17–25 years), lacked qualifications, and often had criminal records and were from just four regions: Antwerp, Brussels, Mechelen, and Vilvoorde’.²⁶⁵ In other words, *Sharia4Belgium* were recruiting young, uneducated criminals from Muslim communities. It was only in February 2015 that *Sharia4Belgium* was finally declared a ‘terrorist organization’ and 45 members were arrested and handed jail time, including Abu Imram who is serving 12 years.²⁶⁶

Claude Moniquet, Director General of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, explained in 2005 that before the end of the 1990s there were no Islamist parties in Europe, but this changed at the turn of the century. In Belgium in May 2003, the PCP or Party of Citizenship and Prosperity, which advocated radical Islam, won 8,000 votes in Brussels; more than four percent of the 200,000 Muslim population in Brussels gave

their vote to them and most of the votes came from one municipality where 50,000 Muslims resided. In other words, 10 to 16 percent of Muslims in one area voted for PCP.²⁶⁷ In that same year the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Sharia Law is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. However, at the initiative of Sharia4Belgium, a Sharia Law Court was established in September 2012 in Borgerhout, a district of Antwerp.²⁶⁸ Sharia law then became very apparent at the level of local politics.

Two Islamist politicians of the Belgian Islam Party, Lhoucine Ait Jeddig and Redouane Ahrouch, won seats in the municipal elections on 14 October 2012, in Brussels. They were elected for two heavily populated Muslim municipalities, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean and Anderlecht, which are high crime areas considered no-go zones where the Belgian government and the police have lost control.²⁶⁹ Jeddig and Ahrouch are Islamists who are public about their goals: the implementation of Sharia law in Belgium as a whole. Ahrouch stated that 'We are elected Islamists' that 'believe Islam is a universal religion' that is 'compatible with the laws of the Belgian people' and the town council will be a platform 'to express ourselves'. Yet the 'approach' of the Islam Party is to 'sensitize people, make them understand the advantages to having Islamic people and Islamic laws. And then it will be completely natural to have Islamic laws and we will become an Islamic state', a future state that is achieved by 'a long-term struggle that will take decades or a century, but the movement has been launched'.²⁷⁰

This Belgian Islam Party is similar in nature to Sharia4Belgium in that it radicalises Muslim youth, supports self-isolated parallel Muslim communities, and aims to achieve the total application of Sharia law in Belgium. Alain Destexhe, MP in the Reformist Movement, says that 'The people of the Islam Party refuse to shake hands with women...They do not want to mix with others in public transport and other communal places. They advocate getting married and wearing a veil at 12 years old, based on Islamic law'.²⁷¹ Philip Claeys, Belgian Euro MP, has said of the Islam Party that 'demanding...the introduction of Sharia law and an Islamic State in Belgium' has been 'always predicted,' but Muslims should instead adhere to European values, rule of law, and separation of religion and politics. He also pointed out that Muslim immigrants are 'people who cannot and will not adapt to our way of living,' and if Islamist politicians are 'candidates for elections' then 'there is a big problem', a problem further exasperated by those who do not have Belgian nationality but who are 'allowed to vote for local elections', which has been allowed since 2004.²⁷²

9.2 United Kingdom

In 1950, the Muslim population in the United Kingdom was about

100,000;²⁷³ by 2010, there were almost 2.5 million, many of Pakistani descent.²⁷⁴ This means that in just 60 years the Muslim population in the UK increased by about 2,400 percent. In the 2001 census most Pakistanis (92%) identified as Muslim and ‘accounted for less than half (43%) of Great Britain’s Muslims’. The other largest Muslim populations in 2001 included ‘Bangladeshi (16%), Indian (8%), Black African (6%), Other White (7%), Other Asian (6%) and White British (4%)’.²⁷⁵ In January 2016, the Muslim population of Britain had reached over 3 million and over half were foreign-born.²⁷⁶ It has been estimated that by 2030 Muslims will make up 8.2 percent of the total population or 5,567,000 individuals.²⁷⁷ In 2007, *Open Society* reported that in England and Wales ‘Muslims are the largest minority faith group’ and ‘have the youngest demographic profile as a faith group’; over 60 percent were under 30 years of age.²⁷⁸ Table 23 shows the top 10 local authorities in England with the highest percentage of Muslims.

Table 23. Muslim Population of Top Ten Local Authorities in England, 2011

Local Authority	Number
London Borough of Tower Hamlets	87,306
London Borough of Newham	98,356
Blackburn with Darwen	39,814
City of Bradford	129,047
Luton	49,906
London Borough of Redbridge	64,289
Slough	32,353
London Borough of Waltham Forest	56,549
Birmingham	234,241
Leicester	61,486

Source: Data from the Office for National Statistics, 'Table KS209EW: Religion, local authorities in England and Wales.'

Some people call Tower Hamlets the ‘Islamic republic of Tower Hamlets’ and describe the Muslims living there as the ‘Tower Hamlets Taliban’ because they intimidate the non-Muslim population with death threats, homophobic abuse, and physical attacks.²⁷⁹ Although constituting one-third of the Tower Hamlet population, Muslims receive a disproportionate amount, almost two-thirds, of government funds: ‘25 Muslim organisations have received a total of 378,000 from the 595,000 dished out,’ whereas only ‘12 Christian groups were handed 140,000 — with the rest of the grants distributed between a total of six Jewish, Sikh, Hindu and Buddhist organisations’.²⁸⁰ The elected mayor of Tower Hamlets, Bangladeshi-born Lutfur Rahman, was a Labour candidate, but was rejected by the party due to ‘allegations about his links with an organisation known as the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE)’.²⁸¹ IFE, founded by Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin,²⁸² believes in jihad and Sharia law, wants non-Muslim countries (particularly the UK and European countries) to become Islamic republics, and dominates the Muslim Council of Britain, which promotes sectarian interests in East London rather than community interests.²⁸³

Between 2005 and 2010, the Muslim fertility rate in Britain was 3.0, which is much higher than the national average of 1.8.²⁸⁴ This high fertility rate, as well as high-rates of immigration, family reunification, and marriage migration led, in 2011, to 9.1 percent of all children under five years old in Britain being Muslim.²⁸⁵ Around half of Muslims in Britain are under the age of 25.²⁸⁶ Muhammad has become the most popular baby name in the capital of Britain, London,²⁸⁷ which first occurred in 2012. This is partly why London is referred to as *Londonistan*.²⁸⁸ In 2013 and 2014, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported that Oliver was the most popular baby name in England and Wales; Muhammad, Mohammed, and Mohammad were the 15th, 23rd, and 57th most popular baby names in 2013, and in 2014 they were the 14th, 27th, and 56th.²⁸⁹ This is misleading, however. In 2008, Max Hastings, writing for *MailOnline*, claimed that Mohammed was already ‘the third most popular choice for boy children’ in England and that the ONS, rather than using all the various spellings of Mohammed, had catalogued them separately.²⁹⁰ Accounting for the various spellings (Muhammad, Mohammad, Muhammed, Mohamed, Mohamad, Muhamed, Mohammad, Mahamed, Muhamad, Mohammed and Mohammed), by 2009, Mohammed was the most popular name given for baby boys in England and Wales: ‘A total of 7,549 newborns were given 12 variations of the Islamic prophet Mohammed’s name’ and the second most popular name was Oliver, ‘given to 7,364 babies’.²⁹¹ If only three of the spellings of Mohammed in the top 100 were accounted for, Mohammed was also the most popular baby name in England and Wales for 2013 and 2014, at 7,435 and 7,240 newborns respectively.²⁹²

In terms of educational qualifications, in 2003–2004, 31 percent of Muslims of working age (16–64) in Great Britain had no qualifications, the highest percentage for any religious group.²⁹³ Of those aged between 16 and 30, less than 12 percent had a degree or equivalent, which was the lowest percentage for any religious group.²⁹⁴ By 2011, the situation had improved substantially but the percentage of these without qualifications was still considerably high: 26 percent of working age Muslims in England and Wales had no qualifications.²⁹⁵ In the 2001 census, out of all ethnic groups, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations had the highest percentages of unemployed, 57 percent and 62 percent respectively, and the highest percentages for those who have never worked or who have been long-term unemployed, 26.3 percent and 29.1 percent respectively. The next ethnic groups with high and long-term unemployment rates were classified as Other Asian (42% and 14.1%), Black African (45% and 13.4%), and Other Black (42% and 10%).²⁹⁶ In 2005/06 Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups continued to have high inactive employment rates compared to all other ethnic groups in the United Kingdom, standing at 43 percent and 45 percent respectively. Those classified as ‘Other Asian’ and ‘Black African’ had the next highest inactive employment rates, both standing at 25 percent.²⁹⁷

Steve Doughty, *Daily Mail* journalist, wrote an article that summarised a report²⁹⁸ by two academics affiliated with the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration at University College London, Professor Christian Dustmann and Dr. Tommaso Frattini, which was a major study on the impact of non-European migration on taxpayers in the UK. Doughty writes that ‘Over a 16-year period, the bill to the taxpayer of providing them with welfare, health and education was 14 per cent higher than the money they put in the national purse’ and that immigrants received ‘100 billion more in benefits and services than they paid back in taxes’. In comparison, according to Dustmann and Frattini, between 1995 and 2011 ‘migrants from Europe — including those from Eastern Europe who came in large numbers after 2004 — have paid more in taxes than they received’ i.e. ‘4 per cent more into the tax system than they took out’.²⁹⁹ In other words, non-European immigrants are a financial burden upon indigenous taxpayers.

In 2001, Muslims of working age ‘had the highest male unemployment rate in Great Britain’, standing at 14 percent, which was ‘over three times the rate for Christian men (4 per cent)’.³⁰⁰ Muslims between 16 and 24 years of age ‘had the highest unemployment rates of all. They were twice as likely as Christians of the same age to be unemployed — 22 per cent compared with 11 per cent’ and working age Muslims had ‘the highest overall levels of economic inactivity in 2003–2004 — 30 percent compared with 16 percent of Christians’.³⁰¹

In the 2011 census, out of all ethnic groups (apart from Gypsy and Irish Traveller [40%]) the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations had the lowest percentage of their populations in employment, at 49 percent and 48 percent respectively. Again, apart from Gypsy and Irish Traveller (50%), out of all ethnic groups the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations had the highest percentages of population that were economically inactive (not employed and/or not actively seeking employment or not available to work), at 42 percent and 41 percent respectively. The next ethnic groups with high inactive economic rates were classified as White and Black Caribbean (30%), Black Other (29%), and Black African (28%). Fifty-four percent of Pakistanis and 48 percent of Bangladeshis between 16 and 24 years of age were economically inactive in 2011.³⁰² In 2011, Muslims of working age had the highest economic inactivity rate in England and Wales compared to all other religious groups, standing at 45 percent, and 9.3 percent of the Muslim population were unemployed, compared to 4.7 percent of the general population.³⁰³

As in Belgium, Muslims consistently make up a disproportionate percentage of the prison population compared to their share of the total population in England and Wales. In 1994 Muslims constituted five percent of the prison population³⁰⁴ and in 1997 this number rose to 6.3 percent; by 2003, they made up 8.3 percent.³⁰⁵ In 2009, despite constituting less than five percent of the total regions’ population, Muslims accounted for 11.9

percent of the prison population, or 9,952 persons. Compared to other religious groups, except Christians (who made up 59% of the total national population), Muslims accounted for the highest percentage of prisoners from a religious group.³⁰⁶ In 2012, a total of 11,248 Muslim prisoners made up 13.1 percent of the prison population.³⁰⁷ In some prisons, such as HMP Whitemoor in Cambridgeshire, Muslims now constitute the majority of the inmate population and have formed the ‘biggest power bloc’, effectively displacing other prison gangs.³⁰⁸

Figures 8 and 9 and tables 24 and 25 break down the prison population by ethnicity, religion, and nationality (based on the top 17 non-European foreign-born populations in 2011 shown in table 5) in England and Wales between 2004 and 2014. Prison percentages of Whites (all White categories) and of Christians have been left out as they are the majority ethnicity and religious group. Whites (including all varieties of Whites, not just White British) accounted for 51,281 prisoners in England and Wales in 2004, and in 2014 this number had increased to 62,491. The Christian prison population in England and Wales was 41,154 in 2005 and 42,706 in 2014.




Figure 8. Prison Population by Ethnicity, 2004–2014 England and Wales

Source: Data adapted from Gov.uk, 'Table A1.7 Prison Population by Ethnic Group, Nationality and Sex, 2002–2014, England and Wales.'

Table 24. Prison Population of Top Seventeen Non-European Foreign-Born Nationalities, 2005–2014 England and Wales

Nationality											2009
India											300
Pakistan											300
China											300
Bangladesh											250
Nigeria											1,000
Jamaica											1,000
Kenya											50
Philippines											20
Sri Lanka											150
Zimbabwe											200
Somalia											400
Ghana											200
Turkey											200
Iran											200
Iraq											200
Malaysia											30
Afghanistan											100

Source: Data adapted from Gov.uk, 'Table 1.10 Prison population by nationality, 2002 to 2014, England and Wales.'




Figure 9. Prison Population by Religion, 2005–2014 England and Wales

Source: Data adapted from Gov.uk, ‘Table A1.8 Prison population by religion and sex, 2002 to 2014, England and Wales.’

Table 25. Main Religious Populations and Percentage of National and Prison Population, 2011 England and Wales

Religion	Religious Population (Number)	Prison Population (Percent)
Christian	33,243,613	61.3
Muslim	2,706,000	6.0
Hindu	816,000	0.5
Sikh	423,000	0.1
Jewish	263,000	0.0
Buddhist	242,000	0.3

Source: Data adapted from Gov.uk, ‘Table A1.8 Prison population by religion and sex, 2002 to 2014, England and Wales.’

As in Belgium, Muslim radicalisation and recruitment in British prisons is a serious problem. The head of counter terrorism for the Metropolitan Police, Richard Walton, said in 2015 that ‘The issue of radicalisation in prisons is a concern. Everybody needs to think what more can be done’³¹⁰ and in April 2016, the Shadow Justice Secretary, Lord Falconer, warned that British prisons are becoming ‘terrorist academies’.³¹¹ The national chairman of the Prison Officers’ Association (POA), Colin Moses, has said that ‘People are being radicalised, forcibly radicalised by these [Muslim] gangs. We see it as a real danger, now and for the future of prisons’ and ‘the gangs are becoming more and more prevalent by the week and they fight to take control of the drug trade and the dealing of mobile phones in prison’.³¹² The POA has reported that radical jihadists actively seek incarceration to radicalise prisoners once inside,³¹³ and the Quilliam Foundation has stated that incarcerated Muslim extremists are the main sources of prison

radicalisation.³¹⁴

In 2014, Anthony Glees, head of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham, warned of radical imams preaching in UK prisons: ‘Our prisons have turned into a state-funded breeding ground for extremism. It is completely unacceptable that imams with extremist views are allowed to preach in prisons’.³¹⁵ Addressing the issue, PM David Cameron said he was ‘prepared to consider major changes: from the imams we allow to preach in prison to changing the locations and methods for dealing with prisoners convicted of terrorism offences, if that is what is required’.³¹⁶ However, British historian Roger Griffin said ‘If a unit could be created with counter-radicalization Imams and trained de-radicalizers, this could be a very innovative scheme, but, characteristically, this does not seem to be part of the government proposals’.³¹⁷ As of 2016, de-radicalisation programs are voluntary.³¹⁸

Muslim radicalism outside of the prisons, such as in mosques, Muslim neighbourhoods, schools, and online media, is also a major problem in the UK. According to the Investigative Project on Terrorism, Europe Trust is a British-based Europe-wide organization that is funded by Kuwait and the UAE Makhtoum Foundation, and brings European Muslims ‘directly into the Muslim Brotherhood via complex financial, non-profit and religious networks that stretch from Spain to Ireland — and across the Atlantic to New York’. It also ‘channels money from the Persian Gulf to groups sympathetic to the Brotherhood in Europe, primarily to build mosques’.³¹⁹ Many imams in the UK and elsewhere in Europe get direction and funding from other theocratic Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which funds the construction of ‘giant mosques, such as the East London Mosque, which can accommodate 5,000 worshippers’.³²⁰ Mosques can be understood as not just places of worship, but also centers that spread hard-line Islam throughout Europe. In the Islamic mythology and strategy of war and invasion, mosques (and especially minarets) built on foreign lands are seen as ‘a mark of conquest’.³²¹ Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, quoted the poet Ziya Gökalp during a speech in 1997, when he was Mayor of Istanbul: ‘Mosques are our barracks, domes our helmets, minarets our bayonets, believers our soldiers’.³²² Some mosques in Britain have been mired in hate preaching, like the Green Lane Mosque in Birmingham, wherein Abu Usamah, who supported the total Islamic state and violent jihad, was a leading preacher.³²³ Other mosques have been storehouses for terrorist-related paraphernalia, i.e., Finsbury Park Mosque in London.³²⁴

Besides mosques, several radical Muslim groups have called for Sharia to be implemented as law for all in the UK, such as Muslims Against Crusades (MAC),³²⁵ who initiated an Islamic Emirates Project in mid-2011 that sought to create Islamic statelets within the UK.³²⁶ These statelets are areas and cities where Muslims are either in the majority or are projected to be in the near future, most of which run up the backbone of England: Birmingham,


Bradford, Derby, Dewsbury, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Luton, Manchester, Sheffield, Waltham Forest in northeast London, and Tower Hamlets in East London. There are also ‘Sharia police’ and ‘Sharia patrols’ who attempt to enforce Islamic law in what they call ‘Muslim-only areas’, such as the streets of London,³²⁷ several of whom have been arrested, jailed, and handed Antisocial Behaviour Orders.³²⁸ The infamous hate preacher, Anjem Choudary, is associated with these patrols and describes ‘Sharia zones’ as areas where ‘the Muslim community will not tolerate drugs, alcohol, pornography, gambling, usury, free mixing between the sexes — the fruits if you like of Western civilisation’ and where Islamists aim ‘really to put the seeds down for an Islamic Emirate in the long term’.³²⁹ Some of these areas are identified as Muslim enclaves or no-go zones, of which there were over 100 in 2011.³³⁰ For example, Muslims in Luton claim that this area is theirs and they are going to eventually take over Britain.³³¹ In North Finchley in north London, Tory MP Mike Freer had to be ‘hidden for his own safety’ after MAC stated on their website that politicians were ‘no longer welcome in any Muslim area’.³³² And in Leytonstone in east London, Muslim extremist Abu Izzadeen yelled ‘How dare you come to a Muslim area’ at the former Home Secretary John Reid.³³³ Islamists have also used British universities to recruit and radicalise new members. For example, the organization *Stop Islamophobia* was recruiting students from several London universities under the façade of fighting anti-Muslim prejudice, while in actuality this organization was a front for Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). HT used the organization to spread anti-Western rhetoric.³³⁴

There is also the pressing issue of hundreds of British Muslims who have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside ISIS or al-Nusra (Syrian al-Qaeda). According to Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, since 2012 around 1,400 Muslims with British citizenship have attempted to enter Syria. Around 600 of them were apprehended before reaching Syria and about 50 have died fighting.³³⁵ Met Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, said that the vast majority of British Muslims fighting in Syria/Iraq are from London, and that around 250 had returned by 2014 and entered into terrorist networks.³³⁶ Many of them have criminal records, attended mainstream mosques in Britain, and were quite likely to have been radicalised online.³³⁷ In 2014, an MP for Perry Barr in Birmingham, Khalid Mahmood, estimated that between 2012 and 2014 ‘at least’ 1,500 British Muslims had ‘been recruited by extremists fighting in Iraq and Syria’.³³⁸ Clarissa Ward, reporting for *60 Minutes* on *CBS News*, suggested in 2014 that social media and young radicals are responsible for a great deal of Muslim radicalisation in Britain: ‘it’s less about preachers radicalizing young men. And it’s more young fighters radicalizing other young fighters from the battlefield using social media as their recruitment platform’. However, Ward also suggested that Choudary, who is linked to various Islamist groups that have been listed as terrorist organizations, such as the al-Muhajiroun network, is mainly

responsible for the flight of British Muslims as well as ‘hundreds of Muslims from across the West’ to Syria and Iraq to fight.³³⁹ Ward’s assertion is supported by a 2013 report by *Hope Not Hate* (HnH), which branded various groups associated with Choudary as the ‘gateway to terror[ism]’³⁴⁰ and provided a map (Map 3) that shows the links between Choudary and the networks of various Islamist organizations. HnH also state that

While Choudary might not have been directly involved in terror plots, he helped shape the mindset of many of those behind them. He indoctrinated them and through his networks linked them up to terror groups and supporters across the world.³⁴¹

In 2007, there were 4,000 terrorist suspects and 200 jihadist networks in Britain.³⁴² Such networks also span Europe and ‘represent the largest extreme Islamist network in Europe linked to domestic or overseas terrorism’.³⁴³



Map 3. Anjem Choudary and Islamist/Terrorist Networks

Source: Map from Hope not Hate, *Anjem Choudary and the al-Muhajiroun Network*, 'AM Network Map.'

9.3 France

The top three countries of non-European foreign-born populations in France are Muslim-majority countries from the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 1950, there were an estimated 230,000 Muslims residing in France and by 2010 there were over 6.2 million, which means that in 60 years the Muslim population of France increased by 2,596 percent.³⁴⁴ Today, the estimated Muslim population of France rests between six and eight million or around 10 percent of the total population³⁴⁵ and it has been forecast that by 2030 the Muslim population will have reached 10.3 percent of the total population.³⁴⁶ Table 26 below shows the estimated Muslim population in five cities in the year 2000.

Table 26. Estimated Muslim Population in Five French Cities, 2000 (Percent and Number)

Paris			1,700,000
Lille			200,000
Marseilles			200,000
Lyon			180,000
Roubaix			50,000

Source: Data adapted from 'Table 1–3. French Cities with the Largest Muslim Populations' in Laurence and Vaisse, *Integrating Islam*, 22.

In 2005, the Maghreb population in four areas of the Paris region (Île-de-France) were as follows: Seine-Saint-Denis (22%), Val-de-Marne (13.2%),

Val-D'Oise (13%), and Paris (12.1%). In Lyon the Maghreb population was 13% of the local population.³⁴⁷ By 2011, the Muslim population of Marseilles, which is France's third largest city, had increased to between 30 and 40 percent;³⁴⁸ it has been voted as the most dangerous city in Europe.³⁴⁹ Despite the fact that information about race and religion is prohibited on the grounds of *laïcité* (secularism), which essentially refuses to recognise these characteristics in political life, and despite the fact that Roubaix in the year 2000 was already 50 percent Muslim, it has been officially stated that demographers project Marseille will become the first Muslim-majority city in Western Europe.³⁵⁰ Currently, France has the largest population of Muslims in the European Union. The total fertility rate of Muslims in France is 2.8 compared to the 1.9 national average.³⁵¹ In 2004, one-third of the Muslim population in France was under the age of twenty³⁵² and, accounting for spelling variations, Mohammed was the most popular baby name in Seine-Saint-Denis in 2002 and 2008³⁵³ and in Marseilles in 2007 and 2009.³⁵⁴

In terms of education levels, in 2008/2009 just over 18 percent of second-generation working-age North Africans and almost 22 percent of second-generation working-age Turks in France had no qualifications compared to 11.57 percent of native French. Higher education is arguably vital for success in the labour market, but only 13.31 percent of North Africans and 11.31 percent of Turks had a university degree, compared to 19.16 percent of French natives.³⁵⁵ In regards to employment levels, in 1999 only 55 percent of Moroccans and Tunisians were employed, 25 percent were unemployed, and 20 percent were economically inactive; 50 percent of Turks were employed, 22 percent were unemployed, and 31 percent economically inactive; 54 percent of Algerians were employed, 30 percent were unemployed, and 16 percent were economically inactive.³⁵⁶ Five years later these rates remained largely the same: 58 percent of those from the Maghreb were employed, 26 percent were unemployed, and 5 percent were economically inactive.³⁵⁷ Between 2005 and 2007, the employment rate for foreign-born populations from majority Muslim countries again reflected similar rates as 1999: of the Maghrebi in France it was 50 percent and for Turks it was 49 percent.³⁵⁸ Second generation immigrants in 2008/2009 showed much improvement in employment levels: North Africans stood at 77.1 percent and Turkish at 69.2 percent, but these levels were still comparable to the national rate, which stood at 90.3 percent.³⁵⁹

Similar to Belgium and the UK, Muslims are over-represented in the prison population in France. According to Molly Moore of the *Washington Post*, in 2008 '[a]bout 60 to 70 percent of all inmates in [France's] prison system are Muslim, according to Muslim leaders, sociologists and researchers, though Muslims make up only about 12 percent of the country's population'.³⁶⁰ The same percentage of Muslims in the prison population was also estimated for 2015: 70 percent or 47,250 Muslim prisoners, though

Muslims are considered to only make up eight percent or 5,198,632 of the total population of France.³⁶¹ The majority of serious crimes committed in France are by North Africans; they commit more serious crime (50 percent) than French natives (40 percent) and French natives are overwhelmingly the victims of serious crime, standing at 73 percent.³⁶²

There are serious issues with Muslim youth crime, mainly from the *banlieues* (suburbs), such as the ‘Muslim riots’ and arson of 2005, which were sparked by the death of two Muslim boys and lasted for three weeks involving around 300 towns and resulting in 2,888 arrests, three deaths, the injury of 126 police and fire officers, and about 200 million euros in damage.³⁶³ Two years later another immigrant youth riot erupted in several Paris suburbs that lasted for several days. This riot was sparked by another death of two Muslim boys but was more violent, with perpetrators using ‘hunting shotguns’, firecrackers, Molotov cocktails, and rocks on police officers (130 were injured, six seriously) as well as committing arson, looting, and destroying buildings (including a police station, a library, and two schools). A police officer and senior union official, Patrice Ribeiro said that it was ‘a real guerrilla war’ and Bruno Beschizza of the Synergie Police Union stated that ‘We’re dealing with an urban guerilla tactic, with the use of conventional arms and hunting rifles’.³⁶⁴ Other Muslim-related riots occurred in 2013,³⁶⁵ 2014,³⁶⁶ 2015,³⁶⁷ and 2016.³⁶⁸ There is also a tradition, followed mainly by Muslim youth from the banlieus, of torching hundreds of strangers’ cars during New Year’s Eve celebrations in France³⁶⁹ (and at other times of the year). There were 1,067 cars torched in 2013/2014, 940 in 2014/2015, and 804 in 2015/2016. The numbers have reduced as more police are mobilised every year to deal with the ‘tradition’. It is also estimated that around 30,000 and 40,000 vehicles are set on fire every year, or around 80 per day.³⁷⁰

As in the UK and Belgium, France’s prisons are now often thought of as ‘breeding grounds for Islamist extremism’. There is a serious problem of radicalisation, recruitment, and coerced conversion of ‘ordinary’ criminals, committed by Muslim prisoners, which include militants and those who are in prison on terrorism-related charges.³⁷¹ For example, the Algerian Mohamed Merah had spent time in jail for violent theft and then went on to kill four Jews and three soldiers in 2012 in the city of Toulouse.³⁷² Amedy Coulibaly, the Senegalese gunman with French citizenship who was behind the murder of a policewoman and four Jews at a Kosher grocery shop in Paris in January 2015, had been imprisoned for robbery in 2005.³⁷³ He declared allegiance to ISIS.³⁷⁴ Coulibaly met Algerian Cherif Kouachi while in prison, who was part of the 19th arrondissement network³⁷⁵ and had been arrested on terror-related charges in 2008.³⁷⁶ Along with Kouachi’s brother Said, who had travelled to Yemen to receive training from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),³⁷⁷ Coulibaly and Cherif co-ordinated the January 2015 attacks that killed 17 people. The Kouachi brothers shot 12

people to death at *Charlie Hebdo* magazine in Paris.³⁷⁸

In response to these jihadist attacks and the November Paris attacks in 2015 that killed 130 people and wounded more than 360, various Muslim leaders said the attacks were deserved. For example, Muslim cleric Mizanur Rahman of Palmers Green, north London, defended the attacks in Paris, declaring that ‘Britain is the enemy of Islam’, that the cartoonists at *Charlie Hebdo* were guilty of ‘insulting Islam’ and therefore ‘they can’t expect a different result’, and ominously stated that ‘You know what happens when you insult Mohammed’.³⁷⁹ In contrast, as a response to the attacks, the Hollande government of France introduced several new anti-terror and de-radicalisation measures, including the provision of €425m towards increasing security personnel and equipment, the closing of several mosques, the dissolution of radical Muslim organizations, and the introduction of de-radicalisation wings in various prisons.³⁸⁰ Prime Minister Manuel Valls added to these measures, including a €736 million program to enhance anti-terrorism defenses, the training of ‘2,680 new anti-terrorist judges, security agents, police officers, electronic eavesdroppers and analysts over the next three years’ and ‘an enhanced online presence based on a new government website called “*Stop Djihadisme*”’.³⁸¹

Outside of the prisons, radicalisation through social media, mosques, Muslim neighbourhoods, schools,³⁸² and workplaces is an increasing problem in France. In 2005, Eric Denécé, founder of the French Center for Intelligence Research, reported that ‘France’s Islamic workforce is beginning to impose their beliefs at their places of work and is using their religion to justify theft, embezzlement, and the supply of inside information to criminal gangs’.³⁸³ Ten years later, a study by the Observatory of Religion in the Workplace (*Observatoire du fait religieux en entreprise, OFRE*) and the Randstad Institute found that 23 percent of managers in France were confronting religious problems at work on a regular basis.³⁸⁴ In December 2015, Philippe Martinez, the Secretary General of Air France’s labour union, revealed that the organization had expelled almost 500 members who were suspected of being Islamic extremists.³⁸⁵

Denécé had estimated in 2005 that there were around 500,000 Muslim citizens of France that identified with radical Islam.³⁸⁶ In the summer of 2015, Prime Minister Manuel Valls said there were between 10,000 and 15,000 Salafists in France³⁸⁷ and the Paris newspaper *Le Figaro* reported that 41 mosques in France were ‘now destabilized’ by radicalism.³⁸⁸ In 2014, over 400 French nationals had gone to fight in Syria,³⁸⁹ but by April 2015, according to Manuel Valls (PM), this number had increased to more than 1,550.³⁹⁰

There are hundreds of areas in France considered Muslim ‘no-go zones’ that are beyond police control and where lawlessness, in terms of French secular-judicial law but not Sharia, reigns and where Salafi radicalism takes place. For example, in 2010 *Le Figaro* called downtown Perpignan a

‘veritable no-go zone’ where ‘aggression, incivility, drug trafficking, rising communitarianism, racial tensions and tribal violence’ results in non-Muslim flight from the area.³⁹¹ In 2011, the newspaper *Le Parisien* referred to parts of Grigny in the southern suburbs of Paris as a ‘lawless zone’ run by Muslim gangs.³⁹² In 2012 Gilles Demailly, mayor of Amiens, stated that the Fafet-Brossolette district of the city is a no-go zone³⁹³ and *Le Figaro* stated that Les Izards district of Toulouse was a no-go zone ruled by Arab drug trafficking gangs.³⁹⁴ In 2013 a leading broadcaster in France, *Europe 1*, stated that Marseille was a no-go zone due to warring Muslim gangs in the city³⁹⁵ and the Ministry of the Interior said that it aimed to ‘reconquer’ the roughly 180 square kilometers of Marseille from the control of Muslim gangs.³⁹⁶ In the same year a local police commander in the township of Trappes in the western suburbs of Paris, Mohammed Duhan, said that crime and radical Islam are two sides of the same coin: ‘Criminals are pursued by Islamic fundamentalists to impose an alternative society, breaking links with the French Republic’.³⁹⁷ In 2014 Fabrice Balanche, a French Islam scholar who teaches at the University of Lyon, stated that ‘mini Islamic states have been formed’ in various areas, such as Roubaix and northern Marseille ‘where police will not step foot, where the authority of state is completely absent’³⁹⁸ and Franck Guiot, a French politician, stated that there are no-go zones in the southern suburbs of Paris, such as parts of Évry, where police are attacked.³⁹⁹ There are many more Muslim no-go areas dotted across France like the ones mentioned above.⁴⁰⁰ After the Islamist attack on *Charlie Hebdo* and the kosher supermarket in January 2015, PM Manuel Valls stated that there is ‘territorial, social and ethnic apartheid’ in France.⁴⁰¹

9.4 Sweden

In 1930, there were only 13 Muslims in Sweden;⁴⁰² it is projected that by 2030, the Muslim population will have reached almost one million or about 10 percent of the total population.⁴⁰³ In 1960, the Muslim population in Sweden was estimated to be 701 persons and by 2010 there were 499,965, which means the Muslim population increased by 71,222 percent in just 50 years.⁴⁰⁴ Some estimates of the number of Muslims in Sweden are much higher; one million or more, equaling about 10 percent of the total population already.⁴⁰⁵ The Muslim population is mainly made up of immigrants from Turkey, Iran, the Balkans, Pakistan, and Arab and African nations. In the year 2000, when there were around 350,000 Muslims in Sweden, the largest populations of Muslims were found in Sweden’s three largest cities: approximately half or 175,000 lived in the capital, Stockholm, 10–15 percent or 35,000–50,000 lived in Gothenburg, and about 50,000 lived in Malmö.⁴⁰⁶ These proportions were similar in 2007, when there were

around 400,000 Muslims in Sweden, and are estimated to be the same today, with a Muslim population over 500,000.⁴⁰⁷

The total fertility rate of Muslims in Sweden is 2.5 compared to the 1.8 national average.⁴⁰⁸ In Malmö, in 2007, the name Mohammed was in the top five baby names while being 71st nation-wide,⁴⁰⁹ then in 2011 at the national level, Mohamed made 66th place in popularity,⁴¹⁰ and by 2015 it had made it to 43rd place.⁴¹¹ This is significant as within only eight years the baby boy name Mohammed had jumped 28 places and, as such, if this trend continues, within 12–13 years or by 2027/2028 Mohammed could be the number one name given to newborn boys in Sweden.

According to the *European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia*, in 2006 the majority of students who were ‘under achievers’ in Sweden had a ‘foreign background’.⁴¹² In 2014, according to *Sweden Statistics*, the foreign-born population and the Swedish-born had similar percentages when it came to having achieved more than three years of post-secondary education: 23 percent of foreign-borns compared to 21 percent of Swedish-born. However, 19 percent of foreign-borns had only achieved primary and lower secondary education compared to 13 percent of Swedish-born, and 36 percent of foreign-borns had only achieved upper secondary education compared to 51 percent of Swedish-born. The level of education of foreign-born Muslims in Sweden varies between different source countries. Table 27 breaks down the level of educational attainment in 2015 for the four top non-EU foreign-born populations in Sweden, those from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Somalia (which are Muslim-majority countries), aged between 25 and 64, in comparison to the national and foreign-born percentages. The percentage of Iranians who had achieved post-secondary education was higher than Swedish-born, Iraqis had similar levels to Swedish-born in regards to post-secondary education, and Turks and Somalians had very low levels of post-secondary education compared to Iraqis, Iranians, the Swedish-born, and the foreign-born totals.

Table 27. Educational Attainment (25–64 years): Foreign-Born, Swedish-Born, and Four Top Non-European Foreign-Born Populations, 2015 (percent)

Nationality	Primary and lower secondary	Upper secondary	Post-secondary	Total
Swedish-born	13%	51%	21%	21%
Foreign-born	19%	36%	23%	23%
Iran	19%	36%	23%	23%
Iraq	19%	36%	23%	23%
Turkey	19%	36%	23%	23%
Somalia	19%	36%	23%	23%

Source: Data adapted from Statistics Sweden, ‘Table: The population 2015 by level of education, country of birth and sex. Age 25–64.’

Most often, when refugees and family reunification migrants first arrive in Sweden they lack the relevant skill sets (such as higher education and language ability) to successfully integrate into the labour market, which is a

a foreign background is likely much higher.

Table 30. Swedish-born and Foreign-born Welfare Use in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, 2010 (percent)

	Stockholm				Gothenburg				Malmö			
Swedish-born												
Population												82.0%
Welfare Use												88.5%

Source: Data adapted from Affes Statistik-blogg, ‘Ekonomiskt bistånd i 24 kommuner.’

Table 30 shows that in 2010 over 22 percent of the population of Stockholm were foreign-born but made up over 67 percent of those receiving welfare, being over-represented by a factor of 7.3. In Gothenburg, over 22 percent were foreign-born but received over 66 percent of welfare, which is an over-representation of 6.9. Over 30 percent of the population of Malmö were foreign born but made up over 75 percent of those receiving welfare, being over-represented by a factor of 7.1. For these three cities, the total foreign-born population amounted to 392,570 persons, but the total cost of welfare for this group was over two billion (2,096,379,000) Swedish Kroner. In comparison, the total Swedish-born population of these three cities amounted to 1,267,217, but the total cost of welfare for this group was just over 930 million (933,137,000) Swedish Kroner. Although the foreign-born population only amounted to less than 30 percent of the total population of the three largest cities of Sweden, they received almost 70 percent of the total amount of welfare issued in 2010. As the majority of the non-European foreign-born population are from Muslim-majority nations (as detailed above) and as the majority of the Muslim population in Sweden reside in the three largest cities in Sweden, one can suppose that the majority of foreign-born receiving welfare are Muslim.

Over the last few years, numerous public figures in Sweden have stated that mass-immigration is threatening the welfare system. In 2010, Swedish Social Democrat Chairman Henrik Sass Larsen stated that:

we do not want to sacrifice the welfare state in the name of humanism...the welfare state is....a society built on the principles of freedom, equality and solidarity. Mass immigration... will undermine the economic and social foundation of the welfare state.⁴¹⁵

In 2013, Immigration Minister Tobias Billström said immigrants ‘are coming to households where the only income is support from the municipality. Is that reasonable?’⁴¹⁶ In 2015, economist Tino Sanandaji explained that open borders can’t be combined with a welfare state:

If you’re offering generous welfare benefits to every citizen, and anyone can come and use these benefits, then a very large number of people will try to do that. And it’s just mathematically impossible for a small country like Sweden to fund those benefits.⁴¹⁷

Despite these warnings, Sweden continues to import large numbers of non-economic immigrants i.e. asylum seekers and those under family reunification laws.

Since 1975, when Sweden introduced mass-immigration, there has been a rapid rise in crime. Violent crime has risen 320 percent⁴¹⁸ and reported rapes have risen almost 1,500 percent.⁴¹⁹ First and second generation immigrants are over-represented in both these statistics.⁴²⁰ Annual reports from the Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics, known as SPACE (*Statistiques Pénales Annuelles du Conseil de l'Europe*) reveal that the foreign prison population (which only includes non-Swedish or dual citizens and not those with a migrant background i.e. those who are Swedish-born who have one or two foreign-born parents) has hovered between 20 and 22 percent since at least 2004.⁴²¹ In 2007, the Ministry of Justice of Sweden reported that 30 percent of prison inmates in Sweden were foreign-born,⁴²² although they made up less than 15 percent of the national population.

As in Belgium, the UK, and France, immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are over-represented in Sweden's crime statistics. The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) issued a report in December 2005 that revealed immigrants, particularly those from North Africa, East Africa, Other Africa, and Western Asia committed 25 percent of all crimes, although they constituted less than five percent of the total population.⁴²³ The report, *Crime Among Persons Born in Sweden and Other Countries* (2005), revealed that the foreign-born groups with the highest over-representation as criminal suspects were Other African (4.2%), North Africans (3.7%), Western Asians (3%), and East Africans (2.8%). The report also showed that between 1997 and 2001, the groups with the highest percentages for registered crimes were foreign-born residents from Western Asia (18.8%), North Africa (23.3%), East Africa (17.5%), and Other Africa (26.3%) who had over-representation rates of 3.8, 4.7, 3.5, and 5.3 percent respectively.⁴²⁴ Eight of the 12 top source countries for non-European foreign-born migrants (2011) of these regions of the world are Muslim-majority nations and one has a significant Muslim population (Ethiopia: 35%) (see tables 13 and 18).

Sweden has the second highest number of reported rapes in the world: in 2010 there were 53.2 reported rapes per 100,000 people⁴²⁵ and in 2014 it rose to 69 cases per 100,000 people.⁴²⁶ A 1996 Crime Prevention Council in Sweden report revealed that foreign-born men were four times as likely to commit rape than native Swedish men and the overwhelming majority of foreign-born rapists were from Muslim majority countries in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. Men from these countries were 23 times more likely to commit rape than Swedish-born.⁴²⁷ In 2002, 85 percent of those sentenced to two or more years for rape by the Svea Court of Appeal in Stockholm, which is one of six appellate courts in the Swedish legal system, were foreign-born or second generation immigrants.⁴²⁸ The rate of

sexual assaults by foreigners in Sweden has been increasing every year. The above mentioned *Crime Among Persons Born in Sweden and Other Countries* (2005) report by Brå revealed that from 1997 to 2001 foreign-born individuals were 5.5 times more likely to be charged with rape than Swedish-born individuals with two Swedish-born parents and that foreign born individuals from all regions, apart from East Asia, committed sexual assaults at rates up to 5.3 times greater than that of Swedish-born with two Swedish-born parents.⁴²⁹ Just recently, eight sexual attacks against girls and women by ‘foreign men’ in just three weeks in Östersund, a town of 44,000, led police to warn women not to go out alone at night. County police commissioner, Stephen Jerand, said ‘The situation is tense. *We have never experienced anything like this before.* It is almost unreal’.⁴³⁰

Like Belgium, the UK, and France, Sweden has a problem with Muslim radicalism and is threatened by Islamist terrorism. Sweden is involved in a joint project with several European countries called Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation and Terrorism (COPPRA) that targets extremism and extremist groups which use violence to achieve political ends. It is funded by Belgium and the EU and has produced training manuals and packages to help with the understanding of radicalisation processes and the recognition of radicalisation. Sweden has also participated in the development of a similar training handbook designed to ‘identify and address’ radicalisation in prisons.⁴³¹

There is no specific radical Islamic group like Sharia4Belgium in Sweden that is officially known to recruit Muslims for jihad in Syria. However, radicalism is occurring through radical mosques, contact with Bakri and Choudary, and Islamist propaganda online and through other media.⁴³² According to an August 2015 Swedish government report, *Prevent, Preempt, Protect: the Swedish Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, ‘The foremost terrorist threat in Sweden today comes from actors inspired by al-Qaeda or the ideologies of closely related organisations’. This report identifies several channels of Muslim radicalisation, such as the internet, social media, penitentiaries, and Muslims in Sweden who have travelled to Muslim countries to fight and/or receive terrorist training who then return to Sweden.⁴³³ Between 250 and 300 Muslims from Sweden have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS, which is the second largest number of foreign-fighters per capita in the European Union, after Belgium.⁴³⁴ Most of these foreign-fighters come from the northeastern suburbs of Gothenburg, such as Angered, Bergsjön, Backa, and Biskopsgården as well as from Malmö, all areas having high concentrations of Muslims.⁴³⁵

Like elsewhere in Europe with significant Muslim populations, radicalisation in Muslim neighbourhoods in Sweden is a problem. There are many ethnic enclaves, which are referred to as ‘exclusion areas’ or no-go zones — parts of Sweden characterised by immigration, low levels of employment, criminal gangs, and high levels of crime including gun, bomb,

and hand grenade attacks, which were rare in Sweden up until a few years ago.⁴³⁶ The number of these areas grow every year. In 1990 there were three exclusion areas, in 2004 there were 136,⁴³⁷ and in 2006 there were 186.⁴³⁸ In Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, there are over 20 such no-go zones constituting around 75,000 people.⁴³⁹ Swedish authorities are persistently attacked by violent gangs of immigrants when they attempt to provide public aid such as police, fire fighting, and ambulance services, and have effectively lost control in these areas. Journalists are also being attacked,⁴⁴⁰ businesses are leaving these areas, and even bus services have had to be suspended due to the risk of violence in some places.

According to a recent police report, around 55 of these ‘exclusion areas’ function as parallel communities and justice systems governed by Islamic Sharia law and criminal gangs.⁴⁴¹ They are characterised by high unemployment, low education, high levels of crime, and Muslim radicalisation. Fire and ambulance services require police escorts to enter these areas due to the violence directed against them, ranging from physical assaults, theft, and muggings, to damage of service vehicles and equipment. The Ambulance Union has requested military-grade protection gear to enter these places, such as bullet proof vests and helmets.⁴⁴² Police are also attacked by Muslim gangs; most often rocks are thrown, but sometimes fireworks, Molotov cocktails, guns, and bombs are used.⁴⁴³ Jacob Ekström, a police officer working in two enclaves, Tensta and Rinkeby, said that ‘The situation is slipping from our grasp’ and that

If we’re in pursuit of a vehicle, it can evade us by driving to certain neighborhoods where a lone patrol car simply cannot follow, because we’ll get pelted by rocks and even face riots. These are No-Go Zones. We simply can’t go there.⁴⁴⁴

There have also been a multitude of violent riots and arson attacks in Sweden involving immigrants, mostly Muslims, that have cost millions of dollars in damage and resources.⁴⁴⁵ The following are just three examples of many: In 2013, hundreds of Muslim immigrants rampaged through parts of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö for several days, torching cars and buses, setting fires to buildings — including a police station and schools — smashing windows, vandalising property, and hurling rocks and bottles at police, rescue, and fire services.⁴⁴⁶ In 2015, violent racial unrest between immigrants erupted in Stockholm and Malmö involving bombs, guns, and hand grenade attacks between Turkish and Kurdish and other ethnic minority immigrants.⁴⁴⁷ For three months in early 2016 (March to May), ongoing immigrant youth unrest, riots, arson, stone-throwing, attacks on police, and so on occurred in various ‘problem’ neighbourhoods.⁴⁴⁸

9.5 Germany

Partly due to the onset of the bilateral labour agreement in 1961, Turkish immigrants accounted for 2.1 million of the German population by the year 2000, a number that does not include naturalised Turkish immigrants.⁴⁴⁹ As discussed in chapter 3, Turks constitute the largest population of non-European Muslims in Germany today, followed by Muslims from Kazakhstan, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, and Afghanistan. In a 2008 study commissioned by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, it was estimated that the Muslim population of Germany was between 3.8 and 4.3 million or 4.6 and 5.2 percent of the population, and 86 percent considered themselves rather or strongly religious.⁴⁵⁰ In his article ‘Muslim Population in Europe: 1950–2020’, Kettani calculated that in 1950 there were 20,513 Muslims residing in Germany and by 2010 their numbers had climbed to 4,283,364.⁴⁵¹ This means that in just a sixty-year period the Muslim population in Germany increased by 20,781 percent. Other estimates of the Muslim population in Germany are similar. It was estimated that in 2007 about ‘one-third’ of the 7.3 million foreign-born population in Germany (just over 2.4 million) were Muslims.⁴⁵² By 2009, an estimate for both the foreign and naturalised Muslim population of Germany was 4.3 million or 5.4 percent of the total population, and by 2010 the Pew Research center reported that Muslims constituted over 4.7 million or 5.8 percent of the total German population.⁴⁵³ In 2009, most Muslims in Germany lived in North Rhine-Westphalia (7.5%, 1,342,248 of the total population), which is the most populous state in Germany. The majority of the rest of the Muslim population in Germany resided in the old federal states, as shown in table 31.⁴⁵⁴

Table 31. Largest Muslim Populations by German State, 2009

	Population	(%)
North Rhine-Westphalia	1,342,248	7.5
Baden-Württemberg	673,163	4.6
Bavaria	535,273	3.7
Hessen	417,679	3.0
Berlin	279,802	2.0
Lower Saxony	251,418	1.8
Rheinland-Palatinate	162,206	1.2
Hamburg	141,980	1.0
Schleswig-Holstein	85,156	0.6
Bremen	64,888	0.5

Source: Data adapted from Felix Strüning,⁴⁵⁵ ‘Muslims in Germany Increasingly Segregated.’

In 2011, the Muslim population was estimated to rise to 5,545,000 or 7.1 percent of the population of Germany by 2030, but this figure is rendered inaccurately low by the large-scale influx (over one million) of ‘migrant crisis’ refugees in 2015/2016, who were majority Muslim and most sought refugee status in Germany (see chapter 11.2).⁴⁵⁶ Despite the fact that the unemployment level in Germany is over 10 percent and around 20 percent for youth, Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s deputy chancellor, wants to bring in

around 500,000 migrants per year over several years.⁴⁵⁷ This is astounding considering the overwhelming majority of the 2015 influx of ‘refugee’ migrants to Germany were young Muslim males who will compete for jobs with the natives.⁴⁵⁸

The total fertility rate of Muslims in Germany is 1.8, which is comparable to the national rate of 1.3.⁴⁵⁹ However, other reports, such as the multi-authored Congressional Research Report, suggest that the ‘Muslim birthrate is three times higher than for non-Muslims’.⁴⁶⁰ According to Soeren Kern, a senior fellow at the Gatestone Institute and senior analyst for European politics at the Madrid-based Strategic Studies Group, the population increase of Muslims in Germany is 1.6 percent or 77,000 per year, which is significant compared to the minus 0.18 population growth rate for Germany as a whole.⁴⁶¹ In 2004, over nine percent of all children born in Germany were born to Muslim parents⁴⁶² and one-third of the total Muslim population were under the age of 18.⁴⁶³ According to Kern, the high number of Muslims in Germany means that Germany has ‘the highest Muslim population in Western Europe’.⁴⁶⁴ Names analyst Knud Bielefeld examined the birth registrations of 183,396 babies in 2015 and found that Mohammed/Muhammad was the 57th most popular baby name in Germany as a whole.⁴⁶⁵ This does not reflect the large young Muslim populations in Germany, as it did for the other countries profiled above. The majority of Muslim immigrants in Germany are of Turkish descent, and in 2014 the five most popular baby boy names in Turkey were: Yusuf, Eymen, Mustafa, Ömer, and Berat.⁴⁶⁶

In terms of educational levels, 29.4 percent of Turks in Germany had no educational qualifications compared to 0.9 percent of the native German population between 1991 and 2004. Only 37.8 percent had general elementary education (compared to 79% for natives), 18.7 percent had general elementary education and a vocational qualification (compared to 43.8% for natives), and 0.9 percent had lower/higher tertiary education (compared to 18.7% of the native German population).⁴⁶⁷ Higher education is vital for success in the labour market. According to a 2007 Open Society report, in 2004 Turkish nationals had ‘an unemployment rate of 23 per cent’ compared to 11 percent for Germans, and Turkish nationals comprised ‘up to one third of all unemployed foreigners’. In some federal states the ‘juvenile Muslim populations’, which would include second and third generations, had an unemployment rate of almost 30 percent. In Berlin ‘foreign welfare recipients stood at 27.0 percent’ in 2004. In 2007, the Muslim population of Berlin, most of them Turks, stood at 200,000 or about 9 percent of the total population and concentrated in three districts: Kreuzberg, Wedding, and Northern Neukölln. In these three districts the population of welfare recipients made up more than 11 percent compared to the city average of 8.1 percent.⁴⁶⁸

As for prison statistics, there are no official statistics available in Germany

based on religious or ethnic background. However, according to a February 2000 report by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, there were 1,925 Muslim prisoners in Baden-Württemberg prison making up 22 percent of the total prison population⁴⁶⁹ and it was estimated that in 2004 Muslims comprised 11 percent of the prison population of the penitentiary in Freiburg, a city in Baden-Württemberg state.⁴⁷⁰ Annual reports from the Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics (SPACE: Statistiques Pénales Annuelles du Conseil de l'Europe), publish the number and percentage of foreign prisoners per year. Figure 10 shows the native and foreign prison populations in Germany between 2004 and 2014; 'foreign' means those with a foreign nationality and not those who have been naturalized.




Figure 10. Native and Foreign Prison Populations, 2004–2014 Germany

Source: Data from Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics, Annual Reports: SPACE I (2004–2014).

Figure 10 shows a consistent decline in the number of native prisoners over the 11 year period from almost 80,000 in 2004 to less than 66,000 in 2014, and a decline in the number of foreign prisoners, from almost 22,500 in 2004 to almost 19,600 in 2014. Despite a decrease in actual numbers (-2,900), in terms of percentage, foreign prisoners shared a larger proportion of the prison population in 2014 (29.8%) than in 2004 (28.2%). If one-third of foreigners in Germany are Muslim, then a conservative estimate for the percentage of Muslims in German prisons is around 10 percent of the total prison population. But as a significant number of Muslims in Germany have been naturalised (45%) and thus are included in the ‘native’ category, then the percentage of incarcerated Muslims is likely much higher. In addition, if the categories ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ were disregarded, and if the Muslim prison population of other European countries were taken into account (which reveal a trend of Muslims being over-represented in prison populations), then the percentage for Muslims in German prisons will likely be similar. In a recent analysis of crimes committed in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia by the newspaper *Die Welt*, it was revealed that although the Algerian population was only 5,210 in 2015, they were responsible for committing 13,231 crimes; and although the Moroccan population was 36,118, they were responsible for committing 14,733 crimes.⁴⁷¹ A very conservative estimate of the Muslim prison population in Germany based on these factors may lie between 15 and 20 percent of the total prison population.

Like the other countries mentioned above, Muslim radicalisation in German prisons is a problem, but there is little official data on this

phenomenon. However, it is known that prisoners (Muslim and non-Muslim) exposed to incarcerated Muslim extremists and radical imams are at risk of being radicalised. Officials of the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which monitors extremist activity, have witnessed Salafi Muslims attempting to convert other inmates and have identified jihadist handbooks that suggest the recruitment of fellow prisoners.⁴⁷² There are also jihadist social media networks that actively focus on helping Muslim prisoners through letter-writing, direct interaction with prisoners, and donations, such as the *Ansarul Aseer*,⁴⁷³ which maintains contact with Muslims once released.⁴⁷⁴ Efforts to de-radicalise prisons involve the use of counter-ideology moderate imams, yet such programs have had a little success.⁴⁷⁵ Germany is also involved with joint de-radicalisation projects with the European Union and individual member states. They produce booklets and handbooks that provide instructions for prison staff on the ‘indicators of radicalization’.⁴⁷⁶ In 2008, Germany, Austria, and France developed a ‘guide of best practices’ to deal with prison radicalisation involving: the ‘training of prison staff in detecting signs of radicalism or radicalisation’; the ‘placement of Islamist prisoners’, which includes methods of ‘regrouping’, ‘dispersing,’ and ‘isolation’; ‘the monitoring of visits, communications and entertainment activities (readings, Internet) of inmates’; and the attempt to fill a ‘religious gap’, such as proving halal food.⁴⁷⁷

As in other European countries, Muslim radicalisation in Germany is a serious problem. Concerns about violent Salafists (Vidino calls them ‘violent rejectionists’) in Germany have been a focus of German intelligence since at least 2010. In 2013, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) claimed that ‘violent Salafists are increasingly seeking to launch terrorist attacks in Germany’.⁴⁷⁸ In 2014, the BfV said that extreme Salafism, which it called Germany’s ‘most dynamic Islamic movement’, was becoming increasingly popular. It estimated that the number of Salafists had increased from 3,800 in 2011 to 5,500 in 2013 and would be around 7,000 by the end of 2014.⁴⁷⁹ Also in 2014, the interior minister of Germany, Thomas de Maiziere, warned that radical Islam is ‘a critical security threat to Germany’.⁴⁸⁰ By 2015, after several months of the ‘migrant crisis’, Hans-Georg Maassen, head of BfV said that the number of Salafis in Germany had increased, such that there were around 7,900 in September 2015 and by December 2015 there were 8,350.⁴⁸¹ At this time the BfV and the Federal Criminal Office (BKA) warned that as many as 43,000 Islamists were residing in Germany.⁴⁸²

Many Muslim organisations in Germany have been labelled Islamist by Verfassungsschutz, the German internal Intelligence Service, and have had funding blocked or withdrawn, which include INSSAN, Millî Görüş, and the Muslim Youth Germany organization (MJD). MJD promotes Muslim

identity and has been accused of having ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, and INSSAN and Milli Görüs are Islamist Muslim organizations in Germany that focus on identity politics and promote a collective and distinct Muslim identity.⁴⁸³ There are several prominent Muslims in Germany that are considered as leading Islamists and radicalisers, especially of youth. These include: Syrian-rooted Hassan Dabbagh, who is head Imam of the Al-Rahman-Mosque in Leipzig; Palestinian Abou-Nagie, a leading German Salafist; Pierre Vogel, a convert, who is considered one of the most influential Islamists in Germany; and Sven Lau, another convert, who, in 2014, set up 'Sharia Police' in Wuppertal.⁴⁸⁴

The 'Sharia Police' in Germany, like the sharia patrols in London and elsewhere, claimed the Wuppertal city station and other nearby areas as a 'Sharia Controlled Zone,' where they gushed their radical Salafi-Islamism and ordered the locals to abide by the rules of Sharia. They were first taken to court over their uniform (bright orange with the words 'Sharia Patrol') and public gathering in 2015, but their case was dismissed by a Wuppertal district court.⁴⁸⁵ They are now being tried in the Dusseldorf state court for wearing a uniform with a political message, and for their leader, Lau, who is suspected of supporting the foreign terror group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JAMWA) in Syria by way of the provision of funds and materials, as well as recruiting fighters in Germany for this group.⁴⁸⁶

Between 2008 and 2012 there were '30,000 participationist Islamists', 4,000 Salafists, and 1,140 violent jihadists in Germany.⁴⁸⁷ In 2014, around 450 Muslims in Germany had joined Islamist militants in Syria and Iraq to fight for the Islamic state⁴⁸⁸ and 11 of them had died fighting jihad in Iraq and Syria, being part of the Lohberger Brigade from North Rhine-Westphalia and the Wolfsburg Cell from Lower Saxony.⁴⁸⁹ In November 2015, there were an estimated 770 foreign fighters in ISIS from Germany and some of these were former convicts;⁴⁹⁰ at least 20 of them were former German soldiers.⁴⁹¹ In April 2016, a report by the German military counter intelligence service (MAD) revealed that at least 29 former German soldiers had left the country to join ISIS; 65 active soldiers were under investigation for being sympathetic to jihadism; and, that while there is no 'systematic push by Islamist organizations to infiltrate the army', Islamism 'represents a real danger that we have to take seriously' says Social Democratic Party (SPD) MP Hans-Peter Bartels, who oversees the army.⁴⁹²

Radical Islamic representatives urge that Muslims not assimilate into European societies as it would be an offense to pure Islam, or a crime against Islam, and declare it is imperative that they stick to their roots, deny democracy, and practice Sharia law. As an example, in 2008 the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan addressed 20,000 Turks in Cologne, Germany, saying that assimilation constitutes 'a crime against humanity' and that Turkish people must stay Turkish and not adopt German identity.⁴⁹³ In this way, Turkish and other Muslims in Germany and elsewhere in Europe

who refuse to adopt Western values and law constitute a major factor in the social fragmentation of society.

There are at least 10 major ghettos in Germany, characterised by large immigrant populations, high unemployment and welfare dependency, low education, and high crime,⁴⁹⁴ and there are numerous no-go zones where radicalism is flourishing. In 2011 Germany's chief of police, Bernhard Witthaut declared that migrant no-go areas in Germany are where 'crimes are not reported. They are left to themselves. Only in the most terrible of cases do we in the police learn anything about it. Government authority is completely out of the picture.'⁴⁹⁵ In 2013, Germany's Steinke Institute (SI) began mapping no-go areas in Bonn that have been described as 'high danger potential'.⁴⁹⁶ CDU deputy Gregor Golland has criticised the political establishment in North Rhine-Westphalia for allowing the conditions to develop that have enabled 'criminal parallel societies' that 'are seeking the upper hand, or those already solidifying,'⁴⁹⁷ to flourish. A leaked police report in 2015 revealed that problem or criminal neighbourhoods are becoming increasingly lawless and police cannot guarantee public order 'over the long term' in these areas. Already in 2009 the president of the German Police Union, Rainer Wendt, stated that 'In Berlin or in the north of Duisburg there are neighborhoods where colleagues hardly dare to stop a car — because they know that they'll be surrounded by 40 or 50 men' and that these attacks are a 'deliberate challenge to the authority of the state — attacks in which the perpetrators are expressing their contempt for our society'.⁴⁹⁸ Such contempt is quite common according to police commissioner Tania Kambouri, who stated in an interview with *Stuttgarter Zeitung* in 2015 that police are harassed and ganged-up on by mainly young Muslim men who 'do not identify themselves with the German state — even if they were born in Germany or have long lived here. Some openly say "sh*t on Germany"'.⁴⁹⁹

Such criminality and rejection of the German state law is linked with various immigrant clans, including Bosnians, Lebanese, Moroccans, and others. In October 2010, *Der Spiegel* published an article titled 'Large Arab Families: The State Cowers in Fear of Criminal Clans', which highlighted the gravity of immigrant criminality in Germany: 'immigrant mafia clans with thousands of members' are 'taking advantage of legal loopholes, social welfare services and international contacts with dominant organized crime groups'.⁵⁰⁰ According to Dirk Jacob, the director of the State Criminal Police Office (LKA), the clans specialise in property crime and drug trafficking, and are very costly and hard to dissolve.⁵⁰¹ According to a recent report, these extended Arab migrant clans are now recruiting new migrants and exploiting the recent arrival of 'migrant crisis' refugees.⁵⁰² There are also issues with the largest Muslim population in Germany, the Turks, some of whom have formed a biker gang and an 'Ottomans Germania' boxing club that spans several other countries, including Sweden, Austria, Switzerland,

and Turkey. The club released a music video that claims it aims to conquer Germany:

We're coming to take over the entire country. Men, fighting to the last drop of blood for their brothers on the battlefield. We stand in this fight — until the whole world knows our name. The Ottomans are Coming.⁵⁰³

Joachim Wagner, a German legal expert and author of *Judges without Law: Islamic Parallel Justice Endangers Our Constitutional State* (2011), claims that a parallel legal system of Sharia Courts is now operating in all of the big German cities and undermining the rule of law. Sharia courts undercut the secular legal system 'because Muslim arbiters-cum-imams are settling criminal cases out of court without the involvement of German prosecutors or lawyers before law enforcement can bring the cases to a German court'.⁵⁰⁴ This is a problem as Sharia is not based on the same guiding principles and values as secular rule of law, including human rights and the equality of women, which has bearing on how inheritance, divorce, and other 'family matters' are settled. Under Sharia these matters are resolved in a way that is heavily biased towards males. Sharia courts also shun the involvement of the state justice system in cases involving criminal offenses and, according to Wagner, instead rely on a traditional system of 'conflict resolution' involving 'violence and threats.' As such, it is usually 'the stronger family' that wins the case. Thus the 'dictate of power' rather than justice dominates sharia law.⁵⁰⁵

Not only are there Sharia courts in Germany but Sharia law is being used by German courts themselves.⁵⁰⁶ In 2010 Hilmar Krüger, a law professor at the University of Cologne, declared that 'We have long been practicing Islamic law', particularly family and inheritance aspects of sharia, which include marriage (including 'bride price' or dowry) and divorce laws. Mathias Rohe, a lawyer and Islam expert stated that 'We apply Islamic law just as we do French law', which seems awkward, in that he places the secular constitutions and rule of law of Germany and France, which have long and often interwoven histories, on equal footing with the religious law of Islam. How can it be that the German legal code based on secularity and the enshrinement of human rights, can suddenly represent, after experiencing only 60 years of Muslim immigration, a legal system interwoven with a historically foreign source of religious law?⁵⁰⁷

10. In Statistics: Muslim Fundamentalism and European Opposition

Different crises have erupted in Europe over the last few decades from the yearly entry of high volumes of legal and illegal migrants from the non-European world, particularly from Muslim regions, into Europe. These crises involve national identity, demographics, culture, security, terrorism, and territorial dispossession. Since at least the 1990s, there have been various scholars talking of a 'global migrant crisis' that posed demographic, security, and cultural problems for Western nations. One such person was Myron Weiner, a renowned American scholar of international migration and ethnic conflict, who published *The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and Human Rights* (1995). In this work, Weiner wrote that in response to non-European immigration into the West, Westerners have increasing anxiety

that they are now being invaded not by armies and tanks, but by migrants who speak other languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures, and, they fear, will take their jobs, occupy their land, live off the welfare system, and threaten their way of life.⁵⁰⁸

These fears are not unfounded. As discussed in chapter 9, statistics show that non-European foreign-born residents, particularly from North African and other Muslim countries, are consistently over-represented in unemployment rates, low educational levels, welfare benefits, violent crime, and prison populations compared to national levels in Europe. There are also issues with ethnic enclaves and parallel societies that have become identified as hotbeds of Muslim radicalism and terrorism, and various polls and surveys reveal there is significant support for radical Islamism as well as widespread Islamist fundamentalism in Europe.

10.1 Muslim Views on Integration and Sharia Law

Various polls and surveys have shown that a significant number of Muslims in Britain do not want to integrate into British society; they reject its law, values, and principles and would rather live under a socio-political system based on Sharia. Public opinion researcher, ICM, conducted a poll of 500 Muslim adults in Britain for the *Guardian* newspaper in 2005. This poll revealed that 32 percent thought the amount the Muslim community had integrated into British society was just right and 18 percent thought they had integrated too much.⁵⁰⁹ In other words, 50 percent of those polled did not want to integrate into British society any further.

A year later, another ICM poll for the *Sunday Telegraph* of 500 Muslims

revealed that 40 percent wanted Sharia to be implemented in parts of Britain that were majority Muslim.⁵¹⁰ Another survey in the same year by NOP Research that was broadcast by Britain's Channel 4-TV, revealed that 30 percent of British Muslims wanted to live under Islamic law rather than British law.⁵¹¹ In 2007, the British think tank Policy Exchange issued a report called 'Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism'. This report compiled data from a survey of 1,003 Muslims and found that in the age group of 16–24-year-olds '28%...would prefer to live under Sharia law', '74%...would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear the veil', '37%...preferred to send their children to Islamic state schools', and '36%...believe if a Muslim converts to another religion they should be punished by death'.⁵¹² In 2010, a survey of 600 Muslim students at 30 British universities revealed that 40 percent wanted Britain to live under Sharia law.⁵¹³

A poll of 1,000 Muslims in Britain conducted by ComRes for the BBC in 2015 revealed that 20 percent thought Islam is incompatible with Western society.⁵¹⁴ In an ICM poll for Channel 4 of face-to-face interviews with 1,081 British Muslims, released 11 April 2016, it was revealed that 24 percent would prefer there were areas of Britain under Sharia rather than British law and 17 percent wanted to lead a separate Islamic life in Britain. Almost 30 percent agreed that 'Britain is a country of bad moral behaviour' and the same amount wanted Islamic schools and laws in Britain. Almost 40 percent thought that wives should always obey their husbands, over 30 percent agreed that British Muslims should have the right to more than one wife, and five percent supported the stoning of female adulterers.⁵¹⁵

In summary of the above statistics we can see that fully half of British Muslims in 2005 thought there was no need for more integration, a trend that is most likely the same today (and perhaps escalated) despite continued calls for more integration efforts by various Left-wing and Liberal organizations and political figures. We can also see that in the ten-year period between 2006 and 2016, between 30 and 40 percent of British Muslims wanted to live under Sharia law rather than British secular law and be instructed in Islamic education rather than British education. Extrapolating these percentages to the Muslim population of Britain as a whole, in 2006 between 640,000 and 850,000 Muslims in Britain wanted Sharia law to be implemented in Britain, and by 2016 this amount had risen to between 900,000 and 1.2 million Muslims.

10.2 Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism

Immediately after the London bombing in July 2005, an ICM poll of 500 Muslim adults in Britain revealed five percent thought suicide attacks were justified and 37 percent thought more suicide attacks by Islamists will occur

in Britain.⁵¹⁶ A year later, another ICM poll for the *Sunday Telegraph* of 500 Muslims revealed that 20 percent sympathised with the 2005 London suicide bombers⁵¹⁷ and a 2006 survey by NOP Research revealed that around a quarter of British Muslims thought the London bombings were justified due to 'British support for the US-led war on terror'.⁵¹⁸ In 2007, the Policy Exchange think tank reported that 13 percent of 16–24-year-olds admired 'organisations like al-Qaeda that are prepared to fight the West'⁵¹⁹ and another research study by Pew Research released in 2007 found that 15 percent of Muslims in Britain, 16 percent in France, and seven percent in Germany thought suicide bombings were justified, with this percentage rising for 18–29-year-olds to 35 percent in Britain, 42 percent in France, and 22 percent in Germany. For those over 30 years of age, support for suicide bombings was 17 percent in Britain, 31 percent in France, and 10 percent in Germany.⁵²⁰

In 2010, a survey of 600 Muslim students at 30 British universities revealed that 32 percent thought killing in the name of Islam was justified.⁵²¹ A poll of 1,000 Muslims in Britain conducted by ComRes for the *BBC* after the January 2015 *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attack revealed that 27 percent had sympathy for the gunmen; 11 percent said the victims deserved the attacks.⁵²² In a 2016 ICM poll for *Channel 4* of British Muslims, 24 percent supported the use of organised violence to protect religion, nine percent were sympathetic with those who use violence in political protest, six percent agreed with the use of terror threats in political protest, four percent supported the use of terrorism in political protest, and four percent thought that suicide bombings were justified to fight injustice.⁵²³

A 2013 study in Belgium found that 10 percent of young Muslims in Belgium supported Islamist terrorism and one in ten supported hate preaching in mosques.⁵²⁴ A 2014 ICM poll for the Russian news agency *Rossiia Segodnya* of 'European attitudes' on ISIS revealed that 16 percent of French citizens had a positive opinion of the group and this percentage increased to 27 percent among 18–24-year-olds. For British citizens, seven percent had a favourable response towards ISIS and this percentage increased to 11 percent among 35–44-year-olds. For German citizens of all age groups, between three and four percent had positive attitudes towards ISIS.⁵²⁵ A possible explanation as to why there are variations among support for ISIS in these three countries could be the composition of the Muslim populations, i.e. there are more Turks in Germany than in France and Britain, more North African Muslims in France than Britain and Germany, and more Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Afghanis in Britain than in France and Germany. In an ICM poll of British adults in July 2015, it was revealed that support for ISIS was at nine percent, which was two percent more than in 2014. This means that around 1.5 million Brits viewed ISIS favourably.⁵²⁶ In the 2016 ICM poll mentioned above, seven percent supported the ISIS objective of establishing a Caliphate, rising to 10 percent for 18–24-year-olds and 11

percent for those over 65; however, only three percent supported their methods.⁵²⁷

In 2014, telephone interviews undertaken by the *Arab Centre for Research and Public Policy Studies* of 5,100 respondents in seven Arab countries and in Syrian refugee camps located in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, showed that 11 percent (561) of all respondents had a positive or somewhat positive view of ISIL and 13 percent (663) had a negative view 'to some extent'. Almost 40 percent (1,887) opposed military airstrikes in Syria against ISIL, 32 percent (1,632) opposed the destruction of ISIL, 45 percent (2,295) absolutely disagreed with the use of US-Western ground troops to defeat ISIL, and 36 percent absolutely disagreed with the use of Arab ground troops to defeat ISIL. In addition, 36 percent (1,836) opposed Arabs joining the international coalition against ISIL, 73 percent (3,723) thought US foreign policy in the Arab region was negative or negative to some extent, 69 percent (3,519) thought ISIL was 'created by foreign actors', and 33 percent (1,683) thought ISIL was not a direct threat to their countries. Out of the 900 Syrian refugees interviewed, 13 percent (117) had a positive or somewhat positive view of ISIL and 10 percent (90) had a negative view to 'some extent', 31 percent (279) opposed the destruction of ISIL, 37 percent (333) opposed the airstrikes, and 73 percent (657) thought US foreign policy in the Arab region was negative.⁵²⁸

In terms of Muslim fundamentalism, the 2005 ICM poll for the *Guardian*, mentioned above, showed that 38 percent thought hate preachers should not be excluded or deported from the UK and four percent thought political and religious groups using violence to achieve political ends was justified.⁵²⁹ The 2006 NOP Research survey mentioned above revealed that 28 percent wanted the UK to become a fundamentalist Islamic state, and 68 percent wanted British people who 'insult Islam' to be arrested and prosecuted. A full 62 percent thought freedom of speech should *not* be protected. In contrast, the 2015 poll of Muslims in Britain by ComRes mentioned above found that 45 percent thought hate preachers that advocate violence against the West represent 'mainstream Islam'.⁵³⁰ The 2006 NOP survey revealed that nine percent of the British Muslim population were 'hardcore Islamists' and 29 percent were 'staunch defenders of Islam', meaning they defended Islam 'aggressively'.⁵³¹ In 2006, the British Muslim population was estimated to be 2,142,000, which means that almost 200,000 British Muslims were 'hardcore Islamists' and over 600,000 'aggressively' defended Islam.⁵³²

In 2011, the Pew Research Center published a survey they had conducted on the views of Muslims in seven Muslim nations, 'Common Concerns about Islamic Extremism: Muslim-Western Tensions Persist'. This survey revealed that a significant majority of Muslims have a negative view of Westerners: over 50 percent see Americans and Europeans as 'selfish, violent, greedy, immoral, arrogant and fanatical'.⁵³³ Muslims also have a negative view of

Christians and Jews: 82 percent of Muslims in Turkey and 66 percent of Muslims in Pakistan have negative views of Christians and ‘less than 10% have a positive opinion of Jews’.⁵³⁴ In 2013, the Berlin Social Science Center, WZB, released a report titled ‘Six Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey’, which was a survey of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Sweden.⁵³⁵ Dr. Ruud Koopmans, Professor of Sociology and Migration Research at the Humboldt University of Berlin, was project manager and co-author of the report. He wrote various articles based on the findings, such as ‘Fundamentalism and Out-group Hostility: Muslim Immigrants and Christian Natives in Western Europe’, which was published in WZB Mitteilungen in December 2013, and ‘Fundamentalism and Out-group Hostility: Comparing Muslims and Christians in Western Europe’, which was published in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* in July 2014. In these two articles he revealed that

While about one in five natives can be considered as Islamophobic, the level of phobia against the West among Muslims — for which oddly enough there is no word; one might call it ‘Occidentophobia’ — is much higher still, with 54 percent believing that the West is out to destroy Islam.⁵³⁶

Further, the percentage of Muslims with ‘consistent fundamentalist attitudes’ stood at 44 percent. Koopmans explains that although it is not universal among European Muslims, ‘religious fundamentalism is not marginal among Western European Muslims’ either, for

almost 60% agree that Muslims should return to the roots of Islam, 75% think there is only one possible interpretation of the Quran, which is binding for every Muslim and 65% say that religious rules [Sharia] are more important to them than the laws of the country in which they live.⁵³⁷

Koopman suggests that such ‘religious fundamentalism is very likely to provide a nourishing environment for radicalization’.⁵³⁸ These figures are very troublesome. As the Muslim population of Western Europe is around 20 million people, according to these percentages almost nine million are religious fundamentalists, almost 11 million think the West wants to destroy Islam, and around 13 million think Sharia law is more important than the rule of law.

10.3 European Opposition to Islam and Immigration

Several polls, surveys, and government reports since the late 1980s have consistently shown a majority opposition by European publics to anti-European Muslim neighbourhoods and large scale population changes

brought about by global mass-immigration into Europe, but with no efficient action taken by political elites. In fact, there has been an increase in immigration and stronger and more pervasive arguments for it. For example, in a 1989 Eurobarometer poll 56 percent of Britons thought that there were 'too many immigrants in the UK', and by the early 1990s over 60 percent of Britons agreed with this statement.⁵³⁹ A 2004 in-depth study of anti-immigrant attitudes in Britain by Lauren McLaren, associate professor of Politics at the University of Nottingham, and Mark Johnson, a senior researcher at the National Centre for Social Research, reported that 'In 1995, around two-thirds of the population thought that the number of immigrants should be reduced, but by 2003 this had jumped to three-quarters' of the population. In other words, as they state, 'the conviction is overwhelmingly against immigration'.⁵⁴⁰ A survey in 2000 by the UK research group Ipsos MORI found that agreement with the statement that there were 'too many immigrants' jumped from 55 percent in 1999 to 66 percent in 2000 and the majority of respondents (63%) either strongly agreed or tended to agree that too much is done to help immigrants.⁵⁴¹

According to Heaven Crawley, Coventry University Professor and Chair in International Migration of the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR), since the UK Labour party came to power in 1997 'race and immigration' had risen from '17th to 6th' place among the most important issues for almost 35 percent of the British public in 2005.⁵⁴² A poll for Migration Watch UK in January 2003 titled 'British Views on Immigration' found that 74 percent thought there were too many immigrants and 57 percent were 'concerned that Britain is losing its own culture'.⁵⁴³ In 2009, the Migration Policy Institute reported that 'between two-thirds and four-fifths of the public [were] indicating a preference for less immigration'.⁵⁴⁴ In a 2013 BBC survey called 'Young People and Prejudice Survey', unemployment, the economy, and immigration were the top three issues for Britons. This survey showed that 53 percent viewed immigration from Eastern EU member countries and immigration from non-EU countries negatively. Only 42 percent thought that immigration was good for Britain and 57 percent wanted less immigration. Two-thirds thought that immigration 'leads to increased tension between different groups' and 72 percent thought that race relations were a problem in the UK.⁵⁴⁵

In a 2013 poll of over 20,000 Britons conducted by Lord Ashcroft, an international businessman, author, philanthropist, and founder and Chairman of the Board of Crimestoppers, found that 60 percent thought immigration had produced more disadvantages than advantages. Over three-quarters (77%) thought that 'a dramatic reduction in the number of immigrants' would 'help the economy' because it would reduce 'the pressure on public services, cutting the benefits bill, and making it easier for British people to find jobs'. The poll also revealed that 76 percent thought an 'annual limit on migration from outside the EU' was a 'good idea'.⁵⁴⁶ In a 2014 British

Social Attitudes Survey, 77 percent of people wanted immigration reduced and 56 percent wanted it reduced ‘a lot’.⁵⁴⁷ A year later, in March 2015, similar results were concluded from public opinion polls: 76 percent wanted immigration reduced and 52 percent said they wanted immigration reduced by ‘a lot’.⁵⁴⁸

In 1990, statistics from France showed that over three-quarters (76%) ‘thought there were too many Arabs’, over two-fifths (46%) thought there were ‘too many blacks’, and two-fifths thought there were ‘too many Asians’ in France. In 1994, statistics in Germany showed that almost half (47%) of Germans did not want ‘Arabs living in their neighbourhoods’, almost two-fifths (39%) ‘did not want Poles’ and over one-third (36%) did not want Turks.⁵⁴⁹ In a 2003 survey — the *International Social Survey Program on Views on Desirable Trajectories for Immigration in Selected Western Nations* — it was found that 66 percent of the population in France, 73 percent in Germany, 78 percent in Great Britain, and 57 percent in Sweden wanted to ‘reduce levels of immigration “a little” + “a lot”’.⁵⁵⁰ In 2003, a qualitative survey by the European Commission found that in terms of immigration in the UK, France, and Germany, ‘there is an impression amongst the vast majority of people that things have “gone too far”’.⁵⁵¹

In 2011, a Global Views on Immigration poll by IPSOS found that ‘only 17.5% of Europeans say immigration has been positive’, with ‘Belgians and Britons’, who have ‘some of the least integrated Muslim populations in Europe’, having the most negative views.⁵⁵² This poll also revealed that over 56 percent of Europeans thought that there were ‘too many immigrants in our country’ and around 53 percent thought that immigration had negatively impacted their country.⁵⁵³ Another ICM poll in 2011, the Guardian Euro Poll, showed that the majority of respondents in Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and Spain were opposed to immigration from outside the EU.⁵⁵⁴ In 2015, an International Organization for Migration report revealed that between 2012 and 2014, 52 percent of Europeans wanted immigration to decrease and only eight percent wanted it to increase.⁵⁵⁵ In January 2013, a poll by Ipsos and the Jean-Jaures Foundation found that 70 percent of French thought there were too many foreigners living in France.⁵⁵⁶

In 2014, a European Commission report showed that unemployment (45%), the economic situation (24%), and immigration (18%) remained the top three most important and pressing issues for Europeans, with the latter becoming an increasingly important concern over the last few years. This report revealed that immigration from outside of the EU was viewed negatively by 57 percent of Europeans: ‘In 23 EU Member States, a majority of the population have a negative view of the “immigration of people from outside the EU”’.⁵⁵⁷ Also in 2014, a Pew Research report revealed that the majority of people in Greece (86%), Italy (80%), France (57%), and the UK (55%) wanted fewer immigrants, and Spain (47%), Germany (44%), and Poland (40%) were not far behind. All seven countries did not want an

increase in immigration; only between 1% (Greece) and 14% (Germany) wanted more.⁵⁵⁸ A Gallup poll in 2015 revealed 52 percent of Europeans wanted lower immigration levels.⁵⁵⁹ In a February 2015 Eurobarometer opinion poll, it was revealed that 57 percent of Germans were against immigration from ‘third countries’ or countries outside of the EU.⁵⁶⁰ A European Commission survey also from 2015 revealed that a significant number of Europeans thought migrants were negatively impacting their cities. A total of 83 cities were surveyed, which included cities in Turkey, and for 36 of them, 50 percent or more of respondents thought foreigners were not well integrated, with the highest levels of discontent in European cities found in Athens (76%), Greater Athens (75%), Malmö (65%), Roma (64%), and Stockholm (56%).⁵⁶¹

A 2016 Institute for Opinion Research (IFOP) poll in France revealed that 60 percent oppose Muslim refugees coming into France,⁵⁶² and a YouGov poll in January 2016 revealed that 62 percent of Germans think there are too many asylum seekers in Germany.⁵⁶³ Despite German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s insistence that there would be no cap on refugee intakes into Germany in 2016⁵⁶⁴ — which dismisses the suggestion of an upper limit of 200,000 a year by the leader of Bavaria, Horst Seehofer — only 11 percent agreed with Merkel in a February poll by Infratest, while 38 percent agreed with Seehofer.⁵⁶⁵ In a poll by IFOP, it was found that one in three Germans opposed the acceptance of additional migrants into Germany in September 2015, and by March 2016 this number increased to almost one in two Germans (47%). This same poll showed that in both September 2015 and March 2016, 64 percent of Italians and 63 percent of French opposed the acceptance of additional migrants. A main reason for opposition was the fear that accepting large numbers of migrants would draw more inflows into Europe; over three quarters of French and Italians in March 2016 thought this, and 48 percent of French, 42 percent of Germans, and 60 percent of Italians thought that the same intense migrant flows into Europe would continue for three years or more. This poll also showed that over 40 percent of Germans thought irregular migrants were actually economic migrants rather than asylum seekers.⁵⁶⁶ In a June 2016 study by the University of Leipzig, it was found that 60 percent of Germans thought that most asylum seekers ‘are not really at risk of any persecution in their home country’ and 33.8 percent thought that Germany had too many foreigners in a ‘dangerous’ way.⁵⁶⁷

On 3 October 2010, German President Christian Wulff declared that ‘Islam has become a part of Germany identity’.⁵⁶⁸ However, according to a poll by *Bild* newspaper, only 24 percent of Germans agreed with him.⁵⁶⁹ A month later, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, Merkel’s party) passed a resolution that stressed that the cultural identity of Germany is based on the ‘Christian-Jewish tradition, ancient and Enlightenment philosophy and the nation’s historical experience’. It further stated that

Our country benefits from immigrants who live and work here. But Germany does not benefit from a minority that refuses to integrate, does not want to learn our language, and denies participation and advancement to their children....We expect that those who come here respect and recognize our cultural identity.⁵⁷⁰

Merkel also stated that ‘What applies here is the constitution, not sharia’.⁵⁷¹ In addition to the statement ‘Islam belongs to Germany’ not being supported by the majority of Germans and the emphasis on the Judaeo-Christian character of Germany by CDU, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich stated in March 2011 that ‘To say that Islam belongs in Germany is not a fact supported by history at any point’.⁵⁷² And further polls showed consistent majority opposition to the statement: in 2014, a poll by Forsa for *Stern* magazine showed that only 44 percent of Germans agreed with Wulff’s declaration;⁵⁷³ a year later another poll showed that only 37 percent agreed, and then a 2016 poll revealed that only 22 percent agreed and 60 percent thought that there is ‘no place for Islam in Germany’.⁵⁷⁴ In fact, a study by the University of Leipzig in June 2016 found that 40 percent of Germans think Muslims should be prohibited from immigrating to Germany and 50 percent felt like ‘a stranger in their own country’ because there are too many Muslims, a view that increased nearly 18 percent since 2009.⁵⁷⁵ In other words, both the people and history do not support the claim that ‘Islam belongs to Germany’.

Neither does Islam ‘belong’ to Europe. Yet, at a ‘Call to Europe V: Islam in Europe’ conference in June 2015, an Italian politician and socialist, Federica Mogherini, the current high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice-president of the European Commission in the Juncker Commission, declared that ‘Islam belongs in Europe. It holds a place in Europe’s history, in our culture, in our food and — what matters most — in Europe’s present and future’. She further stated that the religion of Islam is not only part of Europe, but ‘political Islam should be part of the picture’ as well.⁵⁷⁶ In other words, Islamism, which is political Islam (i.e. non secular), blending politics and religion and rooted in Sharia law and inextricably linked to Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism, ‘belongs’ to secular Europe. But again, polls and surveys (let alone history) have consistently shown that significant numbers of Europeans do not agree.

The European Values Survey in 2000 showed that Muslims are the societal group that Europeans least wanted as a neighbour.⁵⁷⁷ In a 2002 survey in Germany, 43 percent of respondents thought Islam was not a tolerant religion and almost a fifth thought that Islam should not be allowed to be practiced in Germany.⁵⁷⁸ A 2003 Ipsos poll found that 62 percent of French thought that the values of Islam are incompatible with the French Republic.⁵⁷⁹ Another 2003 study found that 56 percent of Italians thought that Muslims have ‘cruel and barbaric laws’, and 47 percent viewed Muslims as ‘religious fundamentalists and fanatics’.⁵⁸⁰ In a 2008 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, it was found that 38 percent in

France, 50 percent in Germany, and 52 percent in Spain viewed Muslims negatively.⁵⁸¹ In a 2009 Gallup poll, *The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations*, it was revealed that 35 percent of the French public thought that Muslims in France were not loyal to France, 45 percent of the German public thought the same about Muslims in Germany, and 49 percent of the British public thought the same about Muslims in Britain.⁵⁸²

A 2010 opinion survey of 5,000 people from Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal titled 'Perception and Acceptance of Religious Diversity', conducted by the Sociology department of the University of Münster in partnership with the TNS Emnid political polling firm, found that only 20 percent of Germans and 30 percent of French thought Islam was suitable for the Western world and more than 80 percent from all five countries agreed with the statement that 'Muslims must adapt to our culture'. The same survey revealed that only 34 percent of West Germans and 26 percent of East Germans had a positive view of Muslims, less than 10 percent of West Germans and five percent of East Germans said Islam is a peaceful religion, and more than 40 percent of Germans thought the practice of Islam should be 'vigorously restricted'.⁵⁸³ Another report from 2010 showed that 58.4 percent of Germans wanted Islam to be restricted in Germany.⁵⁸⁴

A 2010 Ifop poll for *Le Monde* found that only 22 percent of French and 24 percent of Germans think Islam enriches their countries. Over two-thirds (68%) of French and three-quarters (75%) of Germans thought Muslims were not well integrated, with 61 percent and 67 percent of these percentages saying that Muslims refuse to integrate. And 66 percent of French and 72 percent of Germans described Islam as fanatical, submissive, and opposed to western values.⁵⁸⁵ A 2011 poll by *Le Monde* newspaper also revealed that '61% of the French blame' the poor integration of Muslims 'on the "refusal" by Muslims to integrate'.⁵⁸⁶ A 2011 'Global Views on Immigration' poll conducted by Ipsos revealed that

scepticism about Muslim immigration is not limited to a 'right-wing' political fringe, as proponents of multiculturalism often assert. Mainstream voters across the entire political spectrum are now expressing concerns about the role of Islam in Europe.

Over 50 percent of respondents from 12 out of the 23 countries polled thought that immigration had a negative impact on their country, 7 (out of 9) were EU member states.⁵⁸⁷

In 2012, an IFOP poll on European perceptions of Islam in France, the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands found an overall rejection of political Islam and general agreement that Muslims had essentially failed to integrate.⁵⁸⁸ In 2013 Baroness Warsi, Britain's most senior Muslim minister, revealed only 24 percent of Britons thought Islam is compatible with the British way of life⁵⁸⁹ and in January 2013 a poll by Ipsos and the Jean-

Jaures Foundation found that 74 percent of French thought Islam as 'intolerant' and 'incompatible' with the values of French society. In response, French historian Michel Winock stated that 'the ingredients for populism are there and not just in the ranks of Marine Le Pen's Front National party'.⁵⁹⁰

An April 2013 study by the research agency Tilder and the Institut MONTAIGNE for the French private broadcaster *LCP* found that 73 percent of French view Islam negatively and only 36 percent considered Islamic practices to be compatible with French law.⁵⁹¹ In a 2013 *BBC* survey, 60 percent of Britons thought Muslims had a negative image in the British public and 28 percent thought Britain would be better off without Muslims. Muslims were also given the lowest trust level (43%) compared to all other religious groups.⁵⁹² In a 'Global Attitudes Survey' by Pew Research in 2014, 27 percent of French, 33 percent of Germans, and 26 percent of Britons saw Muslims unfavourably.⁵⁹³ A 2016 poll by Ipsos in France found that 89 percent of respondents think that Muslims are poorly integrated because they refuse to integrate.⁵⁹⁴

In March 2016, the former PM of Britain Tony Blair (Fabian) said that 'many millions' of Muslims have a worldview that is 'fundamentally incompatible with the modern world'.⁵⁹⁵ An April 2016 COMRES survey for the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in the UK found that 33 percent of respondents thought that Islam promotes violence in the UK and 56 percent did not think that Islam was compatible with British values.⁵⁹⁶ Also in April 2016, in an interview with the *Libération* newspaper, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls admitted that 'a majority of our fellow citizens doubt' that Islam is compatible with democracy, revealing that this view is not the perception of 'marginal extremists'.⁵⁹⁷

Most revealing are European views on Islam as being dangerous and/or a threat to their country and identity. In 2003, a study showed that 36 percent of Italians thought that Islam was dangerous and 10 years later a survey by the marketing research company SWG conducted for *The Festival for Politics* found that this view had risen to 50 percent.⁵⁹⁸ In a 2007 *Financial Times*/Harris Poll, it was found that 38 percent of Brits thought the presence of Muslims in their country was a threat, which was followed by 30 percent of Italians, 28 percent of Germans, 23 percent of Spaniards, and 20 percent of French.⁵⁹⁹ A 2010 Ifop poll for *Le Monde* found that 42 percent of French and 40 percent of Germans thought Islam was a threat to their country.⁶⁰⁰ A 2011 poll by *Le Monde* found that '42% of French citizens considered the presence of a Muslim community in their country to be "a threat" to their national identity' and another '40% of French voters believe that Muslim prayer in the streets of France resembles an occupation'.⁶⁰¹ In an October 2012 Ifop poll for *Le Figaro*, it was found that 60 percent of French thought Islam was too influential in France and 43 percent saw it as a threat to national identity.⁶⁰² In 2013, Baroness Warsi revealed that only 23 percent

of Britons thought Islam was not a threat to the West.⁶⁰³ A 2016 poll by IPSOS in France revealed 54 percent of respondents think that immigration is not a source of enrichment for France and 39 percent think the main source of insecurity is immigration.⁶⁰⁴ An April 2016 Ifop poll found that 52 percent of French think that Islam is too influential in France and 47 percent think that Islam is a threat to French identity.⁶⁰⁵

Part IV: The 2015/2016 Migrant Crisis in Europe

11. Asylum, Migrant Demographics, and International Responses

The 2015/2016 European ‘migration crisis’ is not a new phenomenon. Already in 1993 there were problems in Spain with illegal immigrants arriving from Morocco, leading to the construction of a fencing network, and in 2011 alone there were around 345,000 border refusals of illegal immigrants trying to enter Europe. In the first few years of 2010, there were problems with illegal migrants (20,000+) arriving on the Italian island of Lampedusa, issues with illegals (30,000) at the border of Poland, and problems with illegal migrants entering Greece and Bulgaria from Turkey, also leading to the erection of key border fences.⁶⁰⁶ In 2011, citizen protection minister of Greece, Christos Papoutsis, declared that ‘Greek society has reached its limits in taking in illegal immigrants’. He said this because the Greek border with Turkey had become ‘the most common entry point for illegal immigrants...from Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia’, leading to the arrests of around 250 illegal immigrants every single day. Only when 200 Frontex agents arrived in November 2010 to help patrol the frontier border were arrests reduced to 140 a day.⁶⁰⁷ A few years later, in July 2014, the head of Germany’s federal police stated that Germany was the ‘number one destination’ for illegal immigrants entering Europe.⁶⁰⁸

Over the last few decades, hundreds of thousands (and into the millions) of mostly male migrants from Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have been using the Mediterranean Sea and land crossings to illegally enter the European Union and other European nation-states. With on-going wars in the Middle East and North Africa, persistent political instability across the Muslim world, high unemployment and an exploding population in Africa, and an aggressive far-left agenda to ‘open the borders’ of Europe to ‘the free movement’ of non-European peoples, the number of ‘irregular migrants’ (both genuine refugees and illegal migrants) making their way to seek opportunities in ‘rich’, ‘generous’, and ‘safe’ Europe have increased dramatically over the last few years, reaching an undeniably visible and critical threshold in 2015/2016.

As can be seen in figure 11, between 2000 and 2011 hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants were detected arriving on the southern shores of Europe via various routes across the Mediterranean Sea.

Migration in the Mediterranean

Numbers of 'irregular migrants' detected




Figure 11. Irregular Migration to Europe, 2000 — 2011.

Source: From Gil, Barna, Hakala, Rey, and Claros, *Mediterranean Flows into Europe*, 7.

On top of this illegal entry into Europe, European countries have also been practicing high-levels of legal immigration from the same regions of the world, levels that have increased steadily from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands every year since the 1960s and 1970s. At this time the populations of European countries were overwhelmingly ethnically European, but by 2011 the total foreign-born populations from Asia and Africa in just five European countries — Sweden, Belgium, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom — amounted to around 14 million people. If we were to include second, third, and fourth generations, then between 20 and 30 percent of the national populations of these five European countries would be African or Asian in ethnicity, which is an incredible contrast to just over half a century ago.

Most legal and illegal migrants entering Europe come from Muslim countries in the Middle East and South Asia, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Syria, and from Muslim countries in Africa, particularly from the Maghreb (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) but also from Somalia, Sudan, Western Sahara, and Senegal. Mass-immigration from Muslim countries and the high fertility rate of Muslims in general has led to large and rapidly growing Muslim populations in Europe, and to Islam becoming the fastest growing religion in Europe.⁶⁰⁹

11.1 Asylum Law, the EU-Turkey Agreement, and the Migrant Crisis as Boon

According to the 1988 *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, the

definition of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) is

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have *not crossed an internationally recognized State border*.⁶¹⁰

In principle 15(c) of the 2004 *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, IDPs have '[t]he right to seek asylum in another country'.⁶¹¹ According to the European Commission, asylum is

[a] form of protection given by a State on its territory, based on the principle of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognised refugee rights and which is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in their country of citizenship and/or residence, in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.⁶¹²

An asylum seeker is a person who has applied for asylum (refugee status) but is not yet considered a refugee.⁶¹³ According to the 1951 *Refugee Convention*, a refugee is a person who

owing to well-founded fear of being *persecuted* for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.⁶¹⁴

Article 10(2) of *Council Directive 2004/83/EC*, explains that persecution involves targeting the 'the racial, religious, national, social or political characteristic[s]' of a person, and according to Article 9(1a) this persecution must be 'sufficiently serious...to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights'.⁶¹⁵ A United Nations Commissioner for Refugees 'Mid-Year Trend' report declared in 2014 that there were 14.4 million refugees in the world and by mid-2015, as a result of the Syrian war, there were over 15.1 million. The top three refugee-producing countries were Syria (4.2 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), and Somalia (1.1 million), with other top countries including South Sudan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea, and Iraq.⁶¹⁶

An asylum seeker who has gained refugee status in an EU member state has been determined as a refugee by the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedure.⁶¹⁷ This involves the member state recognising the asylum seeker as 'a refugee'⁶¹⁸ and being subject to various benefits, such as the protection and fundamental rights and freedoms according to the *Convention and Protocol Relating to Refugees*. Such rights and freedoms include 'unity of family', 'welfare services', 'access to the courts, to primary education, to work, and the provision for documentation, including a refugee travel document in passport form'.⁶¹⁹ Such rights are not afforded without the onus

of the refugee to some obligations or duties given to the state in return, such as obedience to the ‘laws and regulations’ and ‘measures’ for public order in the state concerned.⁶²⁰ There are various reasons as to why a refugee will cease to be a refugee, such as when ‘the circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist’.⁶²¹ Put simply, in the context of Syrians fleeing, say, from the persecution of ISIS in Syria, this would mean that (if and) when ISIS is defeated they will no longer be considered refugees.

If an asylum seeker does not qualify for refugee status in the country in which they apply for asylum (i.e. they do not have a well-grounded fear of persecution), they may be granted subsidiary protection instead, which is given to a ‘person otherwise in need of protection’. According to Article 15 of *Council Directive 2004/83/EC*, subsidiary protection is given to those people who are experiencing the threat of ‘serious harm’, which consists of (a) the ‘death penalty or execution’, (b) ‘torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin’, or (c) ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.⁶²² Those who have been granted subsidiary protection due to (c) are sometimes called ‘war refugees’. Like refugee status, a person can cease to have subsidiary protection for various reasons, such as ‘when the circumstances which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protection is no longer required’.⁶²³ In other words, Syrians fleeing the threat of serious harm from the armed conflict in Syria will no longer require subsidiary protection once the war ends.

According to the European Commission, which refers to international and EU law, a ‘safe country of origin’ is a country that has ‘a democratic system and generally and consistently’ has no persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and no threat of violence or armed conflict against its citizens.⁶²⁴ While citizens have the right to leave this country and seek asylum in another country, their application is likely to be rejected as their country of national origin is considered ‘safe’. There are only 19 non-European countries that EU members have designated as ‘safe countries of origin’ (those with an asterisk are considered as safe for males only): Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin*, China, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia*, Ghana*, India, Kenya*, Liberia*, Malawi*, Mali, Mauritius*, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone*, Tanzania, and Turkey.⁶²⁵ However, while ‘safe countries of origin’ may be safe for their citizens, they may not be safe for non-citizens who are seeking asylum.

Compared to a ‘safe country of origin’, a ‘safe third country’ is a country that is considered safe for asylum seekers of nationalities other than that of the country. All EU member states are considered as ‘safe third countries’. According to the *Asylum Information Database*

Today the safe third country concept has its main impact at land borders. Border police shall refuse entry if a foreigner, who has entered from a safe third country, requests asylum at the border. Furthermore, border police shall immediately initiate removal to a safe third country if an asylum seeker is apprehended at the border without the necessary documents.⁶²⁶

Although human rights organisations are critical of the designation,⁶²⁷ Turkey, since October 2015, is now also considered a ‘safe third country’.⁶²⁸

11.1.1 EU Asylum Law: The Dublin Regulation

The Dublin Regulation, also known as Regulation No. 604/2013 or the Dublin III Regulation,

provides the legal basis for establishing the criteria and mechanism for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the member states by a third country national or a stateless person. This mechanism is known as the Dublin procedure. The Dublin III Regulation applies to 32 countries [sometimes known as ‘Dublin Countries’] which include the EU member states, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.⁶²⁹

The criteria for establishing which Member State is responsible for processing asylum applications is ‘in hierarchical order, from family considerations, to recent possession of visa or residence permit in a Member State, to whether the applicant has entered EU irregularly, or regularly’.⁶³⁰ This Dublin system also includes the EURODAC Regulation, a Europe-wide fingerprinting database for unauthorised entrants to the EU who apply for asylum.⁶³¹ In regards to irregular migrants seeking asylum, in Article 13.1 of the Dublin Regulation it states that the first ‘Dublin country’ a migrant enters is responsible for processing the application:

Where it is established, on the basis of proof or circumstantial evidence as described in the two lists mentioned in Article 22(3) of this Regulation, including the data referred to in Regulation (EU) No 603/2013, that an applicant has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for international protection. That responsibility shall cease 12 months after the date on which the irregular border crossing took place.⁶³²

The vast majority of irregular migrants in 2015/2016 have travelled hundreds if not thousands of miles and across various ‘safe third countries’, particularly ‘central transition’ Turkey, and unlawfully entered ‘gateway’ EU member states such as Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria, all considered ‘safe third countries’. This is not where their journey ends, however. The majority of them have illegally transited through other EU member states, also ‘safe third countries’, in an effort to arrive at their choice country of destination where they apply for asylum, usually the wealthier welfare states of Northern and Western Europe, such as Sweden and Germany, who have very generous

refugee and asylum policies and which have seen the largest asylum applications out of all the EU-28 members. These countries also have generous health benefits, free education and training courses, and relatively low unemployment. But an asylum seeker does not have the right to traverse freely throughout the Schengen area and apply for asylum in whichever European country he or she prefers. The first European ‘Dublin’ countries they enter, which are ‘safe third countries’, are where they should apply for asylum and are responsible for processing their applications. If an asylum seeker applies for asylum in another country other than the one in which they first arrived, they are no longer considered as a ‘genuine’ refugee and will likely be deported back to the first ‘safe third country’ they entered in Europe to be processed for asylum there. In other words, the Dublin Regulation is an effort to deter people who are entering Europe illegally from making ‘multiple asylum claims or “forum shopping” within the European Union’ — which strains resources, skews actual asylum numbers, and overburdens authorities.⁶³³

In sum, asylum seekers are not allowed to choose their preferred country of choice for legal protection and financial assistance. Such patterns of travel and behaviour are unlawful in several instances according to various laws stated above. This is why certain EU member states are rejecting their applications and deporting them. Back in January 2016, and again in March, the European Commission stated that

Member States should refuse entry at the border to third country nationals who do not satisfy the entry conditions of the Schengen Borders Code and who have not submitted an application for asylum despite having had the opportunity to do so. It should be borne in mind that under EU law, asylum seekers have no right to choose the Member State granting them protection. These refusals should be applied at the external Schengen border and at the borders of Member States with temporary internal border controls.⁶³⁴

Hungary, for example, rejects asylum applications by migrants who have travelled through safe third countries and who have had ‘genuine opportunities of seeking and obtaining protection’ there instead.⁶³⁵

Since the onset of the 2015/2016 ‘migrant crisis’, the Dublin Agreement has been violated in various ways by certain European member states. Large numbers, even trains full of irregular migrants⁶³⁶ were ‘waved through’ border checks throughout Europe and at the external borders⁶³⁷. This is a serious security matter as no identity checks were conducted. The Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, stated in March 2016 that ‘all Member States need to apply the rules — the ‘wave through’ approach must end and Member States must grant access to asylum applicants, but refuse entry to those who merely wish to transit’.⁶³⁸ Yet some of these rules were waived for a few months in 2015. Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, suspended the Dublin Regulation for refugees in August 2015,⁶³⁹ which led to various criticisms against her,

including politicians from her own center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its counterpart in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU). CSU said that ‘many migrants would see her decision as an invitation to apply for asylum in Germany’,⁶⁴⁰ which did in fact happen. Over 1.2 million irregular migrants of various nationalities (i.e. not just Syrian) entered Germany in 2015 in the hope of seeking asylum there.⁶⁴¹

By early November 2015, the suspension of the Dublin Regulation by Germany had led to chaos for various European countries. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from various regions of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia crossed the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas and other routes (see chapter 11.2) and forcefully trekked their way across European ‘safe third countries’ to reach open-door Germany on the pretext of being ‘invited’ by *Mutti Merkel*. In an effort to ‘return to orderly procedure’,⁶⁴² Germany’s Ministry of the Interior on 10 November 2015, announced the reinstatement of the Dublin Regulation for all EU member countries, except for Greece, which was (and still is) bearing the brunt of the migrant flows into Europe.⁶⁴³ All asylum seekers that arrived in Germany and other European countries were to be deported back to the first EU country they had entered to apply for refugee status there.

11.1.2 The EU-Turkey Agreement and its Deficiencies

In contrast to the Hungarian idea of building a massive fence in an effort to control the migrant flows,⁶⁴⁴ in September 2015 the European Stability Initiative (ESI), a think tank in Berlin, proposed an agreement between the EU and Turkey that aimed ‘to restore control of the EU’s external border while simultaneously addressing the vast humanitarian crisis’. This agreement involved the German commitment of ‘taking 500,000 Syrian refugees directly from Turkey in the coming twelve months’, which was an ‘offer’ that ‘must be matched by other European nations’ in terms of ‘burden-sharing...at EU level’. It also involved Turkey taking back all refugees that reached Greece.⁶⁴⁵

On 4 October, a version of this EU-Turkey agreement was released by the ESI and called ‘The Merkel Plan’.⁶⁴⁶ Then, on 28 January after a meeting in December with Merkel, Mark Rutte (Dutch prime minister), Stefan Löfven (Swedish prime minister), and Frans Timmermans (Dutch EU commissioner), the Dutch social-democrat leader Diederik Samsom declared a plan for EU member-states to accept ‘a couple hundred thousand refugees per year’ from Turkey, funded by the EU budget, on the basis that Turkey would accept ‘everyone who enters [the EU] via Greece’.⁶⁴⁷ This ‘Samsom Plan’ did not involve forcing reluctant member-states to accept refugee

quotas, but rather ‘a coalition of the willing’ — 10 member states who agreed to the plan. Those that did not join this coalition would contribute financially to the settlement of refugees.⁶⁴⁸ The outcome of both the Merkel and Samsom plans has been called the Merkel-Samsom plan by the ESI.⁶⁴⁹

Already in September 2015 Numan Kurtulmus, the Turkish deputy prime minister, stated that ‘If European nations committed to accepting any number of refugees currently trying to go west from Turkey...Ankara would provide planes to fly them to their new host country’.⁶⁵⁰ By 18 March 2016, a conditional ‘deal’ was reached between the EU Heads of State/Government and Turkey that was based on the Merkel-Samsom plan and addressed, in part, curbing the flow of irregular migrants from Turkey to the EU. A European Commission press release stated that

EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and replace it instead with legal channels of resettlement of refugees to the European Union. The aim is to replace disorganised, chaotic, irregular and dangerous migratory flows by organised, safe and legal pathways to Europe for those entitled to international protection in line with EU and international law.⁶⁵¹

This EU-Turkey agreement, which has been criticised for various human rights reasons,⁶⁵² involves Turkey accepting ‘the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters’ and includes ‘swapping’ every migrant deportee from the EU to Turkey with one Syrian registered with refugee status that is temporarily accommodated in Turkey.⁶⁵³

The EU-Turkey deal also involves certain other conditions, such as Turkey ‘opening its labour market to Syrians under temporary protection’ and ‘stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police’.⁶⁵⁴ In addition, it was declared that the EU will allow Turkey’s 77 million citizens to come to Europe without needing visas by the end of June 2016⁶⁵⁵ (a dialogue that began 16 December 2013)⁶⁵⁶ which will allow Turks, with biometric passports, short 90-day stays for business or pleasure in the Schengen area.⁶⁵⁷ There was also a promise of increased talks regarding Turkey becoming a member of the EU.⁶⁵⁸ EU funding and financial aid is also part of the agreement, such that in March it was declared that, under the Facility of Refugees, the EU aimed to provide funding to Turkey for ‘projects for persons under temporary protection’ especially ‘in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs’, totalling around six billion euros (nearly nine million CDN\$) up until the end of 2018.⁶⁵⁹ On 19 April 2016, the European Commission issued two press releases that declared the EU would provide Greece with €83 million under the Emergency Assistance Instrument to ‘improve living conditions for refugees in Greece’, which on 12 May stood at 54,542 people. It would also provide Turkey with €110 million under the EU-Turkey agreement for ‘the immediate needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey’ and to ‘cover expenses for

food, health care and accommodation of migrants who have been returned from Greece to Turkey', of which there were only 386 by 4 May (and only 125 'swap' settlements).⁶⁶⁰

As a result of the EU-Turkey deal there has been a marked decrease in arrivals to Greece (3,462 arrived in April 2016 compared to 13,556 in April 2015),⁶⁶¹ meaning that Turkey has finally made efforts to stop the asylum seeker flows into Europe. However, the EU-Turkey deal does not address the fact that Iraqis are fleeing ISIS as well as Syrians, though a main reason for accepting Syrian 'refugees' is the supposed repressive regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than ISIS.⁶⁶² The EU-Turkey deal also does not address the continued arrival of irregular migrants from Africa and elsewhere to Greece. As such, between the onset of the EU-Turkey deal and 10 May 2016, Greece has seen 8,587 new arrivals to its shores (some are still coming from Turkey).⁶⁶³ In fact, after deportations, relocations, and returns, Greece still had 1,425 new arrivals between 12 April and 12 May 2016.⁶⁶⁴

The EU-Turkey agreement also does not address the 'swap' of non-Syrian genuine refugees in Turkey, or the ongoing irregular migrant arrivals in Italy (the second largest sea route) and other European countries from Africa and the Middle East (which represent over 50% of all arrivals).⁶⁶⁵ In any case, the Overseas Development Institute has stated that the EU-Turkey deal is 'unlikely to work' as

refugees and migrants do not make the decision to leave their home lightly, are willing to take significant risks and will not be deterred by the policies and restrictions of EU countries. Those excluded from the deal will continue to try different, more dangerous routes if the border between Turkey and Greece is shut to them.⁶⁶⁶

Wil van Gemert, the deputy director of Europol, stated that 'Migrants still want to go to the E.U., and there will be alternate routes looked for and offered by organized crime' but 'they will operate more covertly, using difficult routes despite increased enforcement'.⁶⁶⁷ 'Irregular migrants' will still attempt to come to Europe, and since the Aegean route and Balkan routes are now essentially 'closed', other routes will 'open' or be used, such as routes through Italy, Spain, Albania, France, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, and so on. More importantly, a Greek court in May 2016 ruled that Turkey is an 'unsafe third country', which, in effect, renders the EU-Turkey deal meaningless.⁶⁶⁸ Irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece will now not be deported back to Turkey, which was a central aspect of the agreement between Ankara and Brussels. In addition, Turkey refuses to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide (1915–1923) despite EU pressure to do so. Erdogan has accused the EU of employing 'propaganda machines, Armenians, or terror groups' to destroy Turkey's international image and blackmail it, and he threatened that 'Either we find solutions to our problems in a fair way, or Turkey will stop being a barrier in front of the problems of Europe. We will leave you to your own worries', i.e. Turkey will exit the

EU-Turkey deal, leave Europe to deal with the migrant crisis, and turn a blind eye to the hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants traversing from and through Turkey into Europe.⁶⁶⁹

Since the Balkan route 'closure' (Greece's border with Macedonia, Slovenian and Croatian borders, increased border control in Albania and Bulgaria, and Hungary reinforcing its border with Serbia),⁶⁷⁰ thousands are still illegally entering Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and elsewhere in Europe.⁶⁷¹ Smugglers have been offering routes to Italy from Turkey (costing between 3,500 and 5,000 euros) and from Greece and Albania to Italy; there have also been increased flows from Libya to Italy.⁶⁷² The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) launched a naval operation in June 2015, Operation Sophia, in response to the 'migrant crisis' and to collect intel on and prevent smuggling rings from Libya to Italy. From its inception to mid-April 2016, they have rescued 13,000 people and arrested 68 traffickers and smugglers.⁶⁷³ But this operation is considered a 'failure' according to a UK House of Lords report, and critics claim that it essentially 'acts as a magnet to migrants and aids people traffickers'.⁶⁷⁴ In large part the failure is due to the changing tactics of smugglers, the low-level status of those being arrested, and a lack of cooperation from the Libyan government.

While the flows to Greece from Turkey have greatly subsided, in the first quarter of 2016 compared to 2015 Italy experienced an 80 percent increase in arrivals.⁶⁷⁵ In total, between 1 January 2016 and the end of March, Italy documented around 8,600 more irregular migrants than in the same period in 2015.⁶⁷⁶ In just five days (11–15 April) there were more than 6,000 new arrivals documented in Italy, while there were less than 200 to Greece,⁶⁷⁷ and the week of 23 May Italy rescued 13,000 migrants at sea.⁶⁷⁸ Not only is Italy saving and receiving irregular migrants by boat but, since February 2016, is flying in bona fide Syrian refugees from Lebanon and elsewhere in what is termed a 'humanitarian air corridor' that allays refugees of opting to make the dangerous and illegal journey to Europe by boat.⁶⁷⁹ This 'air corridor' also sees Syrians transported from Turkey to various European nations, which began in early April 2016 as part of the EU-Turkey deal.⁶⁸⁰

In an effort to enforce the Dublin agreement, and with the closure of the Balkan route, Austria is now restricting access to Western and Northern Europe from Italy by monitoring the Brenner border crossing with Italy (Alpine route), which represents another blow to Schengen. In early April 2016 Austria's defence minister, Hans Peter Doskozil, stated that Vienna was ready to deploy troops at Brenner Pass for border checks and by mid-April an 820-foot checkpoint was being constructed.⁶⁸¹ This restriction of the free flow of people across the border essentially 'traps' the migrants in Italy like in Greece, which is a serious political concern for Italy. As a response to these developments, Italy wants to broker a deal with African nations (as most irregular migrants to Italy come from African nations) that would be similar to the EU-Turkey agreement, and would involve providing

economic aid to African countries in return for them stepping up the prevention of irregular migrant flows to Italy and accepting deportees. Italy's interior minister, Angelino Alfano, stated that 'If returns don't work, the whole Juncker migration agenda will fail'.⁶⁸² In 2015, there were 'readmission' deals with North African countries, but there were and still are problems with other African countries who resist the 'readmission' of nationals who have irregularly crossed into Europe.⁶⁸³

11.1.3 Reform of the Dublin System

Due to both Italy and Greece (and Germany) having received large volumes of irregular migrants in 2015/2016 compared to all other EU member states, and thus having to shoulder the burden of so many new arrivals, alongside the refusal of several Central European member states to accept 'migrant quotas',⁶⁸⁴ there are plans to reform the Dublin system. In April 2016 Frans Timmermans, first vice-president of the European Commission, stated there were two options of reform. The first involved 'scrapping the Dublin system: the EU would have a mandatory redistribution system for asylum seekers based on a country's wealth and ability to absorb newcomers' and the second, called 'Dublin plus', would 'preserve the existing rules, but would include a "corrective fairness mechanism" so refugees could be redistributed around the bloc in times of crisis to take the pressure off frontline arrival states'.⁶⁸⁵ Either option will have to be 'approved' by member states. Both options are about the redistribution of asylum seekers among all member states rather than stopping the flow of irregular migrants.⁶⁸⁶

The redistribution of refugees from Turkey among EU nations began in April 2016, with around 1,100 aimed to be settled per month.⁶⁸⁷ Relocations from Italy and Greece had already begun in October and November 2015 under a EU relocation plan to resettle 160,000 from these two gateway countries.⁶⁸⁸ In May 2016, the EC issued an official proposal to reform the Dublin system, which aims 'to ensure a sustainable sharing of responsibility across the EU and guarantee timely processing of applications' and 'a solidarity contribution of €250,000' per asylum seeker from member states who refuse to participate in the relocation program.⁶⁸⁹ Yet despite such reform and relocation efforts, and other attempts to curb the flow of irregular migrants and people smugglers, the reality is that Brussels Eurocrats and many EU member state officials still want the vast majority of migrants to 'solve' economic and demographic issues, they would just prefer they arrive in a more legal fashion.

11.1.4 Migrant Crisis as an Economic and

Demographic Boon

According to the logic of European elites, migrants are seen as necessary for labour shortages that can't be filled by local workers or by local birth-rates. For example, EU Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos has stated that to offset ageism Europe will need 70 million migrants in the next twenty years⁶⁹⁰ and Pierre Moscovici, European commissioner for economic and financial affairs, stated 'Our countries need migration'.⁶⁹¹ Despite very high unemployment, the deputy migration minister of Greece, Yannis Mouzalas, stated that 'refugees' will help solve the demographic problem in Greece.⁶⁹² Swedish Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson stated that Europe was demographically challenged and asylum seekers could 'lead to higher growth for Europe as a whole', and Lithuanian Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius stated that 'We can make use of this [migrant crisis] situation for enhancing our economic capacity'.⁶⁹³ This economic use of asylum seekers and the migrant crisis was also echoed by many other EU elites, such as Angela Merkel who stated in her 2015/2016 New Year's Eve address that 'countries have always benefited from successful immigration, both economically and socially' and urged her citizens to see asylum seekers as 'an opportunity for tomorrow'.⁶⁹⁴ Germany's interior minister, Thomas de Maiziere, stated that 'We need people. We need young people. We need immigrants'.⁶⁹⁵ So, lucky for them, the mass of irregular migrants that have and continue to arrive in Europe are overwhelmingly young people.⁶⁹⁶

Often referring to the employment level as being relatively low at 64 percent (2015) and the need for 140,000 engineers, programmers, and technicians as well as skilled workers in other fields that can't be filled by Germans themselves, various German elites, including business elites, make the argument that to 'close the gap in the lack of professional and skilled labor on the market' Germany needs hundreds of thousands of migrants.⁶⁹⁷ But unemployment figures reveal that over 2 million people in Germany are actively looking for work⁶⁹⁸ — surely a large well to draw from to train and hire to fill the labour shortage! Moreover, according to a Eurostat report, in 2013 'nearly one quarter (23.7%) of the EU-28's economically active population aged 15 to 24 was unemployed', which is another large youth well to draw from within the EU.⁶⁹⁹

Nevertheless, back in September 2015 Germany expected to receive 800,000 refugees, which was four times the amount that arrived in 2014, and Ulrich Grillo, the head of the powerful BDI industry federation, said that 'If we can integrate them quickly into the jobs market, we'll be helping the refugees, but also helping ourselves as well'. Grillo also said that many of the refugees are young and have 'really good qualifications'.⁷⁰⁰ But this is just not the case. The vast majority of those arriving in Europe are indeed young men, but most do not have much education, do not speak German, and are without qualifications (even when they do have qualifications, they are

often not to European standards). According to an October 2015 report by Germany's Federal Employment Agency, 81 percent of refugees had no formal qualifications, eight percent had an academic education, and 11 percent had professional education.⁷⁰¹ In early December 2015, Munich University Professor Ludger Wößmann said that 65 percent of Syrians who are 18 years or older do not even have 'basic skills' and that

We have to prepare ourselves for the fact that the majority of young refugees will fail a three-year full time training course with a high proportion of theoretic content. According to the Chamber of Commerce of Munich and Upper Bavaria, 70 per cent of trainees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq who started lessons more than two years ago have already dropped out.⁷⁰²

In March 2016 Dieter Lenzen, the president of the University of Hamburg and chairman of the German Education Action Council, estimated that 65 percent of working-age Syrians have only basic 'reading comprehension' skills and no qualifications.⁷⁰³ In a May 2016 report for the Federal Service for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), it was revealed that less than two percent of asylum seekers in Germany spoke German, only 10 percent were highly qualified, and only 18 percent had a university degree. The bulk (81%) of adults had high school level education or less: 20 percent high school, 32 percent middle school, 22 percent primary school, and seven percent had no education at all. Most of those who were employed (74.8% of men and 32.7% of women) before migrating to Europe were in the manual labour and service industries.⁷⁰⁴

The same is true for Austria, where the *Kronen Zeitung* newspaper, the largest circulation newspaper, revealed statistics at the end of March 2016 that showed only 100 of the 111,026 asylum seekers since July 2015 had enrolled in higher education and only 13 were acting as 'shadow' physicians in hospitals, without being allowed to 'diagnose or treat the patient'.⁷⁰⁵ Also in March 2016, the Union of Greek Regions and Kapa Research conducted a survey on male and female refugees 15 years and older in the Attica region in Greece and found that 83 percent were Sunni Muslims, almost 74 percent were male, over 72 percent were under 35 years of age, over 61 percent had no or limited education (nine years), and only six percent had finished a university degree. Less than two-thirds said they were economically active when they migrated from their home country to Europe, and the majority were employed in manual, industrial, or service/trade industries.⁷⁰⁶ According to figures from Sweden's employment agency, Arbetsförmedlingen, and migration authority, Migrationsverket, in May 2016 less than 500 of the asylum seekers who arrived in Sweden in 2015 (163,000) had found a job while waiting for their application to be approved.⁷⁰⁷

Despite these facts, the views of Grillo are shared by many political and academic elites and leading international organizations who view the migration crisis as a boon to solve Europe's economic and demographic

problems. For example, various studies have attempted to argue that irregular migrants are a ‘benefit not a burden’,⁷⁰⁸ and the IMF have claimed in at least two reports since January 2016 that it is necessary for migrants to quickly enter the labour force to boost economic growth. In a January report, the IMF stated that ‘the sooner the refugees gain employment, the more they will help the public finances by paying income tax and social security contributions. Their successful labor market integration will also counter some of the adverse fiscal effects of population aging’; a May report stated that ‘the projected decline in the labor force due to aging after 2020 calls for measures to boost labor supply in the medium term’.⁷⁰⁹ According to a European Commission report on 7 June 2016, titled ‘An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis’, ‘[i]f well integrated, refugees can contribute to greater flexibility in the labour market, help address demographic challenges, and improve fiscal sustainability’. They estimate that ‘EU GDP could increase by an additional 0.2% by 2017’ as a direct result of the migrant crisis, but stress that ‘the estimated small and positive impact on growth may only materialise if appropriate integration policies are put in place’.⁷¹⁰ However, even if refugees are integrated quickly into the labour market, for each person it will still cost around €450,000, according to economist Bernd Raffelhüschen.⁷¹¹

In December 2015, just 16 percent of the German population thought that an economic revitalisation will occur from the asylum seeker influx of 2015.⁷¹² A January 2016 report by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) called ‘The Truth about the Refugee Job Wonder’ found that, in contrast to the average German employment rate of 67.3 percent, over a five-year period Afghan and Iraqi employment rates dropped from 37.6 percent to 24.5 percent and from 34 percent to 25.3 percent respectively, while the employment rate of Syrians dropped from 32 percent to nine percent in November 2015.⁷¹³ According to a January 2016 IMF report, it takes ‘up to two years for the refugees to become eligible to work’, but they have ‘lower participation rates’ and a ‘higher unemployment rate’ than natives.⁷¹⁴ Various scholarly studies, reports, and papers have come to the conclusion that it takes many years and even beyond first and second generations for the employment rate of immigrants to reach the level of the domestic population, and often incomes do not converge completely.⁷¹⁵ There is also ample evidence that previous integration efforts have failed, such as foreign-born unemployment, welfare, and crime rates across European nations, which are higher than national populations and is especially true for Muslims from the MENA region compared to all other religious and ethnic minority groups (see chapter 9).

These facts raise questions regarding the ability of new arrivals (most of which come from Muslim majority nations) to integrate well into European society, and thus also calls into question the ideal that immigrants will boost the economy. It is well-established that in terms of employment, a rapid and large influx of people into the labour market depresses wages (cheaper

labour and thus more corporate profits), increases competition for jobs especially in low-skilled and jobs traditionally taken by students and the working poor, and increases unemployment levels, which in turn increases the cost of welfare benefits.⁷¹⁶ The already crumbling welfare system will be under more strain from people who have never contributed to it, and migrants that do find work will mostly find it in unskilled cheap labour positions that drive wages lower⁷¹⁷ and increase unemployment for the native population.⁷¹⁸

In any case, granting refugee status or subsidiary protection to asylum seekers is meant to be a temporary measure for victims of persecution or armed conflict until situations in the countries of origin are settled, and does not involve granting these statuses to economic migrants.⁷¹⁹ Yet international and EU elites, ministers, public officials, institutions, NGOs, and powerful businesses are implying that refugees and illegal economic migrants are to be used to boost the economic and demographic situation of European nations in the long term, i.e. in terms of granting permanent residency and citizenship for millions, which runs counter to the legal rules of asylum.

The embrace of the ‘migration crisis’ as a boon by European elites is a combination of a greedy desire for an unlimited supply of cheap labour and a pretext for a proposed UN project called ‘Replacement Migration’. This project aims to replace the European populations with non-European peoples and falls into the laps of internationalist social engineers that seek to transform Europe into a cosmopolitan open society structured according to the dictates of global capitalism and socialist political interests. This project is not in the interests or longevity of the European peoples as distinct peoples in-themselves. In fact, it is akin to slow genocide, a process already well underway according to some European intellectuals and politicians. An in-depth discussion of the ‘Replacement Migration’ and cosmopolitan open society project is the focus of the last chapter, but what follows provides a general example.

Various demographic projections for the ethnic European populations of European nations, including the United States, Australia, and Canada, reveal that Whites will be a minority in their own homelands by mid-21st century because of low birth rates and high immigration.⁷²⁰ Citing a study by the University of Münster that shows that in many West German cities between 55 and 70 percent of children under the age of six are now foreigners, the deputy federal chairwoman of Alternative for Germany (AfD), Christina Baum, said that mass-immigration into Germany is ‘a creeping genocide of the German people’.⁷²¹ The prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban, has described the settling of distinct ethnic peoples in Europe as a purposeful act by globalists, who aim ‘to reshape the religious and cultural landscape of Europe, and to reengineer its ethnic foundations — thereby eliminating the last barrier to internationalism: the nation-states’.⁷²² Nothing is being done

by leading mainstream elites to protect European ethnic peoples from becoming political and demographic minorities in their own homelands and all that this position entails; in fact, they celebrate and encourage it and pillory and slander those who oppose them. If this was being done to non-European peoples in their own homelands, there would be an uproar to call it out for what it actually is: dispossession, marginalisation, colonization, and even a form of genocide.

Orban thinks that trying to solve the demographic and economic problems of Europe with just one method, immigration, which is then made into a common and mandatory EU policy, denies other solutions also exist. He thinks that a 'demographic race' with the rest of the world is not necessary or the right direction to take, and that there are other methods that could be tried to solve the issue, such as emphasis on and incentives for families to have more children. He wants Hungary, and other European countries, to have the option to choose various solutions for itself.⁷²³ In an interview in May 2016 he states:

we must ask ourselves whether Europe wants to take part in a demographic race. Why should our population grow at the same rate as other countries in the world? I do not at all believe that Europe would not be liveable, viable and sustainable with its current level of population — or even with a slightly lower population. So there is no point in entering a race which we will never win. We need not take part in a demographic race. It is undoubtedly true that a country's viability and performance are related to the age structure of that country's population, the physical strength and intellectual qualifications of its people, and the composition of the various age-groups. And it would be better if we had more young people, because as society ages, the younger, stronger, working-age cohort in society which is better equipped to understand and adapt to the future declines within the Hungarian population as well. It would be better if this cohort were larger. We can only achieve this through effective family policy.⁷²⁴

Whatever the reasons given by EU and European elites to justify large scale migration from the world into Europe, it is quite clear that mass-immigration will not end in the foreseeable future. The Christian Social Union in the German state of Bavaria, the sister party to Merkel's CDU party in Germany, stated in 2010 that Germany was not an 'immigrant country'⁷²⁵ but just five years later, in the midst of the 2015 'migrant crisis' Merkel declared that Germany is a 'country of immigration'.⁷²⁶ EU bureaucrats are declaring the same for all of Europe. In an attempt to sway opinion on the 'migrant crisis', in an October 2015 speech Timmermans declared that Europe necessarily will be and must be a diverse mixture of peoples (from mass-immigration) because diversity is the fate of humanity. He stated that

diversity is humanity's destiny. There is not going to be, even in the remotest places of this planet, a nation that will not see diversity in its future. That's where humanity is heading.

He went on to say that 'Europe will be diverse, like all other parts of the world will be diverse'.⁷²⁷ In other words, immigration is destiny. But such

statements about a hidden mechanism of history and claims of knowing the future are theological and metaphysical, divorced from history and physical reality, and based on subjective ideology and political goals. History has been one of human effort to control the present and the future rather than having destiny determine its outcome, and the uncontrolled influx of masses of peoples from one geographical region to another has usually involved conflict and war. In an April 2016 speech, Timmermans further states that ‘Migration will be one of the main challenges the European Union will have to face together in the long term’ for *inevitable* reasons of ‘Globalisation, climate change, war and instability’ and because people are ‘in search of refuge, of a better life, or to join their families’, forces that essentially mean ‘that people will keep coming to Europe’ whether Europeans themselves want it or not.⁷²⁸

In his October 2015 speech, Timmermans mentioned two main consequences of diversity in Europe, anti-Semitism (and anti-Zionism) and Islamophobia. He said,

we will take stock of the main challenges faced by the Jewish and Muslim Communities in Europe today. And together, we will explore solutions, from the fight against hate crime and hate speech to the role of civil society, education and local authorities to policies promoting non-discrimination and inclusion.

But Timmermans says nothing about Europeans and the consequences of diversity for them, particularly of the same dimension, what is known as Europhobia or anti-Europeanism,⁷²⁹ or even Islamism in Europe, which not only intends to conquer Europe through demographics and infiltration, but has actually killed hundreds of Europeans and critically injured thousands since the 1980s in terrorist acts, a situation that has intensified since 2010.⁷³⁰

11.2 Migrant Nationalities, Numbers, and Routes

Mainstream media have implied that the overwhelming majority of irregular migrant arrivals in Europe in 2015/2016 are Syrian refugees, but this is misleading. Irregular migrants have come from all over the world, particularly the MENA region, South Asia, Africa, and non-EU countries in Europe. Between January and June 2015 only 34 percent of all documented irregular migrants were Syrian; 12 percent were from Afghanistan, 12 percent were from Eritrea, five percent were from Somalia, and five percent were from Nigeria.⁷³¹ In terms of asylum applicants in the same time frame, the top 15 nationalities were: Syrian, Kosovan, Afghan, Albanian, Iraqi, Serbian, Pakistani, Eritrean, Nigerian, Ukrainian, Somalian, Russian, Macedonian, Gambian, and Bangladeshi.⁷³²

Between January 2015 and January 2016 there were 1,099,101 irregular migrants that were documented arriving in Greece, Italy, and Spain via the

Mediterranean Sea according to the United Nations Human Rights Council. Table 32 breaks down the main nationalities for this time period.

Table 32. Documented Nationalities of Irregular Migrants in Greece, Italy, and Spain, January 2015–January 2016


Nationality	Numbers
Syrian	524,597
Afghanistan	228,224
Other	111,086
Iraq	100,788
Eritrea	40,286
Pakistan	27,333
Iran	26,034
Nigeria	23,211
Somalia	17,066

Source: Data adapted from UNCHR, ‘European Refugees & Migrants Emergency Response. Nationality of Arrivals to Greece, Italy, and Spain, January 2015–January 2016.’

Between 1 January and 17 May 2016, the top ten countries of asylum seekers arriving by sea have been from Syria (41%), Afghanistan (21%), Iraq (13%), Pakistan (3%), Iran (2%), Nigeria (2%), Gambia (2%), Somalia (1%) Cote d’Ivoire (1%), and Guinea (1%).⁷³³ For Greece in this time period, 155,837 irregular migrants were documented. The top nationalities were Syrians, (49%), Afghans (25%), Iraqis (15%), Pakistanis (4%), and Iranians (3%).⁷³⁴ Italy documented 32,286 irregular migrants in this time period, 22 percent of which were from refugee-sending countries. The top source countries were Nigeria (15%), Gambia (10%), Somalia (9%), Cote d’Ivoire (8%), Eritrea (8%), and Guinea (8%).⁷³⁵


One of the main routes to Europe is via the Mediterranean Sea. A large number of refugees and migrants are crossing this sea by boat from the North coasts of Africa and into Greece, Italy, France, and Spain, and from these countries are making their way into the rest of Europe and towards economically strong and generous European welfare states. Others, including those from the Middle East, South Asia, and also from Africa, are arriving in Turkey and heading to Europe either via the Aegean Sea (Eastern Mediterranean) and landing in Greece and Italy (and islands) or via the Black Sea⁷³⁶ and landing in Romania, Ukraine, and Bulgaria before making their way to their ‘choice destination’ countries, such as Austria, Sweden, and Germany. Still others are crossing into Europe by land: through Turkey into Bulgaria and Greece, through Turkey into Russia and then into Norway (Arctic route),⁷³⁷ or from Turkey into Bulgaria and then Macedonia and Serbia (the Balkan route) to get to Hungary and then on to the rest of the more prosperous EU member nations. People are also travelling by air. Maps 4, 5, and 6 below show the main migrant transit routes to Europe that have been used in 2015/2016.

EUROPE'S REFUGEE CRISIS




Map 4. Main Migrant Routes to Europe, 2015

Source: From Tasch and Nudelman, 'This Map Shows the Routes of Europe's Refugee Nightmare — and How its Getting Worse.'



Map 5. Main Source Countries and Migrant Routes to Europe, 2016

Source: From Missing Migrants Project, 'Migrant Routes: Mediterranean.'



Map 6. Main Source Countries and Transit Routes to Europe, 2015/2016.

Source: Screenshot of Map from International Organization for Migration, 'Migration Flows — Europe.'

Irregular migrants are travelling from 70 countries from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, many of which are considered 'safe countries' and through several 'safe third countries' to arrive in Italy and Greece. Turkey, which is considered both a 'safe country' and a 'safe third country', is a major transit country for people heading to Europe from the Middle East and South Asia, as well as some from Africa.

In 2015, 42 out of the 70 source countries had between one (e.g. from Mauritius and from Zimbabwe) and 401 (e.g. from Benin and Yemen)

irregular migrants documented arriving in Italy and Greece, and totalled 4,766 people. Out of these 42 countries, 15 are Muslim-majority countries, two have significant Muslim populations (30%–50%), 13 have Muslim populations between 10 and 30 percent, and 12 have small Muslim populations (less than 10%). Out of the remaining 28 source countries, three had between 500 and 1,000 irregular migrants documented in Italy and Greece: Burkina Faso (502), Libya (968), and Tunisia (998), totalling 2,518 people. All three countries have Muslim majority populations. The last 25 countries were the top source countries of irregular migrants (over 1,000) that were documented arriving by boat in only two countries, Greece and Italy, (and not Spain or France, nor land routes from Turkey into Bulgaria etc.) between January and December 2015, and totaled 993,430 persons. Eighteen of these countries have Muslim-majority populations, four have significant Muslim populations (30%–50%), two have Muslim populations between 10 and 30 percent, and one has a small Muslim minority population (less than 10%). Eight of these countries are considered ‘safe countries’.⁷³⁸ Table 33 shows the top 25 source countries for irregular migrants arriving in Greece and Italy in 2015 as well as their numbers. It also shows which countries are Muslim-majority nations.

Table 33. Country of Origin, Numbers, and Muslim Constitution

Country of Origin	Number	%
Syria	483,430	48.3%
Afghanistan	205,111	20.5%
Iraq	87,133	8.7%
Eritrea	40,487	4.0%
Pakistan	25,142	2.5%
Nigeria*	22,502	2.2%
Iran	22,191	2.2%
Somalia	16,830	1.6%
Morocco	12,111	1.2%
Sudan	9,100	0.9%
Gambia*	8,110	0.8%
Bangladesh*	8,118	0.8%
Palestine	7,138	0.7%
Western Sahara	6,116	0.6%
Mali*	6,134	0.6%
Senegal*	6,114	0.6%
Ghana*	4,181	0.4%
Cote d'Ivoire	4,102	0.4%
Egypt	3,111	0.3%
Ethiopia*	2,312	0.2%
Guinea	2,161	0.2%
Lebanon	1,891	0.1%
Algeria*	1,116	0.1%
Cameroon	1,216	0.1%
Congo	1,211	0.1%

Source: International Organization for Migration, 'Migration Flows — Europe.'

Note: MM means Muslim Majority; * means safe country.

According to all of the above figures on the number of irregular migrants that were documented entering Europe through Greece and Italy between January and December 2015, the total number was 1,000,774. This is shy some 800,000⁷³⁹ others who entered Europe through other routes, such as by Mediterranean Sea to Spain and France; by Black Sea to Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine; and by land through Turkey into Bulgaria and from Turkey into Russia and then into Finland and Norway. The figures above also show that over half, or 36 countries out of the 70 source countries of irregular migrants, have Muslim majority populations, six have significant Muslim populations (30%–50%), 15 have Muslim populations between 10 and 30 percent, and 13 have small minority Muslim populations (less than 10%). Out of the top 25 countries of irregular migrants documented in Italy and Greece in 2015, which totalled 993,430 people, 916,136 arrived from Muslim-majority nations. All three countries with between 500 and 1,000 irregular migrants entering Italy and Greece in 2015, which totalled 2,518 people, are Muslim-majority nations. And out of the 42 countries with less than 500 irregular migrants documented in Italy and Greece in 2015, which totalled 4,766 people, 2,339 came from Muslim majority nations. In sum, 920,993 of 1,000,774, or 92 percent, of all irregular migrants that were documented arriving in Italy and Greece in 2015 were from Muslim majority nations.

Initially, the UN estimated that around 700,000 migrants and refugees had arrived by boat to the southern shores of Europe via the Mediterranean in 2015 and the same was predicted for 2016. However, a later UN report stated that a staggering 1,015,078 migrants and refugees had been *documented* arriving in Europe by boat in 2015.⁷⁴⁰ Numbers for the land routes are lower, but amount to tens of thousands more and are increasing as land routes become more popular due to the dangerous nature of sea crossings. A European Parliament internal policy report provides the total number of documented land and sea ‘irregular border crossings’ to the EU between January and November 2015 as 1.5 million, but the amount is likely much higher, as figures for December or undocumented arrivals are not included.⁷⁴¹ According to Frontex, there were over 1.8 million illegal border crossings into the EU that were detected in 2015,⁷⁴² i.e. this number does not include those who were not detected. If the above International Organization for Migration figures, which reveal that over 90 percent of arrivals to Italy and Greece are from Muslim majority countries, also hold true for the total amount (1.8 million) of irregular migrants that arrived in Europe in 2015, then around 1,620,000 people that were detected came from Muslim-majority nations.

As shown in figure 12, between 1 January and 31 March 2016, there were 170,537 documented arrivals to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, which is over seven times more than the amount that arrived in the same timeframe in 2015. Many more are expected to make the journey during the warmer months and calmer seas, starting in spring.⁷⁴³



Figure 12. Mediterranean Sea Arrivals to Greece, Italy, and Spain, 1 January 2015 to 31 May 2016.

Reports suggest that around 3–4 million more migrants and asylum seekers are estimated to arrive in Europe by the end of 2016.⁷⁴⁴ There are numerous predictions that the migration crisis is only going to intensify and that there is no end in sight due to ongoing sectarian conflicts, Western foreign policies, and wars in North Africa, the Middle-East, and South Asia that are destabilising the regions and producing more displaced peoples and refugees, and ongoing conflicts, poverty, rapid population growth, and unemployment in Africa. In Germany, CSU Minister Gerd Müller suggested that 8–10 million more are expected to arrive in Europe over the next few years. He said that

The biggest refugee movements are ahead: Africa's population will double in the coming decades. A country like Egypt will increase to 100 million people, Nigeria 400 million. In our digital age with the Internet and mobile phones, all know about our prosperity and our way of life.⁷⁴⁵

Klaus Schwab, executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, suggests that the 2015 'migrant crisis' was just a 'precursor' to something much bigger. In the context of oil and water crises in Africa, he said, 'imagine 1 billion inhabitants [from Africa], imagine they all move north'.⁷⁴⁶ A joint report by Europol and Interpol in May 2016 declared that they expect 'the number of migrants trying to reach the EU' to increase overall in the future.⁷⁴⁷

Terms such as 'unprecedented' and 'an exodus' to describe the sheer size of the uncontrolled migration into Europe were being used in May 2015 by Ricardo Baretzky, the president of the European Centre for Information Policy and Security (ECIPS), in an interview with Red Ice Insight in May 2015, which was months before the 'migration crisis' reached a fever pitch in mid-summer 2015. Baretzky stated that

the amount of illegal immigrants in Europe is huge numbers. Most of these numbers today is [sic] not realistically published...when we see migration in these numbers... they are unprecedented. We haven't witnessed this type of global migration because it is no longer immigration but is a form of migration....this is actually a point of no return and therefore it can only be compared in a form and type of exodus.⁷⁴⁸

Exodus, meaning the mass departure of people from the same place at the same time, usually refers to the Biblical story of both male and female Israelites (particularly in the form of families) leaving Egypt under the leadership of Moses to find the Promised Land. In regards to the European 'migrant crisis' exodus, hundreds of thousands of people are simultaneously leaving various homelands in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia and heading to Europe. They are not of one ethnic people, but they are overwhelmingly young single men from Muslim-majority countries. In this case, this would mean that the current 'migrant crisis' takes the overall form

of an ‘exodus’ of young Muslim males to Europe.

11.2.1 Problems with Documentation

Although Syrians have been documented as constituting a significant amount, but not majority, of irregular migrants into Europe over the 2015/2016 period, there is a serious problem with proper and accurate identification of irregular migrants which calls into question just how many are actually Syrians and genuine refugees. Many migrants throw away passports and other forms of identification so that they cannot be identified,⁷⁴⁹ or they simply do not have any identity documents. According to the German Federal Police, between January and April 2016 around 80 percent of asylum seekers had no documents.⁷⁵⁰ Having no identification makes it hard to process asylum requests or deport groundless asylum seekers. There is also a problem with migrants using fake Syrian identity documents. In September 2015, Bavarian police seized 10,000 fake Syrian passports,⁷⁵¹ and in March 2016 the president of Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov, said that his country had confiscated over 9,000 fake Syrian passports.⁷⁵² Up to a third (around 160,000) of all asylum seekers to Germany at the end of September 2015 claimed to be Syrian but were not.⁷⁵³ Frontex, the EU border agency, stated in autumn 2015 that fake Syrian passports and identification papers were being used by mostly Arabic speaking economic migrants⁷⁵⁴ and it was a problem that was increasing.⁷⁵⁵ No doubt this is due to migrants thinking their chances of receiving asylum in Europe are greatly increased with Syrian identification.⁷⁵⁶ What is important is that irregular migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015/2016 falsely claiming to be Syrian, yet were not found out, confound the actual number of genuine Syrian refugees that arrived.

Criminal organizations make a huge profit from fake passports and other documentation. In late December 2015 Jörg Radek, the deputy chairman of the Trade Union of the German Police, said that due to the Syrian war tens of thousands of Syrian passports had fallen into the hands of criminals.⁷⁵⁷ According to the newspaper *Focus*, ‘large numbers of fake certificates are among the documents submitted for authentication’ and ‘blank documents, software, equipment, and stamps have come into the possession of criminal organizations as a result of the war in Syria’, which had led to a thriving passport trade.⁷⁵⁸ ISIS appropriated blank government identity documents in Syria and sold them for profit to those who seek ‘asylum’ in Europe.⁷⁵⁹ According to the head of the EU frontier police, Fabrice Leggeri, the country where the illegal passport trade is booming the most is Turkey.⁷⁶⁰

The procurement of fake passports and other forms of identification is also occurring in Europe, particularly in Greece, which has recently been a main ‘gateway’ country for unlawful and irregular migrants. Foreign migrants who

are already in Europe illegally and who want to freely traverse across the EU are purchasing fake ID documents from Pakistani and Middle Eastern immigrant gangs and forgery rings who have legal residency status in Europe.⁷⁶¹ A joint report in May 2016 by Interpol and Europol stated that

it is anticipated that the abuse of legal systems for the purpose of status regularization will increase. Irregular migrants who have already entered the EU may seek to obtain counterfeit breeder documents (such as fake birth certificates or false work permits) in order to acquire residency in the destination country.⁷⁶²

Using fake passports and identification, Syrian or otherwise, is of course a huge security risk for the EU and makes it difficult for authorities on several levels. Genuine documents with forged or false information make it difficult to distinguish between fake and genuine refugees or others in need of protection (subsidiary status). According to a report by the *Daily Mail*, ‘we cannot prove which ones are genuine and which are false’.⁷⁶³ Migrants using fake identities or having no identity documents at all means they cannot be properly identified; they can falsely claim they are Syrian, fleeing a war-torn country, seeking asylum from persecution, or are younger than they really are (gaining lenient treatment for minors). This increases potential security threats in the form of criminals, ISIS militants, and other radical Islamists, who are known to have used fake Syrian documentation and refugee routes to enter Europe to commit crime and terrorist acts.⁷⁶⁴ It also makes it difficult for authorities to distinguish between genuine refugees, those qualified for subsidiary protection, and illegal economic migrants. According to EU and international asylum law, wanting to have a better economic standard of living or to start a new life is not sufficient grounds for asylum.

The European ‘migration crisis’ is one of both asylum seekers and illegal economic migrants entering Europe. According to EU Commissioner Frans Timmermans, 60 percent or more of asylum seekers surging into Europe in 2015 were not genuine asylum seekers but illegal economic immigrants, mostly from Northern Africa, regions that are not undergoing war or where significant populations are persecuted, and thus these individuals ‘have no reason whatsoever to ask for refugee status’.⁷⁶⁵ This means that of the roughly 1.2 million that were documented arriving in Europe in 2015, around 700,000 are illegal migrants and only 500,000 are genuine refugees. Or, if the Frontex amount of detected irregular migrants (1.8 million) is used, then nearly 1.1 million are not genuine refugees. Baretzky stated that

the term refugee, which we are known to understand and have been used over the last 54 years, is no longer relevant in this case. What is a refugee...and how do we define what is a refugee? Is the militant considered a refugee? Is a militant on the other side of the line also considered underprivileged? Or is he still in fact considered a militant?⁷⁶⁶

In March 2016, Greek Deputy Defense Minister Dimitris Vitsas explained that only 10 percent of arrivals in Greece by sea are actually refugees: ‘one in ten of those coming to Greece from Turkey are actually fleeing war and

persecution'.⁷⁶⁷ If applicable to all sea arrivals to Greece, this means that only 15,070 of the total arrivals between January and March of 2016, which amounts to 150,070⁷⁶⁸ are actually refugees; the rest — 135,633 — are illegal migrants. During a press conference in early March 2016 Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, made an almost comical verbal effort to stop the massive flows of illegal migrants by appealing to 'all potential illegal economic migrants, wherever you are from' to 'not come to Europe'.⁷⁶⁹

11.2.2 Problems with Registration and Vanishing Asylum Seekers

The majority of 'irregular migrants' that arrived in Europe in 2015 were taken in by Germany; over 1.1 million.⁷⁷⁰ Such enormous numbers entering Germany with rapidity have overwhelmed German resources, border controls, and cities.⁷⁷¹ There are problems with identification and registration of incomers entering Germany, which are grave security concerns. In late December 2015 Jörg Radek, deputy chairman of the German Police Union, said that only '10 percent of the refugees' have been positively identified or fingerprinted. In a letter he wrote to Merkel, he stated that the border police are, 'in hundreds of thousands cases', unable to know who 'enters the country, under what name and for what reason. This subverts the ability to enforce internal security'.⁷⁷² In January 2016 on *The Debate*, a program on France's international news channel, *France 24*, German journalist, economist, and commentator, Roland Tichy, said that in Germany

we have at least 300,000 to 400,000 people whose identification is not done. So, we have a large number of really illegal people...the situation is out of control, Germany did not control its borders in a proper way and now it loses control in its cities.⁷⁷³

Also in January, the head of the German police union, Rainer Wendt, said that

We can only check a fraction of the incoming refugees at the border. Of the on average 2,000 people who currently enter Germany every day, only about 800 are fingerprinted....All others are simply *waved through* and placed directly in the initial reception centers.

This means that 1,200 asylum seekers per day, or 8,400 a week, 33,600 per month, or 403,200 per year enter Germany without being registered and fingerprinted at the border. In addition, these unregistered 'irregular migrants' are not counted in refugee numbers according to Wendt: 'the tens of thousands who are unregistered are not counted, and also all those who only succeed in crossing the border at the second or third attempt. This is a huge mess'.⁷⁷⁴ It was estimated that in October 2015 there were 290,000

unregistered migrants that had entered Germany.⁷⁷⁵ If there were around 400,000 undocumented irregular migrants that entered Germany in all of 2015, then this would mean that 1.5 million ‘irregular migrants’ entered Germany in 2015, not 1.1 million. It also increases the absolute numbers of irregular migrants that were documented entering Europe in 2015, which officially stands at 1.8 million according to Frontex.

There are also problems with migrants vanishing once they have crossed into Germany and other countries, and disappearing from asylum centers. In late October 2015, German authorities declared that around 700 of 4,000 asylum seekers who had been living at asylum centers in Lower Saxony had disappeared in one week. In a refugee center in Lingen, Lower Saxony, over half (121) of those who had arrived (212) were unaccounted for, with around 60 of them being unregistered. *The Local*, a newspaper that covered this story, said

Local authorities believe the missing refugees travel on to stay with relatives in Germany or abroad. But, because many of the refugees have not even been registered by local authorities yet, nothing is known about who they are or where they could have gone.

They also reported that the federal minister of labour in Germany estimated that about 300,000 asylum seekers who entered Germany in 2015 leave to travel to other countries.⁷⁷⁶

In early November 2015, North Rhine-Westphalia state Interior Minister Ralf Jäger said that ‘thousands of refugees are vanishing before they can be registered in that state alone’ and that ‘Asylum seekers are fleeing from trains and buses or are leaving allocated accommodation because they move in with relatives and friends in other states or go on to Sweden and Belgium’.⁷⁷⁷ A report in *Der Western* newspaper stated that

The instances of refugees disappearing without a trace pile up: A train from Munich which had 800 refugees from Eritrea, the Balkans, India, and Bangladesh had less than half that number on board when it arrived at Dortmund. Refugees disappear overnight at lodgings because they do not want to stay in their allocated cities. They vanish with complete anonymity with friends or relatives, because the authorities cannot force them to stay in the residences.⁷⁷⁸

Focus newspaper also reported large numbers of vanishing ‘refugees’ in Germany from allocated housing in Brandenburg, the city of Bremen, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria. Authorities had no idea where they had gone. In Brandenburg ‘several hundred’ were vanishing each week; in Bremen around 130 had vanished before being registered; in Lower Saxony around 700 refugees had disappeared within the first two weeks of October 2015; and in the same time frame 580 unregistered asylum seekers had vanished from just one camp in Bavaria.⁷⁷⁹

In January 2016, the German government estimated that about 600,000 asylum seekers were unaccounted for, then in late February a spokesperson

for the German minister of the interior said about 13 percent of the 1.1 million documented asylum seekers in Germany, or 143,000, had not arrived at their allocated housing. The spokesperson went on to say that they ‘may have travelled on to other countries’ or ‘returned to their home countries, and some may appear to have disappeared because they registered more than once in different districts to increase their chances of being sent to their preferred destination’.⁷⁸⁰ In April 2016, a leaked interim report to the *Bild* newspaper from the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Criminal Office (BKA), estimated that as many as 500,000 irregular migrants had not been registered in Germany.⁷⁸¹ Also in April it was reported that nearly 6,000 refugee ‘minors’ (children and teenagers) had gone missing in Germany in 2015. There were 555 under the age of 14 and 5,280 between the ages of 14 and 18 that had gone missing.⁷⁸²

Not being registered, fingerprinted, identified, and entered into the ID data system and simply going ‘missing’ could mean that many asylum seekers may have ‘groundless asylum’ claims and thus disappear.⁷⁸³ They may also have ‘slipped into illegality’⁷⁸⁴ and gone underground, raising fears and ‘concerns over terrorism and organised crime’, fears that some of those that were ‘unaccounted for could include Islamic extremists or organised criminals who entered the country posing as refugees’.⁷⁸⁵ These problems of identification, registering, ‘waving through’, fake documentation, and vanishing migrants are serious security issues and are not isolated to Germany; all European member states who have received large numbers of ‘asylum seekers’ in 2015/2016 are experiencing the same problems. For example, out of the 153,000 irregular migrants that arrived in Italy in 2015, 47 percent ‘did not even attempt to claim asylum’ and instead disappeared, probably heading to richer European countries or heading underground.⁷⁸⁶ According to Norway’s Immigration Minister Sylvi Listhaug, 90 percent of the 537 asylum seekers who had their applications fast-tracked in Norway in 2015 had disappeared. Norway has decided to arrest and jail false asylum seekers as a response: ‘We see that groundless asylum seekers are disappearing while police are processing the applications. This will stop them from running away and possibly ending up in a criminal environment’.⁷⁸⁷ In 2015, more than 14,000 illegal migrants with deportation orders had simply disappeared in Sweden, with the head of the national border police, Patrik Engström, saying ‘We simply don’t know where they are’.⁷⁸⁸ In May 2016, it was reported migrants were disappearing in Europe in such large numbers that the European Commission is willing to spend millions on facial recognition technology to complement and expand the Eurodac fingerprinting database of irregular migrants and asylum seekers which is currently in place.⁷⁸⁹

On several occasions the Hungarian prime minister, Victor Orban, has spoken of the security risks of uncontrolled and unchecked migrants into Europe, saying that ‘accepting a flood of migrants makes a safe and secure

life impossible’⁷⁹⁰ and ‘we must not let anybody into our lives in an uncontrolled manner, because it would get us into trouble’.⁷⁹¹ In April 2016, he devised a ten-point plan to solve the migration crisis and protect the Schengen system, what he called the ‘Schengen 2.0 Action Plan’. This plan is an alternative to the European Commission’s proposal of reforming the asylum system to manage the migrant crisis.⁷⁹² The first point of this plan is about EU borders: if a member state cannot fulfill its Schengen duties then the European Border Agency should intervene, but if an agreement cannot be reached then the membership shall be suspended (a measure aimed at Italy and Greece, who have not protected their borders from mass-migration of irregular migrants and have thus let in hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants into the EU). The second point is about the protection of the EU’s external borders with biometric identification measures. The third point is about reinstating and upholding the Dublin regulation and the punishment of any EU Member State which violates the Dublin regulation (in response to Germany, who suspended the Dublin agreement for a period of a few months, which created mayhem for many EU member nations). The fourth point is about the creation of ‘closed and guarded hotspots’ outside of the EU where asylum applications will be processed (rather than within the EU). The fifth point is about the readmission/deportation of ‘asylum seekers’ and involves the agreement of deportation being concluded in the countries of origin and transit, and that must be enforced in cooperation with them, which directly relates to those sending countries that refuse to take back their nationals. The sixth point is about illegal immigrants who should ‘be sent to safe countries of origin or transit back’ to their country of origin. The seventh point is about EU’s foreign, security, visa, and ‘development’ policies, which must be linked to EU migration policy objectives, and the cooperation of third countries on ‘asylum seeker’ returns must be conditional with the granting of aid. The eighth point is about resources being made available for western Balkan nations and other entry hotspots or gateways into Europe to deal with border security. The ninth point is about the creation of ‘a common European list of safe third countries’, so that when applications are being considered the number of safe countries the asylum seeker has crossed will also be considered. The final point is about all ‘demographic and labor market challenges and responses’ being reserved for ‘sovereign national decisions’ and any plan to ‘distribute refugees’ through mandatory quotas must be abolished.⁷⁹³

Orban submitted this Schengen 2.0 plan at the 15 April 2016 meeting of centrist democratic parties in Lisbon, Portugal;⁷⁹⁴ he aims to tour European capitals presenting his plan and also circulate it among Visegrad countries and certain EU prime ministers.⁷⁹⁵ Even though the reform to the Dublin system proposed by the European Commission has to be agreed to by member states, in May 2016 the EC announced that the EU aimed to suspend the membership of Visegrad nations (and any other EU nation) in the

Schengen zone, withhold billions of euros in funding from them, and fine them €250,000 per ‘refugee’ per year for refusing the mandatory quotas — a move, some accused, amounting to ‘blackmail’.⁷⁹⁶

11.3 Most Asylum Seekers are Young Muslim Males: Three Possible Reasons

For at least the last several years, the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers wanting refuge in EU countries have been males, as shown in table 34.

Table 34. Male and Female Asylum Applicants EU-28, 2008–2015

			EUS28
2008			160,411
			64,635
2009			178,230
			85,455
2010			169,770
			89,480
2011			211,883
			97,050
2012			220,280
			114,930
2013			288,370
			142,635
2014			440,700
			186,085
2015			953,470
			366,785

Source: Eurostat, ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded).’

Between January 2014 and January 2016, males accounted for 71.5 percent of all asylum applicants to the EU, and the number of male applicants between 18 and 34 years were nearly four times the amount of female applicants of the same age.⁷⁹⁷ Over one quarter of asylum applicants in 2015 were minors (17 years and under), over half of these were unaccompanied and over 90 percent were male.⁷⁹⁸ Eurostat reported that over half (51%) of unaccompanied asylum seeking minors in 2015 were from Afghanistan and only 16 percent were from Syria. Over half (57%) were aged between 16 and 17 years of age, almost one-third (29%) were between the ages of 14 and 15, together accounting for 86 percent of all asylum applications by unaccompanied minors.⁷⁹⁹ In 2016, between January and early October, 54 percent of all irregular arrivals by sea were male, 28 percent were minors (the majority of whom were unaccompanied and male), and 18 percent were women.⁸⁰⁰ By early October 2016 in Greece, 41 percent of sea arrivals since 1 January 2016, were men, 21 percent were women, and 37 percent were

minors.⁸⁰¹ By early October 2016 in Italy, 70 percent of sea arrivals since 1 January 2016, were men, 14 percent were women, and 16 percent were minors.⁸⁰²

A problem with the irregular migrant wave being constituted mostly by young males is gender equality. According to Valerie Hudson, professor of political science at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, such a phenomenon is altering the sex-ratios of European countries. In regards to Sweden, she states that

My calculations show that there are now approximately 125 boys aged 16–17 for every 100 girls aged 16–17 in Sweden. That is highly abnormal. It is significantly more abnormal than China, whose sex ratio for this age group — due to the problems of the one-child policy — is only 117 boys for every 100 girls aged 16–17.

She continued by saying that

societies with highly masculinized sex ratios, that is, with far more men than women in the young adult age group, are unstable. They have higher rates of violent crime, property crime, crimes against women. Women's freedom to move about in an unconstrained manner is curtailed and there is also a very high demand for prostitution and trafficked women to fill that need, that demand. And so I think someone should be asking whether the alteration in the sex ratio for Europe is not a tragic loss for the women of Europe, for ideals of gender equality in Europe and so forth.⁸⁰³

In addition, most irregular migrants are from Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa — countries that have horrendous track records in the treatment of females.⁸⁰⁴

So why are most asylum seekers young males travelling alone? Baretzky aptly asks

When we look at the present situation, particularly the recent issues and developments in Italy, we can see very clearly that the majority is [sic] men.... and the question is how is that possible? Wouldn't it be that men migrate with their families and their children when they are in a point of need?⁸⁰⁵

There are several possibilities for this phenomenon, the following are three potential reasons.

11.3.1 Dangerous Journey

The first possible reason is that the journey to Europe is far too dangerous for females to make, especially sea voyages, so young males undertake the journey as 'scouts', then apply for asylum and use family reunification laws to bring over their families.⁸⁰⁶ The Common European Asylum Directive (directives 2004/83/EC⁸⁰⁷ and 2011/95/EU),⁸⁰⁸ EU Primary Law (articles 7, 9, and 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union),⁸⁰⁹ International Human Rights Law (articles 12 and 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;⁸¹⁰ articles 17, 23, and 24 of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;⁸¹¹ articles 10, 16, and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child;⁸¹² and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights),⁸¹³ and the Family Reunification Directive (FRD, *Council Directive 2003/86/EC*),⁸¹⁴ state that third country nationals (TCNs, including refugees) have the ‘right to a family life’, which is possible through family reunification. According to the FRD, family life is worthy of protection, establishment, and preservation and

Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion.⁸¹⁵

Family reunification law allows for parents, the spouse, minor unmarried children, and dependent unmarried adult children (with health issues) to join the TCN in his/her host country. For non-refugee migrants who seek family reunification as sponsors, a period of two years legal residency is required before the submission of the application and they may be required to provide evidence of self-sufficiency, such as healthy and safe accommodation, ‘sickness insurance’, and ‘stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself or herself and the members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance system’.⁸¹⁶ In comparison, for refugees, including unaccompanied children, there is no time frame for family reunification application. The fulfillment of the above resources and housing criteria is also not necessary if the application is submitted within three months of being granted refugee status.

In February 2016 Horst Seehofer, CSU minister of Bavaria, made a *very conservative* estimate of the net total number of refugees expected in Germany which included those arriving under family reunification policies. He used a factor of 0.5, which means for every two refugees one single family member will be brought to Germany. He estimated that 3 million refugees will enter Germany per year. However, he mentioned that ‘experts told us you might as well use a factor of 2, 3, and 4’.⁸¹⁷ This is simply because the majority of asylum seekers that have entered Europe in 2015/2016 are Muslims who tend to have high fertility rates and large families and will apply to bring more than one family member to Germany.⁸¹⁸ What this means then, is that between three and nine million refugees may enter Germany per year. Seehofer concludes by rhetorically asking

What this means for security, for integration, for the ability to finance all of this. For the operability of our administration!...This is a different country. And the population does not want Germany or Bavaria to become another country.⁸¹⁹

Although the first reason seems logical in terms of the journey being too dangerous for women and children, the increase of minors (from 20 to 35%) and women (from 10 to 20%) taking the sea journey to Greece in 2016

presents difficulties to this argument. Nevertheless, the majority of those who arrive continue to be male and large amounts are applying for asylum and family reunification. However, although it is quite likely that a majority of males do undertake the journey to Europe to seek asylum and then apply for family reunification, there are various laws being enacted in various EU Member states (particularly those that have received the most refugees, such as Sweden and Germany) that aim to restrict family reunification and hope to deter further asylum seekers. This is due to the unsustainability of providing for such sheer numbers of refugees and their families. For example, in November 2015 Germany's interior minister, Thomas de Maiziere, called for restricted family reunification rights as it was 'no longer viable' to guarantee them with 'livelihoods'. He said that 'No one knows how many people in Syria and its bordering states are waiting for their family reunification applications to be approved' and that 'We cannot double or triple our already high refugee numbers through family reunification'.⁸²⁰ So far, asylum seekers in Germany who have had their application rejected but have not been deported due to humanitarian reasons and have been granted residency permits i.e. have subsidiary protection, may not sponsor family members for two years.⁸²¹

In Sweden, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven argued that family reunification 'is one of the driving factors behind spiralling migration'. He said, in terms of overstretched social resources, that 'The current situation is unsustainable, so we must drastically reduce the number of asylum seekers coming to Sweden'.⁸²² As a result, renewable temporary residency permits are now granted to refugees (except quota refugees) and those under subsidiary protection; the former for three years and the latter for one year. Refugees with temporary permits will only be granted the right to be reunited with immediate family members, such as spouses who must be over 21 years of age. Those under subsidiary protection do not have the right to family reunification. In addition, refugees with temporary permits must provide evidence they are capable of financially supporting sponsored family members if they submit their application after three months of being granted asylum.⁸²³

11.3.2 Economic Opportunities

The second possible reason as to why the majority of asylum seekers are males is perceived economic opportunities in Europe. In late 2015 Inam Ghani, the Director of Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency, stated

In the past, it was relatively easy in Europe to obtain not just asylum, but also accommodation and monetary assistance. I believe, illegal immigrants should not be given any benefits or the right to apply for political asylum. They should be immediately deported.⁸²⁴

Over 60 percent of the irregular migrants in 2015 were illegal economic migrants who sought to take advantage of the perceived job prospects and/or financial benefits in Europe. Various conditions in their home countries may contribute to this: unemployment, low wages, famine, lack of economic infrastructure and development, drying up oil fields, corruption of public officials and elites, and rapid population growth.⁸²⁵ Such conditions have often led to illegal economic migrants being called ‘climate refugees’, ‘oil refugees’, and ‘economic refugees’.⁸²⁶ Such terms are not accurate in accordance with legal definitions of refugees, however. In any case, some illegal economic migrants will apply for asylum and while they wait will receive government benefits.

The Asylum Seeker Benefits Act in Germany provides the asylum seeker (and those awaiting deportation) with the ‘basic benefits for food, housing, heating, clothing, healthcare and personal hygiene...household durables and consumables.’ It also provides ‘pocket money’ for ‘personal daily requirements’ and ‘benefits in case of sickness, pregnancy and birth’ as well as ‘individual benefits which depend on the individual case’.⁸²⁷ In Sweden economic assistance comes in the form of the provision of housing and a daily allowance, which can be from around 11 CDN\$ per day or around 320 CDN\$ per month for a single asylum seeking adult in their own accommodation with self-catering, and around 4 CDN\$ per day or around 110 CDN\$ per month for single asylum seeking adults in reception centers with meals. There is also a one-time allowance for winter clothing and/or provisions for new births. Minors in own accommodation with self-catering can receive between 172 and 235 CDN\$ per month, and in reception centers with meals they receive around 2 CDN\$ per day or around 53 CDN\$ per month.⁸²⁸

If (and when) an asylum seeker application is rejected, the applicant may know of the difficulties of being deported due to various human rights constraints, reluctant countries of origin to receive deportees, or lack of verifiable identification. They may thus choose to stay, sometimes going underground. Some may have relatives, friends, or acquaintances already established in various European countries who will provide them with a place to stay; some may, through various networks, find black market work. According to a study sponsored by the European Commission, in 2008 there were between 1.9 and 3.8 million ‘irregular foreign residents’ in the EU-27⁸²⁹ and there are likely many more since this time. The OECD explains that undocumented foreign labourers often find work in several fields, such as ‘agriculture, building and civil engineering, small-scale industry, tourism, hotels and catering, and services to households and to businesses, including computer services’.⁸³⁰ Hiring illegal immigrants is also beneficial to employers, who circumvent costs of legal labour, such as saving on taxes and paying below legal minimum wage.⁸³¹ Other work by illegal economic migrants may be criminal in nature, such as drug or people

trafficking.⁸³² Some illegal migrants may also hope to eventually gain residency permits, amnesty, or even naturalisation/citizenship after a given period of time, which has happened in Spain, France, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe over the last decade or so.⁸³³

11.3.3 Muslim Invasion

The third possible reason may be a Muslim invasion in the form of 1) an Islamist military invasion and 2) a non-violent Muslim conquest through demographics. According to the *Oxford Dictionary*, an invasion is ‘An incursion by a large number of people or things into a place or sphere of activity’,⁸³⁴ and according to the *Gage Canadian Dictionary*, to invade is to ‘enter with force or as an enemy’ involving ‘interference; encroachment; infringement’.⁸³⁵ In terms of the first form of invasion, we already know that some ISIS militants have posed as refugees and used the refugee route to stealthily enter Europe to commit terrorist acts.⁸³⁶ These are ‘foreign fighters’ or violent Islamist rejectionists. ISIS has claimed that it has sent thousands of such fighters to Europe under the cover of being ‘refugees’. Since Europe received around 1.8 million irregular migrants in 2015, mostly young male Muslims between the ages of 18 and 34, what some have called ‘military age’,⁸³⁷ and since around 11–13 percent of Muslims think of ISIS positively (see chapter 10), this would mean that between 198,000 and 234,000 new arrivals in Europe may be sympathetic to ISIS. There may be other Islamist militant groups, such as al-Qaeda, who have also sent militants disguised as refugees to establish and expand their networks in Europe.

Other than these obvious forms of military invasion, there are less obvious but still apparent forms involving the use of force by ‘refugees’ to enter Europe. These include the use of various tools to cut through border fences; attacks on border authorities with rocks and other weapons by mobs of young physically fit men; violent riots, fights, threats, and protests involving various weapons (including arson and guns) along closed borders and in refugee centers in demand to enter further into Europe; the large-scale disappearance of asylum seekers and the lack of or use of fake identity documents; the occupation of train tracks and other transportation routes; the use of women and children as strategic emotional weapons; the use of what are termed ‘battering-rams’ and other objects by hundreds of violent young males to forcefully and illegally enter Europe; and what some have termed sex jihad (mass rape and sexual assault as a weapon of war) against European women and girls by recent migrants and asylum seekers.⁸³⁸ The use of such force is peculiar, as they are unwilling to use such might and fight in their own countries for their own freedoms.

Various European leaders have called the ‘migrant crisis’ various forms of an invasion. Viktor Orbán gave a speech at the European People’s Party

(EPP) Congress in Madrid on 22 October 2015, stating that

We cannot avoid speaking about the quality of our democracies. Does it comply with the freedom of information and speech that medias usually show women and children while seventy percent of the migrants are *young men and they look like an army*?⁸³⁹

He was referring to the bias of the controlled media in the news that continuously show pictures of women and children although the majority that arrived in 2015 (and still in 2016) are physically fit young Muslim men.⁸⁴⁰

In December 2015, the president of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, stated that he was ‘profoundly convinced we are facing an organized invasion and not a spontaneous movement of refugees’. He questioned why so many irregular migrants were young men who were not fighting ISIS: ‘A large majority of the illegal migrants are young men in good health, and single. I wonder why these men are not taking up arms to fight for the freedom of their countries against Islamic State’.⁸⁴¹ In January 2016, Zeman stated that the Muslim Brotherhood is an umbrella group of all Islamist terrorist groups and that the migrant crisis is an ‘invasion’ that is ‘being organised by the Muslim Brotherhood’, which is using various ‘financial resources from a whole range of states’.⁸⁴² He, and others, think that Turkey is directly involved in the invasion and is an ally of ISIS.⁸⁴³ In December 2015 Zeman said ‘I think Turkey is indeed a member of NATO, but sometimes behaves as if it’s more an ally of Islamic State. It removes oil from Syria which finances Islamic State’. Zeman also dismissed the EU’s financial aid to Turkey for the Syrian refugees there, calling it ‘tribute money’ and that ‘The Roman Empire, before it collapsed, also paid tribute money to barbarians for them not to pilfer its territory’.⁸⁴⁴ In January 2016, King Abdullah of Jordan said to the American Congress that Europe’s migrant crisis and disguised terrorists among them was not an accident: ‘The fact that terrorists are going to Europe is part of Turkish policy and Turkey keeps on getting a slap on the hand, but they are let off the hook’. He also thought it was a fact that ISIS was exporting oil to Turkey and his foreign minister, Nasser Judeh, said that ‘Turkey unleashed the refugees onto Europe’.⁸⁴⁵ A Syrian man himself ominously asserts that

Don’t take this personally, but you Europeans are really dumb....These terrorists came into our house, they took our women...to rape them. And you let them all come to Europe...they are all ISIS and al Nusra....For this mistake you will pay and if you don’t pay, your children will pay. Everyone you let into your countries, they are our trash! You will regret this. There will be explosions in France, Germany, Italy....They will stay until they have cut the head off every last one of you.⁸⁴⁶

Many Syrian women in refugee camps in Syria consider Syrian males who have left to Europe as shameful. One woman says, ‘if they go, who will free us? Who will protect us? We are their honour.’ Another woman states that ‘It is wrong to leave your country’ and ‘your family’. And another says that ‘it

is forbidden to leave the country, they leave it when it is in a bad need! They have to defend it. They have to stand by its people, and not to leave it'.⁸⁴⁷

Whether or not the 'migrant crisis' is an organised invasion by the Muslim Brotherhood or by ISIS et al. and whether or not Turkey is aiding ISIS and sending terrorists to Europe is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, the official estimated number of ISIS fighters who arrived in Europe as refugees is a mere fraction of the over 1.8 million irregular migrants who arrived in 2015, and the number of other violent Islamist group members would likely also be small. Although around 200,000 of the arrivals in 2015 may be sympathetic to ISIS, which is a serious problem in itself, it does not necessarily mean they are Islamist militants invading Europe. So the first form of invasion, although it has some truth to it, does not adequately explain the overwhelming arrival of young Muslim men in 2015/2016.

In terms of the second form of invasion, demographic conquest, it is well established that there are non-violent Islamists who do not want to integrate in Europe but want to non-violently conquer it by expanding the Muslim population and further fracture and undermine European societies through Islamization and the war tactic known as Trojan Horse. As detailed in chapters 8 and 9, many Muslim leaders have called for Muslims in Europe to remain separate from mainstream society and establish parallel Muslim communities (including Turkish President Recep Erdogan), reject Western values, and infiltrate all power structures of society with the ultimate aim of changing them in accord with Islamism. Hundreds to thousands of Muslim enclaves or no-go zones exist throughout all Western European nations, made up of Muslim immigrants (first, second, and third generations) that function according to their own legal code and value system, reject European values, aspire to establish Sharia Law, and are hot-beds of radicalisation and recruitment to militant Islamism. These communities are characterised by high crime and low education and employment levels, and are continuously expanded through high fertility rates and replenished from ongoing Muslim chain migration. We know from various statistics that Muslims in Europe are disproportionately represented in prison statistics and unemployment rates. We also know from various polls and surveys that a significant portion of Muslims in Europe view the Western world unfavourably, support or have sympathy for radical and violent Islamists, and want to establish Sharia law and the Islamic way of life in European nations.⁸⁴⁸ We can say that a significant portion of the Muslim population already in Europe are a mixture of what Vidino calls violent rejectionists, non-violent rejectionists, and participationists.

The population of Muslims in Europe continues to increase every year, and in various European cities they are either already a majority or are set to constitute the majority of the population in the next few decades. It is no mere coincidence (in the game of war) that various Muslim leaders over the last few decades have called for or predicted the demographic conquest or

colonisation of Europe, from Boumedienne in 1974 to Khadafi in 2006 and Belkacem in 2010, and that the vast majority of irregular migrants arriving in Europe in 2015/2016 were young males from Muslim majority countries.⁸⁴⁹ Further, it is well established that even though there are disparate Muslim groups and sectarian Muslim conflicts, which are often violent and bloody, there is a common Muslim identity in terms of the 'ummah' or global community of Muslims that is characterised by a common opposition to Israeli-Western forces, such as the issue of Palestine and Western support for Israel, neoliberal global hegemony, and neoconservative foreign policy and occupation in Muslim countries. As many of the countries where the majority of irregular Muslim migrants have originated from have been and/or are embroiled in conflicts with American-led 'Western' anti-terror forces, one can assume that a large percentage of the young Muslim men arriving in Europe share such negative perceptions of the West.

What is peculiar is that these young Muslim men are physically able but refuse to join their national or local militaries to protect their homeland, resources, people, and families from Islamists (and/or dictatorships), and instead 'flee' through several countries (many of them 'safe countries') and trek thousands of dangerous miles to reach Europe while leaving their most vulnerable (women, children, and the elderly) behind. Many of the countries these irregular Muslim migrants are originating from are not even undergoing war or conditions of persecution. Conflict in these countries, where it does exist, is isolated to specific regions of the country, not the whole country, and often comes in the form of terrorist attacks similar in nature to those committed in Paris and Brussels. Although these countries are often not considered safe for Westerners, they are for the most part safe for their residents. All of the top source countries of irregular Muslim migrants to the European Union, including Syria (large areas in Syria are not under ISIS control), are considered somewhat safe:⁸⁵⁰ Iraq,⁸⁵¹ Iran,⁸⁵² Afghanistan,⁸⁵³ Somalia,⁸⁵⁴ Pakistan (hosts the second largest refugee population in the world),⁸⁵⁵ Morocco (a major tourist destination),⁸⁵⁶ and Sudan.⁸⁵⁷ There is no valid reason for tens to hundreds of thousands of young men from these countries to make the long journey to Europe. Even if these countries were considered unsafe, then it is very unusual for the vast majority of those fleeing to be men in circumstances requiring 'protection', where families would usually travel together, particularly in extended-family settings in Muslim countries, and especially since women and children are more vulnerable than men during such dangerous conditions of conflict.

It may be the fact that the majority of Muslims arriving in Europe do not have the *intention* of demographically conquering Europe, but one can assume that such sheer numbers definitely plays directly into the desires and aims of Islamists. If trends continue, then a significant portion of these Muslims, if granted residency permits, will settle in Muslim enclaves, not integrate, have low employment and education levels, possibly commit

crime, and contribute to the fracturing of society. They will likely bring family members over through family reunification laws, practice marriage migration, and have several children, thereby contributing to the demographic expansion of the Muslim population in Europe. Some will join Islamist groups, whether non-violent or violent, and contribute to the infiltration of all levels of European society and the spread of Islamisation and Sharia Law.⁸⁵⁸

11.4 Migrant Crisis and Muslim Countries

Turkey has a population of 75 million and is a close American ally; it has been a lead player in overthrowing the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad⁸⁵⁹ and hosts the American military, who have conducted a proxy war against Syria since 2011. Turkey has provided shelter, funding, and arms to Syrian opposition fighters, such as the Syrian Free Army, against the Syrian Assad government and ISIS,⁸⁶⁰ while also having an enthusiastic open-door policy for refugees fleeing the war in Syria.⁸⁶¹ It is the largest recipient of Syrian refugees in the world — it officially houses and provides aid to 2.5 million Syrian refugees and about 500,000 other war refugees mainly from Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and more are arriving daily. It has spent billions of US dollars housing these refugees and also receives international aid to do so, such as 455 million USD from the UN and 3 billion euros (\$3.4 bn US) as a ‘first’ payment from Europe over a two-year period (which is part of the EU-Turkey deal).⁸⁶²

Although there is a considerable amount of European pressure on Turkey to close its borders, it is consistently viewed as a ‘first step and transition country’ or a ‘major transit point’ for migrants/refugees from across the MENA region who are heading to Europe.⁸⁶³ This means that Turkey is like a way-station, merely a country that is traversed and used by illegal migrants on their route to Europe. Although Turkey houses the largest amount of Syrian refugees, many of them want to leave, and European elites have actively encouraged them, saying ‘come on in’. The main reason why refugees in Turkey do not want to stay is because refugees are not given access to the labour market (work permits), social benefits, education, or permanent citizenship, unlike European countries, where fast-tracking refugees into the labour market is high on the European Council agenda.⁸⁶⁴ In addition, conditions in camps are poor and many refugees are not provided shelter; there are around 3 million Syrians and non-Syrians who are not housed or officially counted in Turkey.⁸⁶⁵ Many of them have been heading to Europe illegally, either by land or by sea (eastern Aegean) into Greece, Italy, or Bulgaria, often with Turkish officials turning a blind eye, and in some cases, actively encouraging them to do so.⁸⁶⁶

Since November 2015, Turkish President Erdogan, has, in his own words,

at ‘every opportunity’ threatened to flood Europe with the migrants and asylum seekers in Turkey that are seeking to enter Europe. In effect, he has been using the refugees and migrants as a political weapon in order to blackmail the EU.⁸⁶⁷ Having already prepared buses to re-route migrants and refugees to Europe, he has said that if Europe does not provide more financial aid (another 3 billion) to Turkey, then he will ‘open the gates [to Bulgaria and Greece] and wish them a safe journey’. Even when Turkey did not fulfill the 72 criteria⁸⁶⁸ required for visa-liberalisation (part of the EU-Turkey deal), such as changing Turkish counterterrorism laws, which meant that such liberalisation would be stalled, Turkey once again threatened Europe with a flood of irregular migrants. Burhan Kuzu, Turkish MP for Erdogan’s party, who was former chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, warned on his Twitter account that ‘If the EU makes the wrong decision, we will release the refugees’.⁸⁶⁹

Erdogan has also pressed EU member states to accept more refugees and migrants from Turkey and the MENA region, calling the EU ‘shameful’ as it had not taken in more. However, over the last few decades, European countries have received millions of legal and illegal immigrants a year, including from Turkey, whereas between 1950 and 2010 Turkey experienced negative net migration, which means more people left Turkey than entered.⁸⁷⁰ The EU, in particular Sweden, France, and Germany, have also received many more asylum applicants and from a greater variety of nationalities than Turkey for many years already; since at least 1998, the EU has received between 200,000 and 1.1 million asylum applications per year. There were over 300,000 asylum applicants in the EU in 2011 and over 400,000 in 2012. In 2014 there were over 600,000 applicants and in 2015 there were 1.3 million.⁸⁷¹ Between 2008 and 2014 over 750,000 asylum seekers were granted protection in the EU.⁸⁷² In 2015, there were more refugees in Europe than were in the MENA region, and just over 250,000 less than in Asia and the Pacific.⁸⁷³ Since the start of the Syrian crisis, the EU has provided around 8 billion euros in donations; between 2011 and 2013 it had provided around 2 billion, making it the ‘largest donor,’ and between 2013 and May 2016 it had provided over 3 billion more, with an extra 3 billion pledged in February 2016.⁸⁷⁴

Erdogan also supports the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas,⁸⁷⁵ and has called Kurds ‘atheist infidels’ who are trying ‘to destroy Islamic values.’⁸⁷⁶ In a May 2015 speech celebrating the 562nd anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, he showed his support for the re-creation of the Islamic Caliphate of the Ottoman Empire through ‘conquest’. He stated that the ‘conquest’ was of Spain and the Balkans up into Austria: ‘The conquest is *Al-Andalus* [Muslim Spain]. It is to build the most beautiful architecture, literature and culture of the world such as in Córdoba and Granada’ and

The conquest is to open the doors of Anatolia up to Vienna [where the previous

Ottoman Empire was stopped in 1683] for this blessed nation. The conquest is Osman Ghazi [the first Ottoman Sultan]. It is to make the sycamore [the Ottoman Empire] meet with the ground that would cover three continents and seven climates through the enlightenment inspired by Sheikh Edebali who said, 'Make the human live so that the state can live'.⁸⁷⁷

And European leaders want to give visa-free travel to Turkey and possibly let it become a member of the EU.

What about other Muslim countries taking in their Muslim brethren as refugees and economic migrants? There are 50 Muslim-majority countries in the world.⁸⁷⁸ The vast majority (90+%) of refugees and migrants coming to Europe are from Muslim-majority nations, yet most of the wealthy and stable Muslim countries are not accepting or settling them, nor plan to do so. Some of the wealthiest Muslim countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but none of them are settling Syrians or other Muslim refugees.⁸⁷⁹ Roughly 95 percent of the 4 million Syrian refugees are in only five Muslim host countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, and many have been leaving these countries and heading to Europe. Jordan, for example, has a population of 6.5 million and has been confronted with around 1 million refugees primarily from Syria, but also from Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan. It has built refugee camps for about 20 percent and provides basic education and healthcare in host communities. It altered its refugee UNHCR budget from USD 62.8 million in 2010 to a revised 2015 budget of USD 404.4 million.⁸⁸⁰

Lebanon, with a population of around 4 million has around 2 million refugees, particularly Syrians, Iraqis, and Sudanese, and provides many of them with 'cash grants, shelter and access to health and education'. Its refugee UNHCR budget was altered from USD 13.7 million in 2011 to a revised budget of USD 556.8 million for 2015.⁸⁸¹ According to the International Bar Association, 'Both Lebanon and Jordan are facing an unprecedented socioeconomic and political crisis' as refugees compete 'with their hosts for jobs and resources', public services are straining, and outbreaks of 'sectarian conflicts between pro- and anti-Syrian forces continue to escalate'. Unemployment among Jordanians has risen from 14.5 percent to 22.1 percent between 2011 and 2014, which is roughly about 379,000, and it has been estimated by the World Bank that 'by the end of 2015, 170,000 Lebanese will fall into poverty and unemployment will double to around 20 per cent'.⁸⁸² Likewise, the *Globe and Mail* reports that in Lebanon and Jordan 'the devastating long-term effects [of the refugee crisis] are alike in deteriorating public services, including education, health and infrastructure; rising social tensions; and bleak economic outlooks'.⁸⁸³ Paolo Verme, author of a 2014 WB-UNHCR study, writes that the inflow of refugees

has challenged the already delicate societal and inter-communal balance in Lebanon [...]; overcrowding, saturation of basic services and competition for jobs are among the

In other words, refugee influxes in Jordan and Lebanon (and Turkey) are producing serious financial and social problems for these countries.

Jordan and Lebanon do not practice large-scale, permanent, and ethnically diverse mass-immigration. Like Turkey, in the 20th century Lebanon had a character of continual *emigration* and suffered from demographic loss. It is only relatively recently, beginning in the early 2000s, that it has experienced positive migration; the net migration rate in 2002 was 550,110; in 2007 it was 183,370; and in 2012 it was 500,000.⁸⁸⁵ However, economic immigration into Lebanon is in the most part annual or seasonal; migrants are given temporary work permits rather than being granted permanent residency. Migrants also do not have equal access to public services, liberal professions, or estate ownership.⁸⁸⁶ Jordan has experienced inconsistent amounts of inflow and outflow migration since the 1950s. For example, in 1992 it had a net migration flow of 400,000, but in 2002 it was negative 184,000. Its net migration rate for 2007 was 450,110 and in 2012 it was 400,000.⁸⁸⁷ Like Lebanon, immigration is considered as a temporary affair in response to needs of the national economy and integration is rejected at the local level. In addition, preference in the job market is given to nationals over foreigners, liberal professions and government jobs are reserved for nationals only, and migrants have no access to health and education services.⁸⁸⁸

12. Criminal Aspects and Costs of the Migrant Crisis

The European migration crisis is being utilised and fuelled by criminal elements the world over. Not only are illegal migrants exploiting the refugee flows into Europe, whereby some pretend to be fleeing war, use fake passports, and throw away identification, there are also criminals and opportunists who are using the migrant crisis to benefit financially from it and/or enter Europe. There are two main criminals who are doing this: smugglers and ISIS/radical Muslims.

Smugglers, mostly made up of Moroccan, Spaniard, Albanian, and Syrian nationals,⁸⁸⁹ are demanding between \$400 and \$1,500 or more from migrants and asylum seekers who are trying to enter Europe illegally.⁸⁹⁰ There are also reports that legal migrants in the UK are smuggling illegals across the Channel to Britain.⁸⁹¹ In fact, there is a human smuggling network made up of mega-gangs that stretches across the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the UK that exploits refugee and migrant flows; about 9 out of 10 illegal immigrants entering Europe use smugglers to do so.⁸⁹² In 2015 alone, this huge human smuggling network generated more than 5.7 billion euros trafficking illegals into Europe⁸⁹³ and it is projected to rake in more than 10 billion euros in 2016.⁸⁹⁴ In the last few years, human smuggling has quickly become one of the largest crimes facing Europe.

According to Europol, human traffickers are also exploiting the migration crisis to steal children for sex slavery and labour⁸⁹⁵ and, according to officials such as Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann, there are also many unaccompanied migrant minors that are purposefully avoiding registration, prompting concerns that they will not integrate and may be 'criminally exploited', turn to a life of crime, and become 'attackers of tomorrow'.⁸⁹⁶ Illegal entry into Europe is also fuelled as far-away as Thailand, where in February 2016 a crime ring led by an Iranian was busted for producing, selling, and shipping thousands of fake passports to Middle Easterners seeking illegal entry into Europe.⁸⁹⁷

The European migration crisis is one of uncontrolled migration, in contrast to controlled and legal immigration that involves lawful procedures, applicants and invitees, proper security screening, background checks, and sustainable numbers. Due to the uncontrolled and extremely large volumes of migrants arriving in Europe, coupled with poor external EU border controls (and absent internal border controls), proper screening and documentation of arrivals is nearly impossible, which means that European security is endangered. In February 2015, ISIS threatened to use the surge of migrants and refugees heading to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea. They stated they would flood Europe with hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees at the same time in an effort to destabilise Europe.⁸⁹⁸ In response,

Italian Minister for the Interior Angelino Alfano said that ‘We are at risk of an exodus without precedent’, which seems to have materialised.⁸⁹⁹

In May 2015, Baretzky said that

ISIS has taken radicalisation to a whole new level of risk. And migration is an uncontrolled process that opens the ability of ISIS to infiltrate the EU and this poses a major security risk of terrorism and more. So, we can’t ignore the fact that many of these possible migrants might not be migrants.⁹⁰⁰

In September 2015, Elias Bou Saab, Lebanon’s education minister, warned David Cameron, then prime minister of Britain, that as many as one in 50 Syrian refugees to Europe (two percent of Syrian refugees) could be a jihadist or ISIS radical or fighter, and that ISIS was conducting an operation whereby ‘they bring some people, the smugglers. They organise groups and send them out’, these ‘people’ being militants disguised as refugees.⁹⁰¹ In fact, ISIS has taken over some of the main smuggling routes to Europe, particularly on the Libyan coast,⁹⁰² in order to profit and to send fighters to Europe disguised as refugees. In early December 2015 a Czech MEP, Petr Mach, declared to the European Parliament that there were camps in Syria ‘where Europeans [Muslims with European citizenship] were being trained to fight, not alongside the Islamic State, but so that they would return and wage war in Europe’.⁹⁰³ An IFOP poll revealed that in September 2015 almost two-thirds of Germans, over two-thirds of French, and over three quarters of Italians thought terrorists were using the ‘migrant crisis’ to enter Europe and this belief rose to eight out of 10 for all three countries by March 2016.⁹⁰⁴

In distinction to a 26 January 2016 report by Europol (which is the EU’s law enforcement agency that denied ‘terrorist travellers systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed’),⁹⁰⁵ in early February 2016 Hans-Georg Maassen, head of the German domestic intelligence agency, reported that ISIS is indeed using the ‘refugee’ routes, that scores had made it to Germany already and were living there as ‘refugees’.⁹⁰⁶ In addition, he admitted that some ISIS members had posed as Syrian refugees and that some were responsible for the terrorist attack in Paris (November 2015) that killed 130 people and wounded hundreds more.⁹⁰⁷ On 1 March 2016, US Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove stated that mass-migration is ‘masking the movement of criminals, terrorists and foreign fighters’ into Europe and ISIS was spreading ‘like a cancer, taking advantage of paths of least resistance and threatening European nations, and our own, with terrorist attacks’.⁹⁰⁸ European and Iraqi intelligence officials also revealed in March 2016 that ISIS has already trained and sent 400 fighters to Europe, some of which were associated with the Paris terror attacks.⁹⁰⁹ In April 2016, Frontex released its annual risk assessment report, which stated that ‘irregular migrant flows could be used by terrorists to enter the EU’ and that

Two of the terrorists involved in the [Paris] attacks had previously irregularly entered

through Leros and had been registered by the Greek authorities. They presented fraudulent Syrian documents to speed up their registration process.⁹¹⁰

There have been numerous reports of thousands of ‘jihadists’ already in Europe,⁹¹¹ reports of radical Islamic networks all across Europe⁹¹² (including ‘rejectionists’ who call for violence, those who do not, and those who ‘participate’),⁹¹³ and reports of thousands of Muslims being arrested on terrorism-related charges.⁹¹⁴ In fact, Muslim terrorism in Europe was first initiated by Muslim refugees and asylum seekers. According to Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, who wrote *Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe* (2014),

The first generation of Islamist extremists in Europe consisted of asylum seekers and refugees. These were individuals who had been politically active before they arrived in Europe and brought their experience and, in some cases, their battles and political agendas with them. Some of the leading ideologues of radical Islamism in Europe fall into this category. In some cases, recent refugees turned against the host country and its culture because that country’s government supported the regime they opposed or took a foreign policy stance that was inimical to their broader political values or because they became exposed to a more global agenda while in the West.⁹¹⁵

Dozens of Islamic terrorist threats, including lone-wolf attacks, on European soil have been thwarted since the end of 2015, such as the Paris knife attack in January 2016 where a lone Muslim man attempted to storm a police station and stab officers. The perpetrator was a ‘serial asylum seeker’ from Tunisia who had lived illegally in France for five years and had been living in Recklinghausen, a town in western Germany, since 2013; nine migrants from the town were also arrested in relation to the attack.⁹¹⁶ In addition, in refugee centers recent arrivals are increasingly vulnerable to Islamic radicalisation⁹¹⁷ and Europol and news media reports that Islamists are ‘recruiting refugees’ and youth,⁹¹⁸ plotting Paris-style terrorist attacks across Europe, and have set up ‘terror training’ bases in the EU and the Balkans.⁹¹⁹ The latest ISIS terrorist attack in Brussels, the capital of Europe, on 22 March 2016, killed 35 and injured 300 at Brussels airport and a metro station. In relation to the attack, dozens of arrests have been made in Germany, France, and Belgium, particularly in the Molenbeek district, one of many Muslim no-go zones that exist across Europe. It is now known that the attacks and the attackers in Belgium were linked to the November 2015 attacks in Paris⁹²⁰ and at least three of them had posed as refugees.⁹²¹

Germany took in the majority of irregular migrants in 2015 and the flow of migrants into Europe does not seem to be stopping, but rather increasing. Polls and surveys reveal that almost half of Germans now fear refugees; 7/10 fear the migrant crisis will lead to more crime,⁹²² 60 percent think that Germany cannot cope with the influx, 9/10 do not want any more refugees coming to Germany, and there are also fears of an impending civil war.⁹²³

12.1 Migrant Crime

Although a majority of refugees/foreign migrants never commit crime, crime by irregular migrants is becoming an increasing problem across the EU. The chairman of the Federal German Police, Andre Schulz, estimated that at least 10 percent of migrants are criminals, meaning that of the 1.1 million that arrived in Germany in 2015, 110,000 were delinquents.⁹²⁴ A German report by the Federal Criminal Police Office revealed that 208,344 crimes were committed by asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants in 2015 in Germany, a 79 percent increase from the year before.⁹²⁵ But the report is only about solved crimes in 13 of the 16 states in Germany and excludes important data from various states and large cities, so the number of crimes is likely to have been much more, with an estimate of over 400,000 by Soeren Kern, a distinguished senior fellow of the Gatestone Institute.⁹²⁶ The most common crimes were theft, crimes against property, counterfeiting offenses, and ‘acts of brutality’, including ‘assault, robbery, extortion and acts against personal freedom (coercion)’; Syrian migrants committed the largest proportion of crimes.⁹²⁷

German police reports from 2014 show that 40 percent of migrants from the Maghreb countries of Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Algeria committed crimes within 12 months of their arrival in Germany.⁹²⁸ In fact, according to various German politicians and ministers, it was already known in 2014

that there was a problem group among refugees: Northern Africans who stole massively, drank, harassed women, and perpetrated violence. But this knowledge was treated very discreetly from all sides.

In addition, Duesseldorf police officers in 2014 identified more than 2,000 suspects of North African origin in connection with organized thefts and the groping of women.⁹²⁹

According to a report by one of the police forces in the German Federation, Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), in the first three months of 2016 asylum seekers committed 70,000 crimes, involving offenses of theft, wealth and counterfeiting, bodily injury, assault, and robbery.⁹³⁰ And according to a May 2016 report in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) newspaper, hundreds of ‘unaccompanied minor refugee’ criminals that have been arrested in Germany are so violent — destroying prison property and assaulting guards — that they have been moved from youth offender prisons to adult institutions with stricter controls.⁹³¹

In France, thousands of illegal migrants attempting to reach the United Kingdom have formed the ‘Jungle’ camp in Calais. A British immigration judge, Justice McCloskey, stated that the majority of people in this camp are not refugees but illegal ‘migrant nationals of a number of countries outside the European Union’ and are ‘not entitled to recognition’ as refugees.⁹³² This camp in France is made up of 22 nationalities and has increased in size

to the point that it had, before being demolished in 2016, its own schools, theatre, nightclub, shops, and restaurants.⁹³³ Migrants from this camp and others ambush freight trains and ferries that are heading to Britain, while some steal small boats to cross the Channel. They also attack and threaten truck drivers with hammers, guns, and knives, attempt to hijack trucks, cut open truck roofing and force open back doors to get inside, cling to the roof tops of trucks, attempt to illegally walk the length of the Channel Tunnel, and light fires and spread obstructions and debris on roads, all in an attempt to get to Britain and all very destructive, dangerous, and sometimes fatal endeavours.⁹³⁴ Migrants in Calais have also attacked private cars and school buses, such as a British school coach that was carrying 35 children on their way home from a ski trip in Italy.⁹³⁵ There are suggestions by some that many of those that reside in this Calais ‘Jungle’ camp are ISIS sympathisers or ISIS members and that the migrants have no cultural enrichment to offer France, other than to ‘wreck, destroy, steal, and rape’. Calais resident Simone Héricourt gave an account of the situation in Calais in February 2016, saying that the migrants

enter the homes of people, while people are at the dinner table, because they want to eat. They take what they want; sometimes they beat up the inhabitants. They steal what they want and smash what they can’t get. And when you defend yourself, the police get on your back.⁹³⁶

In Sweden, which received the greatest amount of migrants relative to its population in 2015, including almost 40,000 unaccompanied migrant youth, a police report revealed more than 5,000 incidents of crime were committed by migrants within a period of three months (between October 2015 and the beginning of January 2016), including two bomb threats, four rapes, 600 assaults, 450 fights, 194 violent threats, 58 fires, and nine robberies.⁹³⁷ National Police Commissioner Dan Eliasson recently demanded an extra 4,100 police officers and civilian employees for the police and a budget increase of between \$285 million and \$444 million because the ‘migrant situation means a significantly higher workload for the police’.⁹³⁸ In fact, Swedish police are reporting that they can’t cope with the surge in levels of migrant crime as they are not prepared and do not have the resources.⁹³⁹

12.1.1 Migrant on Migrant Crime

Crime between migrants in and outside asylum centers across Europe is also an increasing issue. The head of Germany’s second-largest police union, Rainer Wendt, has said that the European migrant crisis is ‘the greatest challenge in postwar history’. In August 2015 alone, and in one German state — North Rhine-Westphalia — police responded to 926 emergency calls to refugee centers. One month later, a massive brawl erupted at a refugee

center near the city of Kassal in the state of Hesse, resulting in 60 people injured. Two weeks later another brawl erupted at this same refugee center between 350 Pakistanis and Albanians, resulting in 14 people injured, including police officers.⁹⁴⁰ In November 2015, a Sierra Leone man was violently stabbed by a Somalian man at a Bavairan refugee center,⁹⁴¹ and in February 2016, a 20-year-old Senegalese asylum seeker was murdered by a 38-year-old Somalian in a Munich center.⁹⁴²

There have also been several riots and murders in Swedish asylum centers. In January 2016, 19 youth in a Swedish refugee center for unaccompanied children in Lindås rioted, attacked staff with weapons, and caused massive damage to their housing; just one month later in a refugee center in the town of Ljusne, 15 Afghans were involved in a violent brawl that left one man dead and three injured.⁹⁴³ In March 2016, a 19-year-old asylum seeker in Storå was murdered by three other asylum seekers.⁹⁴⁴ In Belgium, a 100-strong riot erupted in a migrant centre between Afghans, Iraqis, and Syrians, where the former two had been bullying a young secular Syrian girl, demanding she wear a headscarf, and the latter protected her. Several people were injured and 11 people were arrested.⁹⁴⁵ In May 2015, over 200 migrants in the Calais 'Jungle' camp in France erupted into a massive riot that left 14 people injured.⁹⁴⁶ In April 2016, a violent brawl between hundreds of migrants using metal poles and planks of wood occurred at a migrant camp near the Stalingrad metro station in Paris. Violence was also used upon police, parked cars, and pedestrians. At least four men were taken to hospital with serious injuries.⁹⁴⁷ This camp had been evacuated twice before, but migrants returned with make-shift beds; in May it was evacuated again.⁹⁴⁸ In late May and early June 2016, hundreds of migrants engaged in violent brawls in Calais, leaving one dead, 40 hospitalised, 12 with gunshot wounds, one with severe burns, and five volunteers injured (one critically).⁹⁴⁹ In Vienna in March 2016, up to 50 Afghan youth attacked a small group of Chechens with iron bars; there were two attempted murders and five serious injuries.⁹⁵⁰

Religion and ethnicity is at the heart of some of these violent altercations between migrants and asylum seekers across Europe.⁹⁵¹ Christian asylum seekers, including Muslim converts to Christianity, and those of minority faiths have been assaulted on their way to Europe and in refugee centers across Europe by Muslim asylum seekers, migrants, and even staff, ranging from sexual assault and persecution to death. In early 2015, 12 Christian Nigerians were murdered by Nigerian Muslims on their way, by boat, to Italy simply because they did not pray to Allah,⁹⁵² and in August 2015, a riot broke out in a German refugee camp in Suhl in the state of Thuringia because a man tore pages from a Koran, which resulted in 17 people getting hurt.⁹⁵³ Already in 2014 there were reports that 'spillover effects' of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq were occurring in Germany and that 'rival Muslim groups' were 'deliberately exploiting the ethnic and religious tensions in the

Middle East to stir up trouble on the streets of Europe'.⁹⁵⁴ In early October 2014, a peaceful demonstration by Kurds protesting the Islamic State attacks on the Syrian-Kurdish town of Kobani erupted into a violent brawl between 400 Kurds and 400 pro-ISIS supporters in Hamburg, Germany. It resulted in 14 people injured, the confiscation of hundreds of weapons, and 22 arrests.⁹⁵⁵ Violent clashes between pro-Kurdish and pro-Turkish supporters again broke out in various cities across Germany in April 2016, which led to five activists and 17 police officers getting hurt.⁹⁵⁶ Turks and Kurds have also clashed in France. David Rachline, National Front senator and mayor of Frejus in southeastern France, posted a video on his Facebook page about the '[c]lashes between Turks and Kurds in the centre of Bordeaux,' commenting that 'mass uncontrolled immigration...leads to chaos and clashes between communities'.⁹⁵⁷

There are problems of rape and sexual assault against female refugees by male refugees. According to German social work organizations, women's rights groups, and the UN, due to the fact that the overwhelming amount of asylum seekers are males, a culture of rape and sexual abuse is growing in refugee centers across Europe. Numerous women, especially single mothers and single women, and young girls housed in refugee shelters are being raped, sexually assaulted, and even forced into prostitution and trafficked by male asylum seekers, and many are too afraid to report the abuse. For example, over an 11-month period in 2015, over 1,000 reports of brutality and attacks against personal liberty had been filed in refugee centers in Saxony (Germany) alone, including six cases of sexual abuse of children. A 12-year-old girl in an underage migrant centre in Dusseldorf was sexually abused by two migrants who claimed they were 15 and 17 years old.⁹⁵⁸ There are hundreds of reports on child sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, rape, and gang rape of female refugees by other refugees on their journey to Europe and again in asylum centers in Europe.⁹⁵⁹ Although there are incidents where male refugee staff and guards have committed sexual assault and rape of women refugees, their numbers are small in comparison. Sexual violence by male refugees against female refugees in refugee centers has been an ongoing problem that is found across the world, as a 2006 report by the Refugee Council's Vulnerable Women's Project (VWP) has shown.⁹⁶⁰ There are also problems with child-marriages among asylum seekers.⁹⁶¹ And there are problems with rape and sexual assault of young migrant men and boys. For example, four Syrian migrants in a Norwegian asylum center raped a fellow male Syrian (19 yrs old) and filmed the incident,⁹⁶² and two migrant men posing as teenagers repeatedly raped a 10-year-old boy in a youth migrant center in Västerås, Sweden, and also filmed the rapes.⁹⁶³

12.1.2 Crimes Against Europeans

There is also a growing problem with male refugees and migrants making death threats, physically attacking, murdering, sexually assaulting, raping, and gang-raping European natives and citizens, particularly girls and women and including staff of refugee centers. There are thousands of reports and there have been many arrests.⁹⁶⁴ For example, in the summer of 2015, a gang of teenage Muslim asylum-seekers from North Africa violently beat and gang-raped a 23-year-old woman in Sweden;⁹⁶⁵ also in the summer of 2015, a 20-year-old recent migrant from Somalia brutally raped an 88-year-old woman in Germany and was sentenced to four years in prison.⁹⁶⁶ In the summer of 2015, an Afghan asylum seeker in Finland raped a 17-year-old Finnish girl and then murdered her by setting her on fire.⁹⁶⁷ In July 2015, a 36-year-old Eritrean refugee in Sweden, who had been staying with a Swedish family while waiting for his application to be processed, stabbed their 7-year-old daughter to death.⁹⁶⁸ Between 1 August and 23 August 2015, there were 11 reported rapes or attempted rapes in Germany by North Africans or Middle Easterners — the victims were between seven and 42 years old.⁹⁶⁹ In September 2015, an 18-year-old male from the Ivory Coast brutally murdered a husband and wife in Italy.⁹⁷⁰ In the fall of 2015, a 30-year-old female activist of the No Borders group was raped by a Senegalese asylum seeker in Ventimiglia, Italy.⁹⁷¹ In October 2015, two asylum seekers in a Bavarian refugee center sexually assaulted a female cleaner repeatedly over the course of several days.⁹⁷² In October 2015, five Syrian refugees gang-raped an 18-year-old girl in a care home in Britain.⁹⁷³ In November 2015, another Afghan asylum seeker in Finland raped a 14-year-old girl.⁹⁷⁴ In just one day alone in January 2016, in Germany there were six rapes or attempted rapes by migrants — the victims were between eight and 55 years old.⁹⁷⁵ In January 2016 in Mölndal, Swedish 22-year-old Alexandra Mezher, an employee at a refugee centre for unaccompanied youth (14 to 17-year-olds), was stabbed to death by a recent migrant from Somalia who posed as a 15-year-old but was in fact an adult.⁹⁷⁶ Also in January 2016, a 22-year-old Afghan asylum seeker violently raped an 18-year-old Austrian woman in a park.⁹⁷⁷ In February 2016, a 16-year-old Afghan refugee raped a female caterer at the asylum center he was staying at in Belgium,⁹⁷⁸ and also in February 2016, a high school math teacher from Celle, a city near Hanover, Germany, who was originally from Iran, was brutally murdered by an Afghan asylum seeker who he had let stay at his home.⁹⁷⁹ These incidents are but a very small example of uncountable, brutal, and ongoing migrant crimes in Europe.

Sexual attacks and harassment by male migrants in public places such as swimming pools, bars, nightclubs, and public events like festivals and celebrations have become a major concern for Europeans, with many now banning male migrants from entering. A police presence in some public swimming pools is now necessary because of widespread complaints about the obscene behaviour of recent migrants — public masturbation, defecation

in pools, sexual harassment and rape of women, and the sexual abuse and rape of children, both boys and girls.⁹⁸⁰ Bars and clubs are also banning male asylum seekers and recent migrants due to complaints about them sexually harassing women.⁹⁸¹ In November 2015, a charity in Germany called Refugees Welcome organized a Rhine River cruise as a welcoming party for 100–150 male refugees. It resulted in the mass-groping of young women student volunteers and guests.⁹⁸² In August 2015, at Europe's largest youth festival in Stockholm, Sweden, called *We are Sthlm*, there was a mass sexual assault and theft of young Swedish females by boys and men mainly from Afghanistan and Syria — around 100 of them were removed from the festival by police.⁹⁸³ In response, Roger Ticoalu, director of events at Stockholm City Council, said 'It was a *modus operandi* that we had *never seen before*: large groups of young men who surround girls and molest them'.⁹⁸⁴ Gunnar Norgren, a police officer in Kalmar, Sweden, had an identical assessment when asked about teenage sex-attack victims in his city. He stated that 'We have not really had this phenomenon before. Had it been a single report, someone being groped on the dance floor, then yes, they've happened, naturally. But...this is something new'.⁹⁸⁵ Sweden has rapidly become the second rape capital of the world, after Lesotho in Southern Africa,⁹⁸⁶ and rape and sexual assaults by migrants across Sweden are on the rise.⁹⁸⁷

12.1.3 Mass Sexual Assaults

By far the worst incidence of public mass-physical and sexual assault and robbery by migrant men occurred in Germany on New Year's Eve (2015/2016). In a planned and coordinated attack, around 2,000 young male migrants and refugees between 15 and 35 years of age of North African and Arab descent,⁹⁸⁸ 70 percent of whom had been in Germany for less than a year,⁹⁸⁹ physically and sexually assaulted and robbed over 1,900 Germans, mostly young girls and women, in 12 of the 16 German states, but especially in the German city of Cologne.⁹⁹⁰ In Cologne over 1,000 young African and Arab migrants⁹⁹¹ gathered outside the central train station — a main transit point for the fireworks display. Young German women and girls (and their partners) were forced to walk through a corridor of these men for at least 200 metres. These men were aggressive, angry, and intoxicated; they sexually assaulted and robbed the German girls and women and physically assaulted the men.⁹⁹² The women and girls were groped, some had their clothes ripped off, including their underwear, others had fingers inserted into private parts.⁹⁹³ They were called 'sluts' and 'bitches', and their personal belongings were stolen. One girl said she was groped over 100 times.⁹⁹⁴ Large groups of young North African and Arab men also encircled young German women and girls in the Cathedral Square by the train station and in

the surrounding area. They would not let the women and girls go, pulled their hair, pinched them, ripped their clothes, groped them, and robbed them — some were raped, some were gang raped, and some were violently beaten.⁹⁹⁵ These men also threw glass bottles and fireworks into groups of revelling Germans. At least one girl was permanently disfigured.⁹⁹⁶ Riot police and local police were called but were outnumbered and attacked too. Ambulances were also attacked when trying to deal with the incident. The Cologne train station was shut down for several hours. This is the first time that a public square in a European city was ‘lost to criminality’ and police could do little to control it.⁹⁹⁷

On the same night, a club in the city of Bielefeld, Germany, was attacked by an organized mob of about 500 North African and Arab males.⁹⁹⁸ The nightclub bouncers phoned the police when the mob became aggressive and started throwing fireworks, but before the police could arrive, they had forced their way in and groped female visitors. In just one state in Germany — North Rhine-Westphalia, which includes the city of Cologne — and in regards to just one night, New Year’s Eve, there were 945 complaints to police of sexual assault, robbery, and gang-rape: 434 were allegations of sexual assault, 126 of ‘rape by a group’, and 47 of ‘sexual assault by a group’, and in Germany as a whole police reports stated that the perpetrators were not of European origin.⁹⁹⁹ This mass-assault was not isolated to Germany, as North African and Arabic speaking males attacked females across Europe, albeit on a smaller scale, in Sweden,¹⁰⁰⁰ Switzerland,¹⁰⁰¹ Austria, Finland,¹⁰⁰² Denmark, and France.¹⁰⁰³

Wolfgang Albers, Cologne police chief, said that the New Year’s Eve mass-sexual assault and robbery was ‘a completely new dimension of crime’.¹⁰⁰⁴ Likewise, Arnold Plickert, the head of the police trade union in North Rhine-Westphalia, said the incidents were ‘organised’ and ‘of a new quality’.¹⁰⁰⁵ German Justice Minister Heiko Maas said that ‘Nobody can tell me that this was not coordinated or prepared’.¹⁰⁰⁶

After the mass-sexual assault of young girls and women in Germany on New Year’s Eve, there were several sexual assaults by irregular migrants during the annual Rose Carnival festival, which marks the beginning of Lent in Germany. Despite the fact that there were increased lights, video surveillance, and a beefed up police presence in response to the New Year’s Eve sex assaults, and although there had been a nation-wide campaign warning women to act and dress differently and instructing them how to deal with the dangers of sexual assault, there were 66 records of sexual assaults during the festival period, an increase of 267 percent from the previous year.¹⁰⁰⁷ And there were at least two brutal rapes.¹⁰⁰⁸

12.2 Costs

The impact of the migration crisis in Europe is extremely expensive. Some of the most pressing costs involve: extra police, emergency resources, and manpower to deal with human smugglers, rising migrant crime, and new types of crime; the prosecution and incarceration of migrant criminals; border control; the provision of tents, blankets, food, water, and medical attention to migrants/refugees as they travel from one center to another; waste management involving trash and human waste; the screening, fingerprinting, and processing of applicants; the construction and provision of housing; the provision of financial benefits, clothing, food, health and dental care, places of worship, travel costs, phones, pocket money, and various courses (including language, integration, and behavioural courses) for potential asylum seekers that may or may not be granted asylum; the provision of these things for those who have been granted asylum; financial aid to most affected European countries, such as Greece; the EU-Turkey deal and provision of financial aid to refugees in other non-EU countries, as well loans and grants for other projects and investments; legal air and boat travel for refugees from refugee centers to Europe; naval rescue operations; de-radicalisation, integration, and counter-terrorism programs; terrorism; deportation, and so on.

12.2.1 Border Control and Security

In April 2015, the EU ‘tripled its funding’ to 120 million euros for Operation Triton rescues in the Mediterranean Sea around Italy for 2015/2016.¹⁰⁰⁹ Operation Triton works in tandem with Poseidon Sea, which patrols the Mediterranean Sea around Greece and had a budget of €18 million in 2015. It was projected in May 2015 that Frontex, which oversees these two operations, would be provided with an additional €45 million for 2016 to further strengthen these two task forces.¹⁰¹⁰ In 2015, the budget for Frontex increased from just under €98 million in 2014 to over €143 million. In 2016, the budget was increased to over €254 million.¹⁰¹¹ The Internal Security Fund (ISF) was set up for the 2014–2020 period to promote the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, the management of the EU’s external borders and law enforcement cooperation, and was allocated a total of €3.8 billion.¹⁰¹² The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was set up for the period 2014–2020 to ‘promote the efficient management of migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration’. It was allocated €3.1 billion in funds.¹⁰¹³ In August 2015, the European Commission approved 23 programs under the AMIF and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) involving 2.4 billion euros of aid over six years for countries such as Greece, Italy, and other EU member states that have received large volumes of irregular migrants.¹⁰¹⁴

In early November 2015, the leader of the Freedom Party of Austria, Heinz Christian Strache, said that financing border controls where illegal migrants try to enter Europe was 'cheaper than illegal mass immigration'.¹⁰¹⁵ In March 2016, the Munich-based Institute for Economic Research (Ifo) estimated that it would cost Europe €5 billion a year to control EU external borders used by illegal immigrants. In contrast, the French think-tank *France Stratégie* estimated that it would cost €100 billion a year to control internal borders of the EU (reintroduction of border controls and identity checks) and the German research institute Prognos estimated that it could cost up to €1.4 trillion by 2025. Prognos estimated that over a 10-year period, the reintroduction of internal border controls could cost the EU up to €470 billion in 'lost economic output'. For Germany alone it was estimated to cost €235 billion to control its borders by 2025 and €20 billion a year for the reception and initial care of refugees, but this latter figure excluded other societal costs, such as migrant crime.¹⁰¹⁶

Despite the costs and the elite and media backlash against proponents of border controls, in March 2016 an IFOP poll found that 60 percent of Italians, 72 percent of French, and 66 percent of Germans wanted the reestablishment of internal border controls (the end of free movement in the Schengen) in response to the 'migrant crisis' and the increased risk of Islamist terrorism.¹⁰¹⁷ In an effort to control illegal migration, various European countries (members and non-members of the EU) who are the hardest hit and along the EU-Turkey border have re-introduced border controls and erected border fences between European countries.¹⁰¹⁸ For example, Hungary erected a fence along its 175 km border with Serbia at a cost of almost €71 million,¹⁰¹⁹ and in February 2016 the EU provided 10 million to Macedonia to 'improve its border and migration management systems in the context of the refugee crisis'.¹⁰²⁰ Bulgaria has constructed a 100km fence along its border with Turkey and hopes to finish the remainder of the 166km fence by July 2016 at a total cost of around 51.1 million. It is also ready to erect a 480km fence along its border with Greece, which is projected to cost almost €256 million according to former Defence Minister Angel Naydenov.¹⁰²¹ In early March 2016, Bulgaria sent 400 armed soldiers and police to guard its border with Greece and was ready to send 500 more if necessary to prevent further flows of irregular migrants into their country.¹⁰²² In 2012, Greece erected a 12.5km fence at the Evros River along its land border with Turkey and also 'deployed 1,800 additional police officers and opened new internment camps for migrants'. The fence cost almost €3 million and Frontex also spent around €37 million for Operation Poseidon to secure the Greek-Turkish sea and land borders in 2011–2012. However, both of these border measures did not stop hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants from Turkey entering Greece and the Greek islands in 2015/2016. As such, in January 2016 the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias said Frontex 'should deploy about 100 boats in the narrow stretch of

water separating Greece from Turkey’, which would act as further sea border patrol. Then, in March 2016, despite the costly EU-Turkey deal, Greece stated that it was seeking a ‘major enhancement’ of international assistance in order to effectively patrol its sea border with Turkey.¹⁰²³

12.2.2 European Aid: Emergency, Humanitarian, and International

Since 2011, when the Syrian war began, the EC has provided €455 million in aid to Turkey for humanitarian and long-term assistance, and since mid-2014 the EC has provided Libya with ‘more than €8 million in humanitarian aid’ for ‘protection, health care, cash support, psycho-social assistance, as well as non-food and hygiene items’ for IDPs and others in need of protection.¹⁰²⁴ At the EU emergency summit on the migrant crisis in September 2015, it was decided that Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey would be provided with ‘greater injections of EU assistance’, which includes a ‘substantial increase’ to the EU’s Regional Trust Fund.¹⁰²⁵ In November 2015, the European Commission implemented the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, starting with 1.8 billion euros (\$2.1 billion) ‘for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’, particularly the ‘Sahel region and Lake Chad area; the Horn of Africa and the North of Africa’ as well as neighbouring countries.¹⁰²⁶ The EC has also increased its humanitarian aid and civil protection resources for refugees and IDPs, particularly in and around Syria, funds that are given to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Red Cross family, international NGOs and other organisations, and amount to at least 1 billion euros. And in early February 2016, the EU and its Member States pledged a further €3 billion to assist the Syrian people inside Syria as well as refugees and the communities hosting them in the neighbouring countries.¹⁰²⁷ In March 2016, according to the EU-Turkey deal, 6 billion euros were allocated by the EU for the provision of health, education, infrastructure, food, etc. to ‘persons under temporary protection’ in Turkey until the end of 2018.¹⁰²⁸

In 2015, the EC had provided over €22.5 million in humanitarian aid to the Western Balkans, notably Serbia and Macedonia, which has consisted of ‘food, water, hygiene, non-food items, health, [and] basic protection’. Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, and Greece have also received material assistance in the form of ‘winterised tents, beds and blankets’ from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.¹⁰²⁹ In September 2015, the European Commission proposed to increase EU resources to deal with the refugee crisis to €9.2 billion. It has since been implemented and includes

funding for the FRONTEX budgets, support to member countries for migration and border management under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, transfers

related to the relocation and resettlement schemes, and support to countries outside the EU (for example, through the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis and additional funding for Turkey).¹⁰³⁰

In March 2016, the EC proposed a new Emergency Assistance instrument to fast-track crisis response and support for the most impacted EU member states, and estimated that €700 million will be needed by the end of 2018 for the provision of food, shelter, medicine, and other basic necessities.¹⁰³¹

In February 2016, a study by the Bank of Greece suggested that Greece will have to spend 600 million euros in 2016 to handle the huge volumes of migrants,¹⁰³² but this study was based on the idea that Greece was a ‘transit country’, which it is not since the closure of the Balkan routes. In that same month, Greece Migration Minister Yiannis Mouzalas stated that due to the closure of the borders ‘the number of people trapped in our country...will be between 50,000 and 70,000...in the coming month’.¹⁰³³ Therefore, due to the need to ‘host’ the irregular migrants, the costs for the migrant crisis for Greece in 2016 will be much higher.¹⁰³⁴ In early March 2016, the EU announced plans to provide Greece with 700 million euros in emergency aid for a period of three years to help provide basic necessities to the migrants,¹⁰³⁵ and on 19 April the European Commission issued press releases that declared in order to ‘improve living conditions for refugees in Greece’ the EU would provide Greece with €83 million under the Emergency Assistance Instrument.¹⁰³⁶

12.2.3 Economic Impact on the EU Budget and Member States

In May 2016, German Development Minister Gerd Müller suggested that the EU should use 10 percent of its funds to help with the migrant crisis: ‘We need to respond to this with new instruments and my proposal regarding the refugee crisis is that 10% of the EU budget be shifted in order to respond to this crisis’.¹⁰³⁷ The EU budget for 2016 is 155 billion euros, and more than 4 billion is for addressing the migrant crisis in the EU and source countries. This means that in 2015/2016 the EU provided around 10 billion in funding for the migrant crisis.¹⁰³⁸ Müller wants the EU to provide an additional 11.5 billion in funding.

An IMF report published at the beginning of this year (2016), which addressed the economic impact of the ‘migrant crisis’ on the EU, provided tentative proposals for the budgetary expenses of the costs of asylum seekers for EU member countries by percentage of their GDP. For example, for Germany it was estimated that for 2016, asylum budgets would increase to around €9 billion or 0.35 of GDP, up from almost €1.8 billion in 2014, and for Sweden asylum budgets would have to increase to over €53 million or 1.0 of GDP, up from just over €15 million in 2014.¹⁰³⁹ According to an EC report in June 2016

the direct additional fiscal implications for the Member States most concerned is expected to fall in the range of 0.1–0.6% of GDP, on a cumulative basis over 2015–2016. It must be recognised, though, that those estimates may prove to be at the low end, depending on how the situation evolves.¹⁰⁴⁰

Another June 2016 report by the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggested that ‘the financial burden, including the direct cost of supporting the newcomers on arrival would be as much as £20billion [more than €25 billion], or 0.2 per cent of the EU’s total economic output in 2016’.¹⁰⁴¹ However, estimated costs for individual European nations far exceed this amount. For instance, in early January 2016 it was suggested by Hans-Werner Sinn, one of the best-known economists in Germany, that it could cost Germany taxpayers up to 450 billion euros to provide for the one million migrants that arrived in Germany in 2015.¹⁰⁴² In February 2016, the Cologne Institute for Economic Research estimated that ‘shelter, welfare and integration will cost Germany €22 billion this year and €27.6 billion next year’, or 50 billion by the end of 2017.¹⁰⁴³

According to a Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) statement in May 2016, to cover the costs of ‘housing, integration, German language courses and social welfare benefits, and dealing with the underlying causes of the refugee influx’ Germany will spend almost €94 billion by 2020.¹⁰⁴⁴

Language courses will cost €200,000 for two and a half years for just 25 people according to the president of the University of Hamburg, Dieter Lenzen.¹⁰⁴⁵ This means that because the majority of asylum seekers do not speak German (98%),¹⁰⁴⁶ it will cost over 8 billion euros over 2.5 years for language classes. In terms of housing and job creation, in February 2016 German Housing Minister Barbara Hendricks requested 1.3 billion euros ‘to help integration and house migrants’ in 2016 and Andrea Nahles, the head of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, requested around 500,000 euros to create jobs for those granted asylum.¹⁰⁴⁷ In terms of covering basic needs and housing, the German Federal Government has provided individuals shelter at reception centers, free meals, €143 per month in cash for ‘basic needs’, which rose to a maximum of €216 per month after three months, and up to €92 euros per child, depending on age. After a year and three months or when granted asylum, a basic income of €400 per month as well as accommodation and heating costs are provided.¹⁰⁴⁸

On top of the huge financial costs of the foreign-born population in terms of welfare and crime, as detailed in chapter 9, asylum seekers are also burdening Sweden’s financial resources. For several decades Sweden accepted less than 30,000 refugees a year. In 2014 Sweden received just over 81,000 asylum applications, the majority of whom were from the Middle East and North Africa.¹⁰⁴⁹ In 2015, almost 163,000 people sought asylum in Sweden, which is over double from the year before, over eight times the amount at the turn of the century, and the highest rate per capita in the EU.¹⁰⁵⁰ In contrast to a previous forecast of €1.6 billion annually, in April 2016 Sweden’s Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson announced that the costs associated with the migrant crisis will amount to €6.1 billion per year until 2020, or over €30 billion for five years.¹⁰⁵¹ Economist and business professor Jan Tullberg, who teaches at Stockholm University, estimated how much those who were granted refugee status in 2015 will cost Sweden over their lifetime: around €65 billion or €322,315 per migrant (including their family).¹⁰⁵² Processing costs alone, which also include housing, food, and pocket money provided for 414 days but often extended to eight years or more (the average time it takes for a new arrival to enter the workforce is about eight years, but can be more than a generation) amounted to almost €26 billion. The costs of unaccompanied migrant minors amounted to around €5.9 million, which is a very conservative estimate.¹⁰⁵³ Then there are the costs of deportation. In January 2016, the Swedish government announced it would expel between 60,000 and 80,000 migrants who arrived in 2015 and had their asylum applications rejected.¹⁰⁵⁴ On top of welfare and housing costs for the asylum seekers waiting for their applications to be accepted, once rejected it will cost just over €32,000 to deport one person according to Tullberg.¹⁰⁵⁵ This means, for Sweden, that for the 60,000 rejected asylum applications in 2015 it will cost over €1.9 billion to deport them.

According to the non-profit *Migrant Report*, it normally costs around €1

billion a year to deport migrants from Europe.¹⁰⁵⁶ Since over 60 percent of irregular migrants that arrived in Europe in 2015/2016 are illegal economic migrants with bogus asylum claims, and since some asylum seekers have committed grievous crimes, many European countries are planning to deport hundreds of thousands.¹⁰⁵⁷ Deporting around 700,000 people (60 percent of the 1.1+ million figure oft cited by the media) or 1,080,000 (60% of 1.8 million cited by Frontex), and not including those facing deportation due to criminality once arrived, will cost the EU between €22.4 billion and €34.5 billion. However, a large portion of deportees do not leave the country. This is for three main reasons: many asylum seekers have no documentation or identification and thus it is difficult to deport them to their home country as it cannot be verified by officials;¹⁰⁵⁸ many rejected asylum seekers go into hiding or underground to avoid deportation and may wait for a set period before reapplying for asylum; many countries of origin of asylum seekers refuse to accept the repatriation of deportees.

In 2015, 200,000 asylum seeker applications in Germany were rejected, but only 21,000 left the country. Up to 70 percent of all irregular migrant arrivals in Germany in 2015 had no documentation (in most cases thrown away, but sometimes lost or never acquired in the first place).¹⁰⁵⁹ Pakistan, which is one of the top-ten countries of origin of irregular migrants in the EU in 2015/2016 (based on documentation), refuses to take back deportees ‘until’, according to Pakistan’s Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan who suspended readmission agreements on 6 November 2015, ‘proper verification is done and that countries share all the information with Pakistani authorities concerned’.¹⁰⁶⁰ And in late 2015, Inam Ghani, the director of Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency, stated that Pakistan ‘will not accept [deported] migrants with dual nationalities who have criminal records’.¹⁰⁶¹ At least 17 countries in North and West Africa (such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), and in South Asia, which are not undergoing civil war and are ‘safe’ countries, are likewise refusing to accept back the deportees.¹⁰⁶² For example, in July 2015 around 5,500 Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians in Germany were to be deported as their asylum requests had been rejected, but by January 2016 only 53 had been sent home.¹⁰⁶³ In January 2016, Tunisia and Algeria demanded that the identity of the migrant deportees had to be ‘ensured’ before they were sent back and Libyan President Fayeze al-Sarraj stated clearly in June 2016 that ‘Libya will not accept immigrants who are sent back’.¹⁰⁶⁴ Already in November 2015 European leaders offered African countries nearly €2 billion ‘in return for agreeing to the deportation of unwanted migrants from Europe’. However, African leaders refused the forced repatriation of their nationals, preferring their voluntary return, and demanded more money from Europe instead. They also attempted to use the meeting to layout their priorities and agenda, such as the opening of more legal channels for African immigration into Europe.¹⁰⁶⁵

Then there is the issue of migrants avoiding deportation by going underground or going somewhere else in Europe to claim asylum again but under a different name. As detailed in chapter 11.2, an enormous number of asylum seekers vanish from reception centers throughout Europe, either to stay with friends, travel to another country, or because their claims for asylum are groundless and thus they try to avoid deportation. For example, in Sweden a spokesman for the immigration agency Migrationsverket says it is ‘powerless to enforce deportation orders’ because would-be-deportees go underground. In 2014 Sweden was going to expel more than 20,000 people, but only 41 percent left voluntarily, a small number were forcibly deported, and the rest disappeared; in 2015 over 14,000 would-be-deportees vanished without a trace.¹⁰⁶⁶

Similarly, in Germany deportation is a charade. On top of the hundreds of thousands of migrants who entered Germany without registering and vanished,¹⁰⁶⁷ there are reports that between 20 and 30 percent of asylum seekers from 2015 had simply disappeared.¹⁰⁶⁸ According to German Police Chief Superintendent Rüdiger Seidenspinner, even criminally convicted asylum seekers and migrants ‘never fear being deported’ because they ‘are protected by Europe’s strict rules on deportation and asylum’,¹⁰⁶⁹ such as the principle of *non-refoulement*,¹⁰⁷⁰ the length of prison term required for deportation (3 years in Germany),¹⁰⁷¹ unverifiable nationality due to no identity documents, or their countries refuse to take them back. As much as 50 percent of those who have had their asylum requests rejected refuse to leave the country according to a government statement in *Die Welt* newspaper.¹⁰⁷²

There are additional financial costs to the migrant crisis, such as the cost of lawyers, translators, and taxi rides (to various appointments, such as the migration board), the costs of the rapid entry of tens of thousands of new arrivals into the education system (who often do not speak the national language), the costs associated with criminals and smuggling rings (police resources, prosecution, and other legal fees, as well as the cost of incarceration), the costs of housing shortages (the construction of housing and development of other infrastructure [sewage works] for the long term), costs of social programs (integration programs, language courses, behavioural courses, and so on), increased security costs associated with an increase in terrorism, increased public health expenditures and hospital security, and so on. In Germany, for instance, migrants are being housed in renovated homes, gymnasiums, military bases, and old schools in both urban and rural areas, but space is rapidly running out. There have also been several cases where German citizens are being evicted to make room for refugees/migrants.¹⁰⁷³

12.2.4 Small Towns, Tourism, Health, Security,

and Safety

There are increasing costs for local businesses and towns who have been numerically overwhelmed, leading to security and safety concerns, large surges in theft and other crimes, large-scale clean-ups of garbage and human waste, and other problems, such as declining tourism for the Greek islands. The constant arrival of large volumes of irregular migrants have negatively affected tourism for Kos and Lesbos for example, which have been some of the hardest hit islands bearing the brunt of Mediterranean Sea crossers. Tourism for these islands is a major source of revenue, especially in the summer months, and locals fear that their islands will become permanent places of transition for migrants crossing the Mediterranean on their way to the European mainland.¹⁰⁷⁴

Small towns and villages have been some of the hardest hit areas, being overwhelmed with the staggering numbers. Here are a few examples: Langenlonsheim is a small village in Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany, with 4,000 inhabitants; it was informed it would be receiving 3,000 refugees.¹⁰⁷⁵ A small city Lohfelden (near Kassel), Germany, were informed only the night before that 400 refugees would be arriving (15 October 2015) in their city, and residents were told by their mayor that if didn't like it they were free to leave.¹⁰⁷⁶ A small village called Grillenburg in Germany, which has only 114 people, were told they would be receiving 80 refugees.¹⁰⁷⁷ Sumte, a German village of 102, received 750 asylum seekers who were housed in 23 empty office buildings.¹⁰⁷⁸ A small town in Bavaria called Freilassing, which has a population of 15,000, saw the same amount of people every few days go through on their way to the rest of Germany, and experienced serious problems with theft and burglary.¹⁰⁷⁹

Other small European cities and towns are also overwhelmed and experiencing large surges in crime. A local Chamber of Commerce president, Peter Erdman, from the small Dutch town of Ter Apel (which has 9,000 residents), said that shoplifting and thefts by 'asylum seekers' was a problem as there had been over 1,000 incidents between January and August 2015. As a result, store personnel were frightened, there was a general air of insecurity in the town, and people were 'afraid to go out on the streets at night'.¹⁰⁸⁰ A small town in Slovenia of 176 residents, mostly farmers, was completely overwhelmed by 70,000 irregular migrants who streamed through the town, resulting in the complete devastation of some of the farmers' fields and the dumping of loads of trash, including burnt plastic bottles and diapers.¹⁰⁸¹ In Brezice, a town in Slovenia of 24,000, up to 12,000 migrants arrived daily. On the outskirts, there is a main refugee camp along the Slovenia/Croatia border where some migrants refused and discarded food and water. There was an incident when some, mostly men, set fires to blankets and tents that were provided for them — even taking selfies — in order to put pressure on authorities so they could move onto their preferred destination, i.e. wealthy

countries such as Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway.¹⁰⁸²

There have also been serious problems with waste, health, and sanitation issues. Plastic bottles, abandoned shoes, clothes, nappies, sheets, and other garbage have turned villages, towns, and farmer's fields into dumping grounds. There are also problems of fires and their spread and pollution from the burning of plastic bottles and pieces of dried wood, which are often left smouldering after people move on. Migrants also defecate in farmers' fields and elsewhere, as there are no public toilets on rural migrant routes; where there are public toilets available, migrants often do not use them properly and defecate and urinate on the floor, in bushes, and elsewhere in public spaces. Such expulsion of bodily waste in public creates sanitation issues and hygiene concerns, not to mention the extra cost of clean-up. These issues, along with the close proximity of asylum seekers in refugee centers and the grouping of migrants around train and other travel stations, have brought an increased risk of foodborne and vector-borne diseases to Europe, including diseases that Europe has not seen in decades,¹⁰⁸³ or not at an epidemic or endemic level, such as AIDS, Ebola, scabies, diphtheria, tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis A, B, and C, lice-borne relapsing fever, cholera, typhus, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and so on.¹⁰⁸⁴ The EC, in May 2015, mobilized an additional €60 million in emergency funding, which included funding for migrant healthcare, and in October €173 million had been allocated in emergency funding for Member States most affected, and also covered monies for healthcare, including voluntary examinations and screening, vaccinations and medicines, establishment of health history, and so on.¹⁰⁸⁵

There are also a variety of serious security and safety problems associated with the migrant crisis. Smuggling gangs are gaining huge profits and rapidly expanding in Europe, and this is putting pressure on law enforcement (human resources and economic costs). There is also an increased threat of terrorism due to ISIS and other Muslim radicals and militants exploiting the 'crisis', which has increased security costs and ruined several long-standing annual celebrations and traditions. For example, on New Year's Eve, there were ISIS terror threats to all major European cities, which effectively limited and even cancelled various celebrations, such as the fireworks in Brussels;¹⁰⁸⁶ in France, bars and bistros have been banned from showing the European Championships on large-screen TVs due to fears of a terrorist attack.¹⁰⁸⁷

There is also the threat against the safety of women, girls, and children, particularly near schools, on public transport, near asylum centers, and in and around bus and train stations. And there is the threat of civil war. The head of the Swiss armed forces, Lieutenant-General André Blattmann, has stated that Europe is on the brink of civil war because

The threat of terror is rising, hybrid wars are being fought around the globe; the economic outlook is gloomy and the resulting migration flows of displaced persons and

In fact, according to parallel studies from the Spectra Institute in Linz, Austria, and the IMAS Institute in Germany, one-third of Austrians and one-quarter of Germans agree with the statement 'If mass immigration continues like this, there will soon be civil war-like conditions' in their countries.¹⁰⁸⁹ In North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany, 600 police and military forces from around Europe attended training in April 2016 in preparation for civil unrest or war in Europe and the creation of the united troops of the European Gendarmerie Force. According to Andrej Huko, the European affairs spokesman for the German government, this is the 'militarisation of the police' and is 'extremely worrying and contrary in Germany to the principle of separation of police and military'.¹⁰⁹⁰ Former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who was foreign policy chief of the EU, has suggested that the 28 members of the EU need to 'join forces on defence and security matters to form a united force against jihadism and radicalisation'.¹⁰⁹¹ Nevertheless, rather than relying on NATO, plans for the creation of an EU army (the denationalisation of armed forces and the creation of a common army) have been expressed by many EU elites such as Jean-Claude Juncker, EU commission president, who said that 'With its own army, Europe could react more credibly to the threat to peace in a member state or in a neighbouring state' and it would be a useful deterrent towards Russia and other security threats, such as terrorism and civil unrest.¹⁰⁹²

13. A Critique of Elite Reactions to Migrant Sex Crimes and Terrorism

At first German police claimed that the New Year's Eve celebrations went without a hitch. An official police report dated 1 January 2016, and entered at 08:57 a.m., stated that the New Year's Eve 'situation was relaxed, because the police were well placed at critical locations and showed their presence'.¹⁰⁹³ Only after alternative social media platforms exposed the mass of migrant violence against Germans based on eyewitness and victim accounts did the police finally admit there had been a serious problem.¹⁰⁹⁴ In an official statement on 5 January, they said that 'After the massive attacks on New Year's Eve at the Cologne main station forecourt, the number of criminal charges has now increased to 90. The police had already set up an investigation team for these offenses in Cologne on Saturday (2 January)'. Police reports then revealed that most of the sex assaults and robberies were committed by refugees and recent migrants from Muslim-majority countries. German Interior Minister Ralf Jaeger stated on 11 January that 'Based on testimony from witnesses, the report from the Cologne police and descriptions by the federal police, it looks as if people with a migration background were almost exclusively responsible for the criminal acts'.¹⁰⁹⁵ However, disregarding the police reports and contradicting Jaeger, European Commission leaders insisted that there was 'no link' between the 'migrant crisis' and the New Year sex attacks across Germany. Minutes from an EC cabinet meeting on 13 January reveal that President Jean-Claude Juncker and First Vice-President Frans Timmermans insisted that the mass-sexual assaults in Germany 'were a matter of public order and were not related to the refugee crisis'.¹⁰⁹⁶ Such a response was expected.

An anonymous EU security source told *Breitbart London* that 'I suspect nobody will admit Brussels policy [of open borders immigration and migrant quotas] is inherently linked to what happened in Cologne — they will not welcome such a link'. Raheem Kassam, editor-in-chief of *Breitbart London*, clarified by saying

news that the EU is unable or unwilling to deal with such a serious problem and global news story serves to underline points made by Eurosceptics that the organisation is not interested in the people of Europe, but rather, the political expansionism, the career political classes, and the bureaucrats: the European elite.¹⁰⁹⁷

The international mainstream media, including *Huffington Post*, the *Independent*, and the *Metro*, were clearly in denial, suggesting that only three refugees (two Syrians and one Iraqi) out of those arrested were in connection with the mass-sexual assaults in Germany, with the majority of the rest being merely migrants from the Maghreb, many of which were already known to police. However, Cologne's prosecutor, Ulrich Bremer, has claimed that this

is ‘total nonsense’ and ‘the overwhelming majority of persons fall into the general category of refugees’, i.e. those from the Maghreb were recent ‘irregular migrants’ or in other words, asylum seekers of 2015.¹⁰⁹⁸ Already on 8 January, it was reported by German authorities that 18 of those who had been arrested in connection to the New Year’s Eve attacks in Cologne were recent asylum seekers.¹⁰⁹⁹

13.1 Migrant Sex Crimes: Non-Disclosure, Blaming Victims, and Sexual Jihad

It took the mainstream media in Germany several days to report the extent and the ethnic nature of the attacks, and all the politically inconvenient details, because they had been ordered not to report on migrant and asylum seeker crimes or disclose the nationality of perpetrators, earning them the title of ‘lying-press’ by the public.¹¹⁰⁰ Former head of the national public service broadcaster *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen* (ZDF) in Bonn, Dr. Wolfgang Herles, said on 29 January 2016, that ‘Today, one is not allowed to say anything negative about the refugees’, particularly the media, because ‘we are completely taken in by the agenda laid down by the political class’. He went on to say that ‘This is government journalism and that leads to a situation in which people no longer trust us. This is a scandal’.¹¹⁰¹ Former Interior Minister of German Hans-Peter Friedrich echoed this view by saying public funded German media was a ‘cartel of silence’ exercising censorship to protect migrants from accusations of wrongdoing.¹¹⁰²

Such black-outs, censorship, lying, non-disclosure, and so on by the mainstream media, politicians, and the police is part of an ongoing trend throughout Europe. For instance, the mass-groping and robbery at Sweden’s music festival in August 2015 and at the Welcoming Party for male refugees in Bonn in November 2015 were not disclosed to the public for some time. These two incidents only came to public attention due to the controversy of the ‘lying press’ and its cover-up of the Cologne incident.¹¹⁰³ But by far the worst incident in recent history was the reluctance of British elites to deal with the phenomena of ‘Asian’ (predominantly Pakistani and Bangladeshi men) sex-grooming gangs in the UK.

According to *Sikh24*, a news portal for the British Sikh community, ‘grooming refers to racially motivated sexual exploitation’.¹¹⁰⁴ According to the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Center (CEOP), in England and Wales in 2012, data from 31 police forces revealed that 52 groups were known to be ‘type one’ sexual offenders, or ‘grooming gangs’ that target the young and vulnerable. Out of these groups, 50 percent were all Asian, 29 percent were either mixed race, Black, or Arab, and 21 percent were all White, while 97 percent of the victims were White. Of 306 known offenders, 83 percent were either Asian (75%), Black (5%), or Arab (3%). In other

words, a disproportionate number of grooming gangs were Asian and a disproportionate number of victims were White.¹¹⁰⁵ These findings are consistent with other reports that have come out over the last few years, which reveal that since the late 1980s criminal gangs of mainly Muslim men of South Asian (Pakistani and Bangladeshi) and African descent have targeted millions of vulnerable non-Muslim school-aged white girls (and some boys) all across the United Kingdom for sexual abuse, gang rape, sex slavery, forced prostitution, and sex trafficking, with victims as young as 11 years old.¹¹⁰⁶ Young girls are targeted and groomed by younger members of the gang with money, drugs, alcohol, and gifts. After the girls have come to trust and to consider their groomer a 'boyfriend', they are then passed around, raped, gang raped, forced into prostitution, drugged, beaten, tortured, threatened, blackmailed, and sometimes killed.

According to the report *Easy Meat: Multiculturalism, Islam, and Child Sex Slavery* by English author Peter McLoughlin,

One of the defining features of this crime is the ethnic/cultural homogeneity of the gang members [Muslim], and the refusal of other members of their community to speak out about them or to condemn their behaviour. The gangs are often made up of brothers and members of their extended family, who take part in the grooming and/or rape of the schoolgirls.

What is more, is that

We are informed that this kind of phenomenon does not occur in other cases where adults are grooming children for sex. In those cases, the adults are either unrelated or are working alone (for fear of exposure or criticism from their friends or relatives). The grooming gang phenomenon thus shows *distinctive new characteristics*.¹¹⁰⁷

Police, social workers, and council members have, for over two decades, ignored and even covered up this child sexual exploitation and abuse. Since many shocking reports have finally come out, it has been revealed that several police officers and at least one politician were complicit in the crimes,¹¹⁰⁸ and scores of police officers and officials have been fired, arrested, or have resigned as dozens of grooming gangs were unearthed all across the country.¹¹⁰⁹ Such criminal and predatory foreign gangs preying on young girls is not isolated to the UK, it has been happening since the late 20th century across Europe. In Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, etc., the gangs are called various names by the mainstream media and research organizations such as 'sex gangs', 'grooming gangs', and 'lover boys'.¹¹¹⁰

There are four main reasons why the police, media, and elites deliberately cover-up and black-out migrant criminal activity: 1) political correctness, i.e. not wanting to be accused of racism; 2) not wanting to alarm or create panic among the general public during large-scale immigration from Muslim-majority nations, especially during the 'migrant crisis'; 3) wanting to prevent a monolithic portrayal of (genuine) refugees and (non-criminal) migrants as

criminals;¹¹¹¹ and 4) not wanting public airing of such information as it might clarify existing anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments, particularly among the growing right-wing movements and parties across Europe.

The British police, social workers, and council members ignored and covered-up the racial nature of the grooming gangs because they feared reporting on it would be considered racist as the majority of perpetrators were of 'Asian' descent.¹¹¹² The mass-molestation at the Bonn Welcome Party was not documented by the media or reported to the police because organizers of the event did not want to 'make a fuss' or be honest about the occurrence and thus expose the risks involved by bringing in masses of young males from countries with different cultural values and views regarding the treatment of women.¹¹¹³ The mass sexual assaults and other migrant crimes in Sweden were deliberately hidden from the public because such information, according to Stockholm Police Chief Peter Agren, 'plays into the hands of the Sweden Democrats'. Ivar Arpi, a Swedish columnist, said that

Immigration cannot be discussed frankly in Sweden. If you mention anything negative about refugees...you're accused of playing into the hands of the reviled far-Right. As a result even those with legitimate concerns are silenced or labelled xenophobic.¹¹¹⁴

In September 2015, an internal letter written by Stockholm police press officers Wolf Gyllander and Carina Skagerlind stated that 'basic information such as ethnicity, nationality, skin colour and height should not be given' to the public about criminals because the Swedish police 'want to avoid pointing out ethnic groups as criminal' and do not want to come across as 'racist'.¹¹¹⁵ The German police did not disclose the ethnic nature of the mass-sexual assault as they were bound by political correctness, feared accusations of racism, and wanted to prevent the public from seeing a connection between the assaults and recently arrived asylum-seekers.¹¹¹⁶ The deliberate cover-up of such large-scale and serious crimes committed by male migrants, immigrants, and asylum seekers mostly from patriarchal Muslim countries is an attempt to hide the seriousness and scale of the problems at the expense of public security and safety, particularly for the most vulnerable members of society.

13.1.1 Creating Behavioural Changes

Other than covering-up these crimes, a series of leading elites and organisations in Germany responded to the mass-sexual assaults on German girls and women by blaming the victims. The council official responsible for refugee integration in the Cologne region implied that the victims of assault at the Bonn Welcome Party were to blame by saying she thought that the

violated girls had 'learned' something from their sexual assault experience.¹¹¹⁷ In response to the mass-sexual assaults in Germany on New Year's Eve, a leading Salafist imam in Cologne, Sami Abu-Yusuf, said that 'the events...were the girls own fault, because they were half naked and wearing perfume. It is not surprising the men wanted to attack them. [Dressing like that] is like adding fuel to the fire'.¹¹¹⁸ This echoed a statement made by a leading Muslim cleric in 2006 in Australia, Egyptian-born Sheik Taj Aldin al-Hilali, who compared women without headscarves to 'uncovered meat'. He said that

If you take out uncovered meat and place it outside ... without cover, and the cats come to eat it...whose fault is it, the cats' or the uncovered meat's? The uncovered meat is the problem. If she was in her room, in her home, in her hijab, no problem would have occurred.¹¹¹⁹

The group *Muslim Stern* in Germany suggested that banning alcohol would prevent future migrant attacks against German women and also chastised the victims for their provocative ways of dressing, blaming them for 'inciting' sexual assault and rape by African men: 'You cannot expect to chuck a naked antelope in front of a lion and not expect it to react'.¹¹²⁰

It seems that Cologne Mayor Henriette Reker, who was adamant that there was no link between refugees and the mass sexual assaults,¹¹²¹ agreed with these Muslim views by saying the victims should have been more responsible, and requested they dress and act differently. She said women shouldn't provoke 'them' and should keep them at 'arms length'.¹¹²² She also said that 'we will publish online guidelines that these young women can read through to prepare themselves' for future attacks.¹¹²³ She has come under harsh criticism for her remarks. However, she is not alone in her view that females are at fault for 'provoking' the 'lions' and 'cats' and becoming their prey. Back in 2001, when two out of three rapes in Oslo were being committed by immigrants of Muslim background, Unni Wikan, a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo said that 'Norwegian women must take their share of responsibility for these rapes' because they dress provocatively and thus must 'realize that we live in a Multicultural society and adapt themselves to it'.¹¹²⁴ More recently, in the town of Bad Schlema in Germany, the mayor was asked a question by a grandfather of a school girl who had been sexually assaulted by a 'refugee' about what will happen during the warmer summer months when girls have less clothing on. The mayor essentially said that the girls should not 'provoke them' and should not 'walk in these areas' by the refugee centers.¹¹²⁵ This led to an outcry by the public at the meeting, with some saying 'You can't even walk in your city anymore!' In May 2016, a Swedish police report blamed the rise of migrant sex attacks, the majority of which were on girls under 15 years of age, on 'Nordic alcohol culture, but also of non-traditional gender roles' (such as the way females dress) and not on migrant behaviour itself, other

than to say that they might not be able to ‘handle the alcohol’, they simply feel ‘horny’, and have ‘ignorance of the consequences for the girls’.¹¹²⁶ On top of blaming European culture and women’s behavior for migrant sexual assaults, new guidelines on behaviour and dress for women and girls, and special sexual education classes, booklets, and visual aids for migrants have proliferated throughout Germany and Europe since 2015, which implies the gravity of the situation.¹¹²⁷

So, European females, including school-age children, are being warned they should not wear certain clothing that may invite rape or sexual assault and should not behave in such ways that ‘provoke’ sexual assault. Women and children are also warned not go out unaccompanied in certain areas, especially at night and near refugee centers. These unsafe areas and unsafe times of day as well as dress codes are essentially restricting the free movement and safety of females and children in European nations. In Sweden, for example, eight sexual assaults against girls and women by ‘foreign men’ occurred in just three weeks in Östersund, a town of 44,000, and led police to warn women not to go out alone at night. County police commissioner, Stephen Jerand, said

We wanted to warn the public and urge women not to walk home on the streets in the central part of the town after dark, because it is not safe...The situation is tense. *We have never experienced anything like this before.* It is almost unreal. Eight attacks and just three this last weekend. This is a quiet part of Sweden where we barely have had any attacks on women and now this.¹¹²⁸

In Finland, Ilkka Koskimaki, the city’s deputy police chief said ‘There hasn’t been this kind of harassment on previous New Year’s Eves or other occasions for that matter. This is a completely new phenomenon in Helsinki’.¹¹²⁹ This is a significant change in the cultural atmosphere of liberal-democratic Europe where police are dealing with a criminal phenomenon they have ‘never seen before’, tell women to stay in doors after dark, and suggest dressing and behaving differently so as not to invite rape upon themselves. This is not just happening in Germany, Sweden, and Finland, but all European nations where no-go zones and no-go times are being created for women, school children, and even men, who are being warned to stay away from certain areas because of various forms of threats, harassment, violence, and abuse committed against them by migrants and refugees.

13.1.2 Importation: Muslim Misogyny and Sexual Terrorism

Barbara Steffens, a minister for emancipation in Germany, said that the New Year’s Eve mass sex assaults were just the ‘tip of a very unpleasant

iceberg'.¹¹³⁰ The reality is that dressing and behaving differently for German and European women and girls is quickly becoming an established norm because of the arrival of large numbers of young foreign men from conservative and patriarchal Muslim countries that have a high prevalence of rape and view women as inferior, unequal, and 'fair game'. Such behaviours have been imported into Europe from Muslim countries that impose a strict code of female modesty (and contradicts the idea that wearing 'appropriate' clothing and not 'provoking' men will solve the sexual assault of European girls by Muslim men). Due to the fact that Muslim immigration into Europe is now dominated by family reunification and marriage migration, many of whom come from traditional rural origins, Europe has experienced the importation of a foreign 'village mentality' involving an 'honor culture and modesty standards', particular 'attitudes toward women', and anti-Western and anti-liberal sentiments.¹¹³¹

Alice Schwarzer, a leading second-wave German feminist, claimed the Cologne attacks were organised by Islamists:

The Islamists have not only stirred up misogyny among young Muslim men towards women over recent years and decades, but I am also convinced the sexual violence of New Year's Eve was provoked (by them). There were a few hundred willing followers.¹¹³²

Likewise, Franco-Egyptian activist and author Serenade Chafik thinks that it was 'sexual terrorism' or 'an imported form of gendered terror played out as a "game" of war'. Chafik makes the claim that

By using rape as an arm of war, these militias — because this indeed consists of pre-meditated acts committed by groups, some of them armed with notes containing a lexicon of sexual vocabulary — want to terrify women but also to humiliate men. The sexual violence these women were victims of not only in Germany but also in Austria, Switzerland and Finland recalls this use of rape as a weapon of war, and reminds me personally of the rapes committed in Tahrir Square in Egypt, against women protesters [in 2012 to 2014].

Chafik also said that the attackers 'are manipulating a Middle Eastern concept of honor "*a l'Oriental*," in which the honor of a family, a tribe or even a nation "is found between women's legs!"' so the 'act of raping women, according to the aggressors will thus destroy the honor of these nations and humiliate not only women but Western countries'.¹¹³³ And according to terrorism analyst and author Brigitte Gabriel, 'these refugees are coming from societies that have no respect for women' and 'What we are seeing in Europe is the importation of a culture that is completely opposed to everything we stand for and believe in'.¹¹³⁴ Some critics have gone so far as to call the mass-sexual assaults on European girls and women, including the Muslim grooming gangs, 'sex jihad' or 'rape jihad'.¹¹³⁵

The phenomenon of mass-sexual assault of women by men in public, which is a completely new dimension of crime unknown to Europe, has been

known in the Middle East and South Asia since at least the 1970s, and is named variously, such as *taharrush gamea*¹¹³⁶ and eve-teasing.¹¹³⁷ As Europe receives a majority of its immigrants from countries that have notorious records regarding the treatment of females, and because the majority of irregular migrants have been men, Europe is also importing social practices, types of crime, and masculinity norms that legitimise violence against women, and which have resulted in a surge of sexual violence against females in Europe. This means that there are serious risks associated with the recent large-scale male-dominated Muslim migrant wave into Europe. Yet, years of research have already shown that around 50 percent of all rapes in Europe are committed by foreign-born immigrants, while making up a minority of national populations. Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa are grossly overrepresented in these rape statistics. The Crime Prevention Council in Sweden (Brå) reported that the overwhelming majority of foreign-born rapists are from Muslim majority countries in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. Men from these countries are 23 times more likely to commit rape than Swedish-born.¹¹³⁸ According to police statistics, in Oslo, the capital of Norway, two out of three charged for rape are non-western immigrants¹¹³⁹ and ‘100 percent of assault rapes between strangers were committed by immigrant, non-Western males’.¹¹⁴⁰ In Denmark immigrants from Muslim countries (Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Somalia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan) are three times more likely than native Danes to commit rape.¹¹⁴¹ Similar statistics can be found throughout Europe.¹¹⁴²

13.2 Paris and Brussels Terrorist Attacks

The terror attacks in Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016) were acts of war against Europe by ISIS and are not going to end soon. Rainer Wendt, chief of the German police trade union, said ‘We have to bear in mind a long period of terror,’ and that they were ‘an alarm signal for the entire Europe’.¹¹⁴³ Nicolas Stockhammer, Austria’s security advisor, said that Europe should prepare for at least a 20-year ‘long-winded, brutal fight’ against terrorism in which *prevention efforts* will be essential.¹¹⁴⁴ In other words, Europe is in for a long fight against ISIS in Europe, not just in Syria and Iraq. However, unlike ISIS strong-holds in Syria and Iraq, which are being bombed by international coalition airstrikes,¹¹⁴⁵ European elites cannot bomb problem Muslim areas like Molenbeek, which is but one of the many ‘incubators’ and ‘hide-outs’ of the enemy in Europe. François Heisbourg, president of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that ‘You can bomb Raqqa [ISIS stronghold in Syria], and you may consider that to be war, but you’re not going to bomb Molenbeek or Schaerbeek or St.-Denis, unless you’re ready for civil war’ in Europe, which is what ‘Daesh

clearly wants'.¹¹⁴⁶

Like the Paris attacks, the Belgium atrocities were simultaneous terrorist acts designed to cause fear, maximum fatalities, maximum economic and socio-political costs to the country,¹¹⁴⁷ and generate more media attention, all of which satisfy numerous goals of the Islamists. According to a 2013 article by Kathleen Deloughery, assistant professor of public administration and policy at the University at Albany, published in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies,

if coordinated attacks do generate more fatalities, then simultaneous attacks in developed countries are more likely to garner media attention than single attacks. This increased news coverage can have the effect of bringing the motives of the terrorist organisation to the forefront, thus satisfying one of their main goals. In fact, the coordinated attacks on September 11th had a permanent effect of increasing the number of news stories on terrorism.¹¹⁴⁸

Another benefit of media attention for Muslim terrorists is the spreading of fear. According to Natasha Underhill, an expert on terrorism in the Middle East at Nottingham Trent University, 'The promotion of fear is one of the strongest assets that Islamic State possesses and it is sadly doing an excellent job in spreading this message across Europe'.¹¹⁴⁹ Gilles Kepel, a French political scientist, sociologist, and specialist on the Islamic and contemporary Arab world, concurs. He says 'part of the Islamic State's intention is to mobilize fears of the "enemy within", create further rejection of European Muslim citizens and radicalize them at home, to create a kind of civil war between European Muslims and the "crusader states"'.¹¹⁵⁰ Hence, European elites, in order to prevent civil war in Europe, think that what Stockhammer suggested — 'prevention efforts' — are what will eradicate Muslim terrorism in Europe.

13.2.1 Prevention Efforts: History and Current Thoughts

The 'preventive' approach holds that Muslim radicalism in Europe is the product of European behaviour and the failure of multicultural policies. It is thought that both Islamophobia and European multicultural policies of ethnic separatism have led to the creation of disenfranchised Muslim enclaves or no-go zones in Europe that foster Islamic radicalism, particularly among youth, and harbour terrorists. According to Peter R. Neumann, director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King's College London, the creation of radical Muslim enclaves in Europe is the fault of 'local authorities and even mainstream Muslim groups' who have 'abandoned them'.¹¹⁵¹ As a result, Muslim youth don't know how to 'fit into society' and, as a response, become angry and turn to crime and

radicalisation. According to a research study by Stanford University titled *Belonging Nowhere: Marginalisation and Radicalisation Risks among Muslim Immigrants* (2015), being ‘culturally homeless’ and subject to Islamophobia contribute to Muslim radicalisation.¹¹⁵² Engy Abdelkader, professor of international terrorism and human rights at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, provides a succinct summary of the report:

Essentially, Muslim immigrants and minorities who feel ‘culturally homeless’—an inability to relate to the home or new culture they are in—may be attracted to a group that offers a strong sense of belonging. Islamophobia, including xenophobic political rhetoric (that excludes refugees), exacerbates cultural homelessness because it erodes a sense of purpose while feeding the extremist narrative that our societies are anti-Islam and anti-Muslim.¹¹⁵³

In order to prevent radicalism from occurring, experts think that more money needs to be spent on social programs that are geared towards the deep integration of immigrants into all levels of mainstream society and directed towards the provision of various avenues for immigrant youth to develop a healthy sense of inclusion and worth; and more efforts should be made to stamp out Islamophobia. The Stanford report insists that ‘more effective homeland security policies focusing on prevention, more resources, and more accepting neighbors for Muslim communities in Western nations’ are needed.¹¹⁵⁴ Abdelkader thinks that ‘policymakers should help Muslims integrate by allowing them to preserve their faith identity while also adopting the cultural identity of their country’.¹¹⁵⁵ Gudrun Biffl, an expert on migration and de-radicalisation from the Donau-Universität Krems, thinks that the only way to counteract terrorism are policies of ‘real integration’ and that the ‘migrants are not the problem, but they are part of the solution. With them and their support, we will be able to spot the tendencies toward radicalization and deal with it’.¹¹⁵⁶ Foreign policy analyst Rula Jebreal, thinks that only those with an intimate understanding of Islam and Islamic radicalism, such as imams and other experts, can help combat radicalism within Muslim communities in Europe. Commenting during a 23 March 2016, CNN *Tonight* show, she said that in order to integrate Muslims:

you need to understand the culture, you need to understand the language, and you need to understand what is appealing, what is the message that ISIS is actually selling in these prison cells and what they are selling online’ as well as ‘in schools, mosques, and prisons.¹¹⁵⁷

Director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, Raffaello Pantucci, thinks that a ‘more bellicose [response] on the Islamic State abroad’, i.e. more bombing campaigns and ground troops, and a program of ‘emphasizing longer-term *social work* in isolated and *disenfranchised* communities’ in Europe will defuse Muslim radicalism and terrorism.¹¹⁵⁸

Concerns about radical and extremist Muslims in Europe have been around since at least the late 1980s. According to Lorenzo Vidino

In 1989 the Muslim world's rage against Salman Rushdie had been sparked by protests and a book burning organized by Muslim organizations in the British city of Bradford. In 1995 militants linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group — many of whom had grown up in France — orchestrated a string of bombings throughout France. In the second half of the 1990s networks of jihadists, mostly linked to outfits in North Africa, were dismantled in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Great Britain. Yet, despite all of these warning signs, few Europeans grasped the magnitude of the problem until the 2000s. Events such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (whose ringleaders were radicalized in Hamburg), the 2004 Madrid train bombings and assassination of Theo van Gogh, the 2005 London bombings and scores of other thwarted attacks and dismantled terrorist networks have revealed the presence of a sizeable number of European-based Muslims who have embraced jihadist ideology and are ready to use violence for it.¹¹⁵⁹

According to a 2011 report on integration efforts in Europe by various specialists and analysts for American Congress, prior to the most recent attacks in France and Belgium, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid (2004), and London (2005) consistently 'injected an even greater sense of urgency into EU counterterrorism efforts and gave added impetus to EU initiatives aimed at both better integrating Muslims into European society and tackling the root causes of radicalization and Islamist extremism'.¹¹⁶⁰ Yet, today, we have elites and academics declaring the same thing in response to the most recent terrorist attacks: more money and more integration; more counter-radicalism and more counter-terrorism. Despite the EAD, equal rights given to legal migrants, the promotion of Islam, Islamic values, Islamic history, and Euro-Arab interculturalism throughout European societies since the 1970s, and despite large volumes of money and various strategies of integration, counter-terrorism, and counter-radicalisation since the turn of the century, these efforts have failed to prevent the presence and rise of significant numbers of Muslim fundamentalists, terrorists, and foreign-fighters with European citizenship and residency permits.

According to the 2011 American Congress report mentioned above, various strategies have been tried in different European countries to integrate foreigners, especially Muslims, such as assimilation in France, multiculturalism in the UK, and 'guest worker' cosmopolitanism in Germany, but none of these efforts have prevented the emergence of exclusive parallel Muslim neighbourhoods and enclaves, which are described as 'discrete ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious communities [that] function apart from the culture of the host society' and where radicalism flourishes.¹¹⁶¹ The various integration efforts of European nations have focused on increased political, social, and economic participation and

new citizenship laws and language requirements in an attempt to instill a common identity, promoting dialogue with Muslim communities in an effort to generate greater Muslim participation, developing 'homegrown' imams more familiar with European

culture and traditions, improving educational and economic opportunities, and tackling racism and discrimination.¹¹⁶²

In 2007, Germany adopted a National Integration Plan that was geared towards

promoting the German language and German values of equality and civic engagement; improving education and vocational training; enhancing employment opportunities; and improving the life and situation of women and girls.

There were also new naturalization and integration requirements, such as the need to ‘establish German language proficiency, take a mandatory integration course on German democratic principles, and participate in a naturalization ceremony that includes an oath or equivalent component’ and ‘a multiple choice citizenship test’ to receive a passport. Mandatory integration courses involved ‘German language, history, culture, and rule of law’ and if immigrants did not attend, then their social benefits would be cut off.¹¹⁶³

In 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that ‘the constitution, not sharia’ applies in Germany,¹¹⁶⁴ and in 2011 Merkel declared that immigrants, particularly Turks, must learn German.¹¹⁶⁵ In 2014, the Society for Intercultural Existence funded by the Federal Ministry of Education in Germany began providing funding to ‘approved’ Turkish mosques for literacy and integration courses for new migrants, many of whom had very low levels of education. The aim of this initiative was the better integration of immigrants (from the religious environment of the lessons rather than a school classroom) and the prevention of radicalisation.¹¹⁶⁶ But in 2016, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere declared once again that immigrants must learn German and integrate, this time with the threat of deportation. They are currently working on a new law to enforce such requirements.¹¹⁶⁷

Similar tactics have been practiced in the UK. Integration efforts have involved ‘improving dialogue with Muslim communities and promoting moderate Islam; tackling socio-economic disadvantage and discrimination; and introducing new citizenship and English language requirements’. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2004 was reformed to strengthen the relationship between new British citizens and Britain, and various language requirements have involved the demonstration of English language ability and knowledge of British history, culture, and customs, allegiance sworn to the Queen, and a pledge of respect for rights and freedoms.¹¹⁶⁸

The EU has also adopted a variety of integration measures since the turn of the century; in 2004, 2007, and 2010 the EU produced a *Handbook on Integration* for policymakers, which involved information on learning second languages, civic participation, ‘economic integration and the labor market, urban housing, immigrant youth, education, and the role of the

media in integration'. And in 2009 the EU established the European Integration Forum, which

brings together representatives of civil society organizations with EU policymakers twice a year to discuss integration issues, and a European Web Site on Integration, which serves as a virtual platform to facilitate the exchange of information about integration policies and practices between policymakers, civil society groups, community organizations, and the general public.¹¹⁶⁹

The EU also adopted 11 common principles for immigrant integration policy in 2004, which were implemented at the national and EU level by the development of the Common Agenda for Integration in 2005. This Common Agenda also established the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in 2007 and was allocated 825 million euros between 2007 and 2013.¹¹⁷⁰ In 2011, the Common Agenda was updated to include various requirements from immigrants:

immigrants must be given the opportunity to participate fully in their new communities, but...successful integration requires immigrants to possess the will and commitment to become part of the society that has received them. The new Agenda highlights four areas as crucial for integration: the acquisition of language skills; participation in the labor market; access to education; and decent living conditions.¹¹⁷¹

On 7 June 2016, the European Commission presented an Action Plan on Integration for 'third-country nationals and their economic and social contribution to the EU' and 'sets out the concrete policy, operational and financial support to be delivered at EU level to support [EU states] in their efforts'.¹¹⁷²

Anti-terrorism and de-radicalisation efforts in Europe have included 'enhancing law enforcement and security measures and [...] reforming immigration and asylum policies', such as 'increased...monitoring of mosques', the investigation of religious groups, the banning of certain Muslim organizations, the deportation of hate clerics, the criminalization of dissemination of terrorist propaganda, and the training of police to spot radicalisation in prisons.¹¹⁷³ Since 9/11 various Islamist organizations have been banned in Germany, such as Kalifatstaat, al-Aksa e.V., and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and in 2010 the Masjid Taiba mosque or Al Quds in Hamburg was shut down due to ties with 9/11 hijackers. Since the 2005 London attacks, Britain has introduced 'tighter controls on Muslim groups receiving public funds', has banned hate preachers 'from visiting Britain to speak in public forums', has taken 'a tougher line on forced marriages', and expects 'all British citizens [to] support common values', changes that were reiterated in 2011.¹¹⁷⁴

UK officials have also engaged in 'counter-radicalization efforts in cooperation with non-violent Islamists whose political goals and values may differ from those held by mainstream Britons'.¹¹⁷⁵ For example, Tariq Ramadan, the son of Islamist Said Ramadan and grandson of the Muslim

Brotherhood's founder Hassan al-Banna, is one of 14 members of the Foreign Office's Advisory Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief. He began this position in 2005 when the British government asked him to become part of a task force called the Home Office Working Group on Tackling Extremism, which aimed at 'examining ways to prevent young Muslims in Britain from deteriorating into violent extremism'.¹¹⁷⁶ There is also the Prevent Program, which is a key program of the official Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST). It was launched in 2007 with five objectives:

challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who promoted violent extremism and support the places where they operated; support people vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists; increase the resilience of communities; and address grievances exploited in the radicalisation process.¹¹⁷⁷

This program cost 53 million dollars between 2007 and 2010 for over 1,000 projects. It was revised in 2011 to separate counter-terrorism and integration efforts and focus more on the prevention of radicalisation in areas such as 'education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities', as well as the internet.¹¹⁷⁸

13.2.2 Political Islam and Muslim Radicalism: Global Phenomena

It is quite clear that radical Muslim groups have developed complex networks throughout Europe¹¹⁷⁹ and Muslim radicalisation is deeply embedded in European societies — in neighbourhoods, schools, mosques, prisons, as well as on social media. These are serious problems that cannot be solved by throwing more money at integration and anti-racism programs. In January 2016 Trevor Phillips, the founding chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UK, stated that

Continuously pretending that a group is somehow eventually going to become like the rest of us is perhaps the deepest form of disrespect. Because what you are essentially saying is the fact that they behave in a different way, some of which we may not like, is because they haven't yet seen the light. It may be that they see the world differently to the rest of us.¹¹⁸⁰

In May 2016, Phillips stated that the arrival of some Muslim groups to the UK are actively 'resistant to the traditional process of integration'.¹¹⁸¹ Despite the evidence of various polls and surveys¹¹⁸² and reasons given by Muslim radicals and Islamists themselves, which consistently reveal to the Western world and its allies *why* radical Muslims exist and do not integrate and *why* Islamists are terrorising the West — because of Western-led international military campaigns in the Middle East, because of global

capitalism, and because of religious aspirations that perceive Islam as the one true faith of all mankind that will eventually conquer Europe and the world — despite this, Western governments persist in reasoning that more needs to be analysed as to the *Why* of Muslim radicalisation and terrorism in Europe so Muslims can be integrated better. Despite hundreds of millions being spent on integration projects, social programs, and counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation operations, radicalism, Muslim criminality, and terrorist incidents in Europe have dramatically increased over the years.¹¹⁸³

As has been discussed elsewhere in this work, Muslim anti-Western sentiments (and hence lack of integration), as well as the formation of radical Islamist networks and movements in Europe and the world over, have their roots in the political Islam and aspirations of Islamists in the Muslim world, such as Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), founders and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979), founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. Islamism and Islamisation in Europe includes three main types of activity: proselytism (*dawah*) and indoctrination (*tarbiyah*), radicalisation, and infiltration of all levels of society¹¹⁸⁴ and is financed by external sources (Wahhabi-Salafism). A significant amount of funding and support for Muslims in Europe, including mosque building and the formation of Muslim networks and movements, comes from conservative and theocratic Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt, and there have been concerns about the transnational and foreign nature of this support and these networks.¹¹⁸⁵

A 2010 Pew Forum report ‘Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe’ states that

The overseas origins of the groups, and their continuing ties to affiliates abroad, have prompted concerns that by strengthening Muslims’ connections to the umma — the world community of Muslim believers — they may be encouraging Muslims to segregate themselves from the rest of European society. In addition, some in the West perceive many Muslim groups as fomenters of radical Islam and, ultimately, terrorism.¹¹⁸⁶

It is well known that prominent and influential Islamists, such as Qutb, al-Banna, Qaradawi, Choudary, and Erdogan et al, reject Western values and have demanded Muslims not integrate into European societies and instead practice self-isolation.¹¹⁸⁷ Both internal and external Muslim groups are themselves promoting the separatism and radicalisation of Muslims in Europe. Many Muslims, including so-called ‘moderates’, do not want to integrate into European societies,¹¹⁸⁸ as has been pointed out in this work and evidenced by various trends in Muslim political activism and declarations of the right to difference, the right to multicultural minority rights, and the pervasive efforts towards self-government and Sharia governed neighbourhoods. As polls and surveys have shown, a significant portion of Muslim populations in European nations (amounting to hundreds of thousands) and in Muslim nations (amounting to millions) also support

radical Islam, including terrorist attacks in the name of Islam.¹¹⁸⁹

Muslim radicalisation is not the direct result of European Islamophobia, multicultural policies, or flimsy integration efforts, and it is not what determines problematic Muslim-European relations in Europe. Tensions between Muslims and Europeans and support for radical Islam by Muslims have existed for hundreds of years, mostly due to their contrasting natures and worldviews, military endeavours, geographical proximity, and the vast differences that justify their hegemonic geopolitical drives. Multicultural policies have indeed encouraged the plethora of ethnic minority groups to preserve their unique culture, identity, and heritage as separate and collective communities within liberal democratic and secular European nations, yet it is only Muslims in Europe that have overtly exploited this right and pushed it to its most extreme form, creating hundreds of radical self-governing ethnic enclaves in European nations that are characterised by criminality, the rejection of the secular way of life, law, and values of Europe, which create major divisions and fractures in society.

Muslim radicalisation is a global phenomenon¹¹⁹⁰ — it is found all over the world where Muslims exist, whether as a minority or a majority national population, and is directed at non-Muslims as well as Muslims considered too Westernised, of another sect, or those in alliance with the West. In just the first half of 2016, there were 1,063 Islamist attacks in 47 countries, which killed over 10,000 people and injured over 12,000 more.¹¹⁹¹ Muslim radicalisation is not determined by poverty, isolation, lack of education, or lack of integration. Research shows that radicalism is on a wide spectrum — from the poor to the wealthy, from the integrated to the non-integrated, and from the educated to the non-educated. There is no direct link between low socio-economic opportunities and radicalisation. Dr. Jitka Maleckova, researcher of terrorism at the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) in Prague, writes that

neither the participants nor the adherents of militant activities...are recruited predominantly from the poor...[and] there is no direct connection between poverty and terrorism.¹¹⁹²

The World Bank has, according to Roderick Parkes, ‘been rowing back from its famous 1999 report which claimed that unemployment was the root of all violent extremism, and has conceded that terrorists in fact “recruit among the employed”’.¹¹⁹³ Other experts also say that ‘integration problems are far from the sole factor behind violent extremism’, and EU officials have said that ‘while the lack of integration may be a contributing factor in explaining why some individuals turn to extremism, it is not the only one’.¹¹⁹⁴ Many Muslim radicals and terrorists have come from wealthy educated backgrounds¹¹⁹⁵ and were well integrated into their host societies, but have ‘common cause’ with Muslims of majority-Muslim countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, and thus have rejected the Western

way of life, embraced fundamentalist Islam, and turned terror on their perceived enemies.¹¹⁹⁶ One glaring example is Osama Krayem, a Syrian with a Swedish passport who in 2005 was involved in a documentary called ‘Without Borders — A Film About Sport and Integration’. In this film Krayem showed how the Malmö football team had helped him integrate into Swedish society. Krayem even had a job with Malmö city council as a management intern. However, he joined the Islamic State in 2014, and, posing as a refugee in 2015, he clandestinely entered Greece and headed to the radical Muslim enclave, Molenbeek, in Brussels. He was later arrested for his involvement in both the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and the March 2016 Brussels terrorist attacks that killed 162 civilians.¹¹⁹⁷

Two important factors seem to be overlooked regarding militant Islamism in Europe: criminality and revenge. According to historian and Arabist Pieter Van Ostaeyen,

the allure of criminals for ISIS is significant. They have useful connections to weapons, money laundering, fake IDs, safe houses. And, crucially, they aren’t as hard to convince to engage in violence.

He further states that the Brussels suicide bombers, Ibrahim and Khalid El Bakraoui,

weren’t known as radicals. They were known as hardened criminals. The police were using two lists. The list of people you should be looking for because they are known for radical Islam, and the other list, people known for violent crimes. But they didn’t cross-reference them. Nobody actually had any idea that they had to look on the other list.¹¹⁹⁸

Ostaeyen also thinks that what Muslim terrorists want in Europe is ‘Revenge for what ISIS claims the West has done to Iraq and Syria. And the more ground ISIS loses there, the more the group lusts for bloodshed in Europe’. And, pessimistically, he states that ‘Even if we take out the Islamic State as a territory, I don’t think we will take out the Islamic State as an idea. That is going to be something we are facing for the next few years, maybe even decades’.¹¹⁹⁹ But how does this affect Europe and Europeans?

Europe has in the past, does so in the present, and presumably will continue to in the future, participate in war against Muslim countries while practicing immigration from these countries. Put another way, American-European neoliberal foreign policies and neoconservative military interventions in Muslim countries occur simultaneously with a European program of hosting large Muslim enclaves, as well as rapid and large-scale legal immigration, illegal migration, and refugee quotas from these very same regions (as well as other Muslim countries). Those who have sympathies with Islamic anti-Westernism, anti-globalism, and anti-Europeanism (as well as criminals, who are often recruited to Islamism) and want revenge upon Europe, well they either exist in Europe already or they are currently on their way, using the ‘migrant crisis’ to enter Europe. Their numbers have swelled, their networks enriched, and their damage more

severe and rapid, as can be seen in the increase of Islamist terrorist acts and threats.¹²⁰⁰ It seems counter-productive therefore, for the security of Europe, to make war upon and destabilise the same nations they import and receive large amounts of people from (migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees) and to make war on a political religion (Islamism) that has many millions of sympathisers. This problem is exasperated by sympathisers who have immigrated and settled in large communities throughout Europe, who continue to have strong transnational ties to their homelands, and who perceive the 'war on terrorism' as a war on Islam. European nations must remove their military forces from the Muslim world, and the rate and depth of mass-migration from the Muslim world into Europe should be stopped. Political Islam and its aims should be officially recognised and acknowledged for what it is. Politically correct democratic ideals, civil liberty protections, and human rights concerns that constrain exclusion, deportation and repatriation, caps on immigration, and other sovereign decisions regarding Muslim immigrants and immigrants in general in European nations should be overturned. The EU should do more to manage and secure its external borders, reduce incentives of migrants to enter Europe illegally, and most importantly, protect the safety, security, and longevity of ethnic European peoples.

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Rupes Nigra

Notes

[←1]

David Coleman, *Immigration, Population, and Ethnicity*, 2.

[←2]

Zolberg, 'Are the Industrial Countries Under Siege?' 59.

The number of European governments that viewed the level of immigration as ‘too high’ were as follows between 1976 and 2001: 5 out of 29 in 1976, 7 out of 29 in 1986, 16 out of 43 in 1996, and 14 out of 43 in 2001. The number of European countries who had government policies to restrict immigration were as follows: 5 in 1976, 13 in 1986, 28 in 1996, and 21 in 2001. See: United Nations, *National Population Policies 2001*, 26, 29.

Mark J. Miller, 1993, *International Migration and Security*, 201–202. Westview Press.

[←5]

Castles, 'The Guest Worker in Western Europe'; Castles, 'Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?'

[←6]

Hollifield, 'The Emerging Migration State,' 895; Ben-David, 'Europe's Shifting Immigration Dynamic.' Liberal laws that act as a pull factor for immigrants to Europe also prevent limiting immigration and the deportation of illegals and foreign criminals.

Marriage migration differs from family reunification in that an immigrant will travel from the new country of residence to their home-country origin to marry and then their spouse will also immigrate. Then, the spouses' family may immigrate under family reunification laws. A never-ending cycle. See Schrover, 'Marriage Migration,' 2108–2122.

Hollifield, 899–900; Castles and Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration*, 70.

A 2009 report stated that there were an estimated 1.9 to 3.8 million undocumented migrants in the EU-27 in 2008. See: ELIAMEP, *Undocumented Migration*, 12.

Michaels, 'Muslim Europe: The Demographic Time Bomb Transforming Our Continent.'

European Commission, 'Migrant Children More Likely to End Up in Poor Schools,' 3.

[←17]

Vasileva, '6.5% of the EU population are foreigners and 9.4% are born abroad,' 1–2.

Western European countries have been greatly impacted by the Left-Liberal EU project for decades and, in comparison to Eastern European member states, are experiencing the most rapid and widespread demographic and political marginalisation of their indigeneous populations. Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, were not subject to the EU project until they joined in 2004 and historically, particularly in terms of post-WWII communism, their political and social realities have been different. As such, their national populations remain relatively homogeneous and traditional, and resistance to EU political and demographic engineering has been more vocal and mainstream than in Western Member states.

[←21]

David Coleman, *Immigration, Population, and Ethnicity*; OECD (2016), Fertility rates (indicator).

Also see Belgian National Contact Point (BE NCP), *Annual Report on Asylum and Migration Statistics for Belgium*; and Statistics Belgium, 'Population — Chiffres population 1990–2011.'

International Organization for Migration, *Compendium of Migrant Integration Policies and Practices*, 26.

Petrovic, 'Belgium: A Country of Permanent Immigration.'

Bruzz, ‘62 procent Brusselaars heeft vreemde herkomst.’

Vezzoli, Villares-Varela, and de Haas, 'Uncovering International Migration Flow Data,' 23–24.

United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), 'Foreign-born Population by Country/Area of Birth, Age, and Sex' and 'Native and Foreign-born Population by Age, Sex, and Urban/Rural Residence.'

Gsir, Mandin, and Mescoli, *Corridor Report on Belgium*, 13; Plasman, Bouajaja, de Wind, and Flament, *Geographical Labour Mobility in the Context of the Crisis: Belgium*, 3.

OECD (2016), Fertility rates (indicator); OECD (2016), Young population (indicator);
OECD (2016), Elderly population (indicator).

Cangiano, *The Impact of Migration on UK Population Growth*, 2; Withnall, 'UK Population to Rise by 10 Million in Next 25 Years with Net Migration Accounting for 50%.'

See Schain, 'Immigration Policy: A Transatlantic Comparison,' 109–114.

Hawkins, 'Migration Statistics,' 12–13.

Vargas-Silva and Rienzo, *Migrants in the UK: An Overview*, 3–4.

Rogers, 'Non-White British Population Reaches 9.1 Million.'

News Agencies, 'Fewer than a Third of Birmingham Schoolchildren Are White, Report Finds.'

David Coleman as cited in Martyn Brown, 'Migrants Change UK Forever.'

Kaufmann, 'Half Full or Half Empty?'; Electronic Immigration Network, 'Demos: Almost Half of Ethnic Minority Population Now Live in Majority Non-white Areas.'

OECD (2016), Fertility rates (indicator); OECD (2016), Young population (indicator);
OECD (2016), Elderly population (indicator).

International Organization for Migration, *Compendium of Migrant Integration Policies and Practices*, 85.

Schain, 'Immigration Policy: A Transatlantic Comparison,' 109–114.

No UN Data is available for 2011 for comparison purposes with Belgium, the UK, Sweden, and Germany. However, the National Institute for demographic studies (INED) provides information for 2013, but unfortunately does not provide specific age demographics.

Lhommeau and Simon, 'The Populations Surveyed,' 14; Borrel and Lhommeau, 'Être né en France d'un parent immigré.'

International Organization for Migration, *Compendium of Migrant Integration Policies and Practices*, 195.

Wikipedia, s.v. 'Luciabeteslutet', <https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luciabeteslutet> (accessed May 2016); Hinnfors, Spehar and Bucken-Knapp, 'The Missing Factor'; Brochmann and Hagelund, *Immigration Policy*, 49.

[←70]

Eurostat, 'Foreign-born Population by Country of Birth.'

[←72]

OECD, 'Total Population by Age and Sex.'

Statistics Sweden, 'Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2015'; Eurostat, 'Foreign-born Population by Country of Birth, 1 January 2014'; Larsson, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report — Sweden*, 11.

Seidle, 'Sweden' in *Comparative Research and Analysis — Country Profiles*, 1.

Statistics Sweden, Demographic Reports: *The Future Population of Sweden 2015–2060*, 276.

Statistics Sweden, 'Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2015'; Eurostat, 'Foreign-born Population by Country of Birth, 1 January 2014'; Larsson, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report — Sweden*, 11.

OECD (2016), Fertility rates (indicator); OECD (2016), Young population (indicator);
OECD (2016), Elderly population (indicator).

Destatis, '81.2 Million Inhabitants at the End of 2014.'

See Akgündüz, *Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960–194*; Shonick, ‘Politics, Culture, and Economics’; Oezcan, ‘Germany’; Kolinsky, ‘Non-German Minorities in German Society,’ 79–80.

Castles, 'The Guests Who Stayed'; Gottfried Volker, 'Turkish Labour Migration to Germany.'

Teitelbaum, 'The Role of the State in International Migration,' 161.

Speckesser, *The Immigrant Workforce in Germany*, 11.

Hollifield, 'The Emerging Migration State,' 885–886.

Bewarder and Lutz, 'Deutschland ist Zielland Nummer Eins.'

Destatis, 'Numbers of Immigrants in Germany at a Record High.'

[←90]

Destatis: '8.2 Million Foreigners in Germany'; 'Naturalisations'; 'Slightly Less Naturalisations in 2014.'

A detailed discussion on the 'migrant crisis' is covered in Part IV.

Pew Research Center. *The Future of the Global Muslim Population*, 131.

Nachmani, *Europe and its Muslim Minorities*, 35; Cherribi, *In the House of War*, 33.

See: Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam*; Gettleman and Schaar, *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*.

Hasan, *Believers and Brothers*, 161; Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam*; Gettleman and Schaar, *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*; Crowley, *Empires of the Sea*; Armour Sr., *Islam, Christianity, and the West*; Lewis, *Islam and the West*; Watt, *Muslim-Christian Encounters*; Nafziger and Walton, *Islam at War*.

Stewart, *The Middle East Today*, 176; Saleh, *Hassan al-Banna*; Khosrokhavar, 'Jihadism,' 59–102.

Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna*, 72.

[←100]

Qutb, *Milestones*, 19–21.

Peter Mandaville, the Director of the Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies, Professor of International Affairs at George Mason University, and non-resident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, defines Islamism in the following way: 'forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions and legal system derive directly from the shari'ah'. Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, 57.

The radical Islamic revivalist party founded in 1941 by Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979).

Wahhabism is a fundamentalist school of Islam that has become 'an integral part of the core ideology of the Wahhabi/Salafi school of radical Islam that motivates Islamist extremism and terrorism.' It is Saudi Arabia's state religion (Sunni) and influential throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Since the 1970s it has been 'exported and promoted' in non-Muslim regions of the world, such as Europe, particularly with enormous funding from Saudi Arabia. Between 1973 and 2002 Saudi spent more than \$80 million USD establishing 'a huge international network of Wahhabi mosques, Islamic centers, madrassas, and charities that constitute the actual infrastructure of Islamic extremism worldwide'. Most Wahhabis call themselves Salafis. Wahhabi-Salafist ideology has much in common with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Deobandi of South Asia, and the movement often provides funding for these latter groups. See Alexiev, *The Wages of Extremism*, 41–42.

Tablighi Jamaat, founded in 1927 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi (1885–1944) in Mewat, India, is ‘the largest Muslim missionary movement in the world’ and very influential in South Asia (HQ in Pakistan). It preaches Deobandi Islamism (an interpretation of Sunni Islam that is adhered to by Pakistani jihadists and the Taliban) and is ‘an integral part of the radical Islamist movement,’ being called, in 2002, ‘the antechamber of fundamentalism’ by French counter-terrorism officials. It came to the West in the 1960s, and, with funding from Wahhabi circles, it established its European HQ in Dewsbury, England in 1978. See Alexiev, *The Wages of Extremism*, 83–86.

See Phares, 'Political Islam in the Mediterranean Basin,' 23.

[←108]

As surmised by Leggiero, this will occur in a ‘grand battle against the Crusaders at the End of Days.’

Zavadski, 'ISIS Now has a Network of Military Affiliates in 11 Countries Around the World'; Mohammed, 'ISIS Beheads Another American as 60 New Terror Groups Join.'

The European Union's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism states that terrorism is 'An intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures by means of attacks upon a person's life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or transport of weapons or explosives.' See European Union, *Council Framework Decision 2002/475 on Combating Terrorism*, 6. To supplement this definition, according to Peter C. Sederberg of the Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, terrorism also involves 'the threat or use of violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than its immediate victim.' See Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader*, 4.

See: Al Shalchi, 'U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Three Staff Killed in Attack on Consulate'; *Al Jazeera*, 'Angry Protests Spread Over Anti-Islam Video'; M.R., 'Algeria's Hostage Crisis: A Murky Mess'; *Times of India*, 'Westerners Executed by ISIS Militants'; Curry, 'Here are the Ancient Sites ISIS has Damaged and Destroyed.'

Tibi, 'The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam,'
39.

Tyan as cited in Bostom, *Sharia Versus Freedom*, 31.

The Koran, 68, 71, 45, 85, 32, 137, 68, 146, 141, 129.

There were several Islamist movements in the 1800s as well. Many of them were linked with liberation from colonialism. S.V.R. Nasr writes that ‘anticolonialism is the language of the jihad, relating struggles for liberation to Islam — [is] a powerful paradigm that continues today to be relevant to Muslim struggles.’ See Nasr, ‘European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States.’

This Islamist counter-hegemony can be considered as a potentially ‘global mass movement’ with a ‘distinctive and complex tradition of religious belief, political ideology, social norms, world outlook, and philosophical method.’ See Tony Evans, ‘The Limits of Tolerance’, 1752–1753.

Butko, 'Terrorism Redefined,' 145.

Tibi, 'The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism,' 37.

Tibi, 'The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism,' 38.

[←123]

Tibi, 'The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism,' 46.

Mandaville, 'Muslim Transnational Identity,' 500.

Tibi, 'International Relations and the Study of Islam,' 9.

Welfare dependency can be seen in terms of Islamism. Throughout history, Muslim majority nations have extracted a poll tax from non-Muslims called *jizya*, which is mandated in the Quran and hadiths, and has funded various Muslim projects, including military expansion. Today, because European welfare monies are derived from the labour tax base and because Muslims are over-represented in unemployment and welfare figures in Europe (see chapter 9), one could conclude that the reason for such over-representation is because many Muslims consider welfare as a form of *jizya*, that is, as a deserved tax from non-Muslims or Europeans. In fact, leading Islamist in Britain, Anjem Choudary has stated it clearly: ‘We take the Jizya [tax on non-Muslims], which is ours anyway. The normal situation is to take money from the kuffar [non-Muslim]. They give us the money. You work, give us the money, Allahu Akhbar [Allah is great]. We take the money.’ He calls it ‘Jihad Seekers Allowance.’ See: Robert Johnson, ‘Muslim Preacher Tells Followers’; Kern, ‘Anjem Choudary, in His Own Words’; Abdel-Haleem, *Understanding the Qur’ān*, 70, 79.

According to Tarik Fraihi, a Moroccan-Flemish political philosopher and publicist, 'Radicalisation is a process in which an individual's convictions and willingness to seek for deep and serious changes in the society increase. Radicalism and radicalization are not necessarily negative. Moreover, different forms of radicalization exist.' See Fraihi, '(De-)Escalating Radicalization,' 135. In terms of Muslim radicalization, particularly in prisons, the US Department of Justice states that radicalization is the 'process by which inmates...adopt extreme views including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes.' See US Department of Justice, *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers*, 6.

See Vidino, 'A Dagger in the Soft Heart.'

Tibi, 'The Totalitarianism of Islamist Jihadism,' 37; Vidino, 'Aims and Methods of Europe's Muslim Brotherhood.'

Schulman, 'Stockholm Syndrome,' 470; Alexiev, *The Wages of Extremism*, 44.

Schulman, 'Stockholm Syndrome,' 470.

Tibi, 'The Totalitarianism of Islamist Jihadism,' 38.

Schulman, 'Stockholm Syndrome,' 474. Finsbury Park mosque was a center for radicalised Islamism in London, headed by imam Abu Hamza al-Masri (who was convicted), and was implicated in several terrorist attacks on the West, including by members that were loyal to the infamous Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev.

Schulman, 'Stockholm Syndrome,' 475.

See Pew Research Center, *Common Concerns about Islamic Extremism*.

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 3; Vidino, 'Political Islam in Europe.'

Agence France Presse (AFP), 'About 6,000 Europeans are Reportedly Fighting with Jihadist Groups in Syria.'

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 4.

Amghar, 'Ideological and Theological Foundations of Muslim Radicalism in France,' 29–30.

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 5; Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.

Vidino, 'The Tripartite Threat of Radical Islam to Europe.'

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 5.

Baran, 'Fighting the War of Ideas.' Baran is a Turkish-American scholar on Islamist ideology, Director of the International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon Center, and a senior fellow of the Hudson Institute.

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 6; also see chapter 9.

Millî Görüş is a network of Islamist political parties and a politico-religious movement that arose in Turkey in the 1970s. It was inspired by Necmettin Erbakan, a Turkish politician, who had written a manifesto in 1969 with the same name. This work outlined a vision of political Islam that rejected the European Common Market and Western values and development, which were viewed as attempts to assimilate and de-Islamize Turkey. It has come to be one of the most influential Islamist organizations in the West and has tens of thousands of members from the Turkish diasporas in Europe. See Vielhaber, 'The Milli Görüş of Germany.'

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 10. Yet, there are Muslims who practice their faith moderately in the West while integrating peacefully into their host societies and do not aim to radicalise anybody.

Gilligan, 'Trojan Horse 'Links to Terror''; Gilligan, 'Guide to School Islamisation'; *BBC News*, 'Trojan Horse "Plot" Schools Timeline'; Kassam, 'Fears of More Radicalised Children'; Griffiths and Kerbaj, "'Trojan Horse 2" in London'; Patton and Gilligan, 'Head Teachers Raise "Serious Concerns" Over Islamic School Take-Over'; Hirsch, "'Muslim School Plot" Fears Were Raised in 1994'; *BBC News*, 'Bradford School Governors "Promoted Islamic Agenda"'; *BBC News*, 'Books "Promoting Stoning" Found at Olive Tree Primary School'; The Clarion Project, 'UK Muslim School Fails Inspection Over Pro-Stoning Books'; 'Birmingham Schools "Target of Extremist Plot" (2:00pm),' YouTube video (Sky News), 04:47.

Daniel, 'The Rise of Political Islam in Europe'; *The Local*, 'Green Party may have been Infiltrated by Islamists'; Gilligan, 'Islamic Radicals "Infiltrate" the Labour Party'; Kassan and Deacon, 'Exclusive: As Paris Burned'; *Telegraph View*, 'This Secretive Agenda Must Be Taken Seriously.'

For English translation see Poole, 'The Muslim Brotherhood "Project" (Continued).'

Ramadan studied law at Cologne University in Germany, earning his PhD in 1959 with a thesis on Islamic law. He then set up the Munich Islamic Center as the Egyptian MB's HQ in Germany and Europe. This Center was essential for the Islamic Community of Germany, which is also associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and has its HQ in Aachen. See: Steinberg, 'Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood,' 87–89.

Qaradawi as cited in Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 7.

As Islam is a politico-religion, apostasy to Islamists is akin to treason and punishable by death.

Qaradawi as cited in Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 8; also see chapter 9.

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 8.

Dewinter, 'The Colonisation of Europe: How Europe Will Become Eurabia.'

Perraudin, 'Muslim Immigration is "Trojan Horse" Invasion.'

Boumedienne as cited by Hashmi, *Global Jihad and America*, 22.

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Al-Qaddafi, 'Europe and the US Should Agree to Become Islamic or Declare War on Muslims.'

Baseer as cited in Paz, 'Middle East Islamism in the European Arena,' 73.

Bakri as cited by Israeli, *Muslim Minorities in Modern States*, 15; Pickles, 'Imam tells Muslim migrants.'

Kern, 'I Will Make London a Beacon of Islam.'

Pizzi, 'Cameron: London Can Be a World Capital for Islamic Finance.' Alex Alexiev has argued that Sharia financing is a strategy of Islamisation. See Alexiev, *The Wages of Extremism*, 93–117.

By March 2015 Italian officials had stated that ISIS was already working with the smugglers. See Hannah Roberts, 'ISIS Could Become the Pirates of the Mediterranean.'

Toaldo, 'Migrations Through and From Libya'; Toaldo, 'Libya's Migrant-Smuggling Highway.'

Winter, 'Islamic State's Ambitions in Libya are a Direct Threat to Europe'; Sherlock and Freeman, 'Islamic State "planning to Use Libya as Gateway to Europe"'; Loveluck, 'How Isil Spread to Libya — and Now has Europe in its Sights.'

Hannah Roberts, 'ISIS Threatens to Send 500,000 Migrants to Europe.'

European Parliament, 'Schengen and the Management,' 2; Frontex, *Risk Analysis for 2016*, 17.

Leiken, 'Europe's Angry Muslims.'

Michaels, 'Muslim Europe: The Demographic Time Bomb Transforming Our Continent.'

Pew Research Center, *The Future of World Religions*. On 29 November 2017, Pew released a new report titled 'Europe's Growing Muslim Population,' which projected that by 2050 the Muslim population of Europe with zero Muslim immigration will have increased to 7.4%, with medium immigration to 11.2%, and with high immigration to 14%. For Belgium, the UK, France, Sweden, and Germany with zero Muslim immigration, the Muslim population will have grown to 11.1%, 9.7%, 12.7%, 11.1%, and 8.7% respectively; with medium immigration 15.1%, 16.7%, 17.4%, 20.5%, and 10.8%; and with high immigration to 18.2%, 17.2%, 18%, 30.6%, and 19.7%. However, an article by Soeren Kern of the Gatestone Institute, titled 'How Many Muslims in Europe? Pew's Projections Fall Short', argues that 'Pew's baseline estimate of the number of Muslims currently in Europe — the estimate upon which its future projections are calculated — has been undercounted by at least five million Muslims, whose presence in Europe will significantly increase the future size of the continent's Muslim population.' In addition, Muslim asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and immigrants that have been naturalised were not included in Pew's calculations according to Kern. As such, the projections of the Muslim population in Europe by 2050 by Pew must be viewed as much too conservative.

Dewinter, 'The Colonisation of Europe: How Europe Will Become Eurabia.'

Leiken, 'Europe's Angry Muslims.'

Philip Jenkins, 'Demographics, Religion, and the Future of Europe,' 533.

See: Nachmani, *Europe and its Muslim Minorities*, 35; Cherribi, *In the House of War*, 33.

According to Nasr writing for the Oxford Islamic Studies online, Islam is more than just a religious faith but is also 'a source of identity and an important factor in social relations and politics. Islam has long been important to Muslim politics'. See: Nasr, 'European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States.'

Noel James Coulson, 'Shariah,' *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Shariah> (accessed November 2015).

Judgements on the merits delivered by the Grand Chamber, *Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey*, 9; European Court of Human Rights, *Annual Report 2003*, 5–6.

Taher, 'Revealed: UK's First Official Sharia Courts.'

Sunday Mercury, 'Islamic Sharia Law Courts Operating in West Midlands.'

Maddox, David. 'Bid to Ban Muslims from Replacing UK Law with Sharia Courts.'

Doughty, 'Sharia Courts in the UK are Run by Extremists'; Millar, 'Sharia in UK.'

Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 'Sharia Courts Should Not Be Recognised Under the Arbitration Act';

MacEoin, *Sharia Law or 'One Law for All'?*; Hope, 'Law Society Risks.'

RT News, 'Sharia Law to be Adopted into UK Legal System for First Time.'

Taspinar, 'Europe's Muslim Street.' The support for Palestine in Europe is creating problems, particularly violent protests and riots, as well as arson and looting etc. such as can be see from these two YouTube videos from 2014 in Paris: 'Manif pro-palestinienne interdite: Très grave incidents à Barbès — 19/07/2014' and 'Metro paris feu à Barbès Rochechoir paris manifestation pour la palestina.'

This is not the case for European nations like France who have promoted assimilation rather than multiculturalism and insisted on secularism at the public level. This goes to show that integration strategies of assimilation or multiculturalism are not successful at preventing the growth of parallel societies.

The Hungarian government has declared that there are more than 900 no-go zones in Europe where authorities have lost control. See here: *RT News*, 'EU has 900 'No-Go' Areas Because of Migrants, Hungary Says'; Kormány Információ, 'Több Mint 900 "No-Go" Zóna Európa Nagyvárosaiban.' Also see: Alexiev, *The Wages of Extremism*; Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet, & Ragazzi, 'Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU'; Moniquet, 'The Radicalisation of Muslim Youth in Europe'; Pizani-Williams, 'The International Context'; Precht, *Home Grown Terrorism*; Rabasa and Benard, *Eurojihad*; Teich, 'Islamic Radicalization in Belgium.'

Stakelbeck, 'Islamic Sharia Law Comes to Great Britain.'

McCarthy, 'What Bobby Jindal Gets About Islam — and Most People Still Don't.'

There are various other avenues that radicalise Muslim youth. According to a 2007 Danish Ministry of Justice funded research report by Tomas Precht, ‘most intelligence services’ in Europe know that ‘prisons serve as a potential hotbed for radicalisation.’ Other radicalisation routes involve the internet, satellite, mosques, schools, universities, youth clubs, workplaces, and sporting activities. See: Precht, *Home Grown Terrorism*, 56–67.

Electronic Immigration Network, 'Demos: Almost Half of Ethnic Minority Population Now Live in Majority Non-white Areas'; Kaufmann, 'Half Full or Half Empty?'

Maltz, 'Record Number of French Jews Immigrated to Israel in 2015.'

Weinthal, 'German Intel: Migrants will Bring Anti-Semitism.'

New World Wealth, 'Millionaire Migration in 2015'; Epstein, 'We're Leaving Britain — Jews Aren't Safe Here Anymore.'

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Bard, 'Wake up Europe: Radical Islam is Coming for You.'

European Commission. 'Opening Remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans at the First Annual Colloquium on Fundamental Rights.'

Kettani, 'Muslim Population in Europe: 1950–2020,' 157.

Hertogen, 'Moslims in België per gewest, provincie en gemeente.'

Kern, 'The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013.'

Teich, 'Islamic Radicalization in Belgium,' 5.

Pew Research Center, 'Table: Muslim Population by Country: Muslim Population Growth by Country.' However, new projections suggest Muslims may constitute up to and above 18.2% by 2050 — see footnote 5, p. <OV>.

Hurd, 'Belgistan?'; Kern, 'The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013.'

Savage, 'Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,' 28.

It is popular among Muslims to name their first born son the name of the founder of Islam, Mohammed, which has various spellings.

Morocco World News, 'Lina, Aya, and Mohamed Among Most Popular Baby Names in Brussels.'

Gazet van Antwerpen, 'Voor het eerst meer dan de helft moslims in Antwerpse scholen.'

Bousetta and Bernes, 'Muslims in the EU,' 21; Gsir, Mandin, and Mescoli, *Corridor Report on Belgium*, 31.

Gsir, Mandin, and Mescoli, *Corridor Report on Belgium*, 30.

De Ridder and Beyens, 'Challenges Regarding Foreign Nationals in the Belgian Prison Population,' 5–7; De Ridder, Beyens, and Snacken, 'Does Reintegration Need REHAB?'

Mufson, 'How Belgian Prison Became a Breeding Ground for Islamic Extremism.'

Ahmed, 'Prison Radicalisation in Europe'; *Agence France Presse* (AFP), 'Belgium to Isolate Prisoners Who May Radicalize Others'; Clapson, 'Belgium to Counter Radicalisation of its Prisons'; Neumann, *Prisons and Terrorism*.

Mufson, 'How Belgian Prison Became a Breeding Ground for Islamic Extremism'; Rubin, de Freytas-Tamura, and Breeden, 'Brothers Among 3 Brussels Suicide Attackers; Another Assailant is Sought.'

He has since been arrested. See: *Catholic Online*, 'Belgium Strikes Back.'

Agence France Presse, ‘Belgium to “Isolate” Prisoners Who May Radicalize Others,’
(*Daily Star*).

Johansson, 'Fouad Belkacem Isolated from other Inmates.'

Pizani-Williams, 'The International Context,' 7–8.

Teich, 'Islamic Radicalization in Belgium,' 1.

Ibid.

Graham, 'What's the Matter with Belgium?'

Coolsaet, 'Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighter Wave,' 9.

Traynor, 'Molenbeek: The Brussels Borough Becoming Known as Europe's Jihadi Central'; Martineau, 'Les leçons de Molenbeek.' Salah Abdeslam, who is a Belgian-born French national of Moroccan descent, was arrested in Molenbeek for his involvement with the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. According to Belgian interior minister, Jan Jambon, when Abdeslam was arrested Muslim residents of Molenbeek 'threw stones and bottles at police and press' and that 'This is the real problem. Terrorists we can pick up, remove from society. But they are just a boil. Underneath is a cancer that is much more difficult to treat. We can do it, but it won't be overnight.' He also said that Muslims in Belgium danced in celebration after the Brussels terrorist attack. See: *Agence France Presse*, 'Belgian Minister Says Many Muslims "danced" After Attacks.'

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RTL, 'Des policiers dénoncent.'

Fagge, Charlton, Greenhill, Duffin, and Ellicot, 'Were Brussels Jihadis Trying to Make a Radioactive Bomb?'; Newton, 'Two Belgian Nuclear Power Plant Workers have Joined ISIS'; Rubin and Schreuer, 'Belgium Fears Nuclear Plants Are Vulnerable.' European parliament has suggested that ISIS has smuggled elements of WMD into Europe. See Immenkamp, *ISIL/Da'esh and 'Non-Conventional' Weapons of Terror*.

De Morgen, 'Sharia4Belgium verdacht van terrorisme, Belkacem aangehouden.'

Mail On Sunday Reporter. 'UK Hate Preacher Linked to Fanatics.'

Eeckhaut, 'Sharia 4 Belgium-militanten naar Syrië.'

Bouchaud, 'Sharia4Belgium Leader and Dozens of Other Militants Are Sentenced to Jail Time.'

Moniquet, 'The Radicalisation of Muslim Youth in Europe,' 2.

Kern, 'Islamic Sharia Law Court Opens in Belgium.'

Three no-go zones around the capital, Brussels: in the municipalities of Molenbeek and Anderlecht in general, and the Anderlecht district of Kuregem in particular. See: Ponsaers, and Devroe. 'On How a Failing Government Creates an Intrusive Police Force,' 122–123; Bolzen, 'Schrecken Sie nicht vor den No-go-Areas zurück!'; Friedland, 'Belgian Government Admits It Has Lost Control of No-Go Zone'; Destexhe, 'Molenbeek : des zones de non droit au coeur de la capitale européenne'; Carle, 'How Europe's Capital Became a Jihadi Recruiting Center.'

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Ahrouch as cited by Kern, 'Belgium Will Become an Islamic State.'

Kern, 'The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013.'

‘Belgian Muslim State? Islamists Vow Campaign After Election Win,’ YouTube video (RT News). Beginning in 2006, Belgium also allowed voting rights of resident Third Country Nationals (or non-European Union foreigners) at the local municipal level. See: Groenendijk, *Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals in Europe*, 7.

Kettani, 'Muslim Population in Europe: 1950–2020,' 157.

Joy Dobbs, Green, and Zealey, *National Statistics*, 30.

Beckford, 'Muslims in UK Top 3 million for First Time...with over 50% Born Outside Britain.'

Pew Research Center, 'Table: Muslim Population by Country: Muslim Population Growth by Country.'

Hussain and Choudhury, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report — United Kingdom*, 14.

De Peyer, 'Muslim Groups Get Biggest Share of Tower Hamlet's Council's Faith Building Grants.'

Mueen-Uddin is wanted in Bangladesh for the abduction, torture, and murder of 18 Bengali teachers, journalists, and doctors who were seeking independence for Bangladesh in 1971 during the Liberation war of Bangladesh. Mueen-Uddin fled to Britain, gained citizenship, and founded the IFE, establishing himself as the leader of the Bangladeshi British Muslim establishment (which is based on Jamaat-el-Islami principles), and became the director of Muslim Spiritual Care Provision (Muslim Aid) in the National Health Service (NHS) as well as a chairman of the Multi-Faith Group for Healthcare Chaplaincy and chairman of the infamous East London Mosque. Bangladesh has now asked for his extradition, finding him guilty of war crimes on 3 November 2013, and has sentenced him to death. In 2010, he was accused by Labour minister, Jim Fitzpatrick, of infiltrating the Labour Party. See: *Wikipedia*, s.v. ‘Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin,’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chowdhury_Mueen-Uddin (accessed 2 November 2014); Douglas Murray, ‘What will History Make of Britain’s Treatment of Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin?’ *The Spectator* (blog), 8 November 2013, <http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/douglas-murray/2013/11/what-will-history-make-of-britains-treatment-of-chowdhury-mueen-uddin/>.

Ami Sedghi, 'Is it true there is a "startling" rise in the birthrate of British Muslims?' *Guardian* (Datablog), 10 January 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/jan/10/rise-british-muslim-birthrate-the-times-census>.

Bingham, 'Number of "Muslim" children in Britain doubles in a decade.'

Gardner, 'A Return to Londonistan?'; Hitchens, 'Londonistan Calling.' The term 'Londonistan' began to be used in the 1990s by French officials in reference to the presence of numerous Muslim radicals there, some of whom had committed terrorist attacks on French soil.

Hastings, 'Mohammed is Now the Third Most Popular Boy's Name in England.'

Doyle, 'Mohammed is Now the Most Popular Baby Name for Baby Boys Ahead of Jack and Harry.'

To note, there are many other Arab names popular among male Muslims such as Yusuf, Omar, Ahmed, Ali, Hamza, etc. To include these other names in popular baby names one could ascertain further the extent of Muslim population growth and birth rate in England and Wales compared to indigenous population growth and birth rate.

Joy Dobbs, Green, and Zealey, *National Statistics: Focus on Ethnicity and Religion*, 41, 114–115, 136.

Sriskandarajah, Cooley, and Kornblatt, 'Britain's Immigrants: An Economic Profile,' 37.

Doughty, 'How Migrants from Outside Europe Leave a £100 Billion Hole in the Public Purse.'

Office for National Statistics, ‘Selected Ethnic Groups by Economic Activity and by Regions’ and ‘Table BD0076 — Economic Activity by Ethnic Group by Sex by Age.’

Office for National Statistics, 'Full Story,' 12; The Muslim Council of Britain, 'British Muslims in Numbers,' 58.

Field, 'Muslims in Prison,' *British Religion in Numbers* (blog), 8 June 2010, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2010/muslims-in-prison/>.

Berman and Dar, 'Prison Population Statistics,' 1, 11.

The large number of Buddhists in prison may not reflect the Buddhist community at large (i.e. Asian) in England and Wales as, according to Religious Affairs Correspondent for *The Telegraph*, Martin Beckford, the 'vast majority' of Buddhists in jail are White and 'most...converted after their conviction...because its emphasis on meditation helps them cope with being locked up.' See Beckford, 'Buddhism is Fastest-Growing Religion in English Jails.'

Henn, 'Fears British Prisoners could be Radicalised and Turned into Jihadis while Behind Bars.'

Porter, 'Muslims "Force UK Prison Inmates to Convert" With Bullying and Intimidation.'

Neumann, *Prisons and Terrorism*; Kotecha, 'Warning over Islamic radicalisation in England's Prisons'; Batty, 'Islamists Actively Seek Prison Sentences to Radicalise Other Convicts, say Officers.'

Brandon, *Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist Extremism in British Prisons*.

Cameron, David. 'Prison reform: Prime Minister's Speech.'

Beal, 'British "Alcatraz" for Islamist Terrorists Would Create Isis "Command Centre" Warns Expert.'

Kotecha, 'More than 400 Children Under 10 Referred for "Deradicalisation."'

Erdogan as cited by Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 141.

This mosque belongs to a British charity, the Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK, Green Lane, Birmingham, which is the head of many mosques and Islamic schools in the UK.

BBC News, 'Mosque Raid Findings Revealed'; Samuel, 'Kalashnikov Bullets Found.'

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Kern, ‘Britain’s “Islamic Emirates Project”’; *CBN News*, ‘Muslim Extremists Seek Sharia Law in UK Towns.’

Kern, 'Muslim Gangs Enforce Sharia Law in London.'

Jeory, 'Judge BANS Muslim Patrol vigilantes from promoting SHARIA LAW in Britain.'

Camber, ““no porn or prostitution” Islamic extremists set up Sharia law controlled zones in British cities.’

‘Britain First carries out Christian Patrol in Islamist hotspot Bury Park, Luton,’ YouTube video.

Daily Mail Reporter, ‘Tory MP ‘hidden for his own safety.’’

‘EDL — English Defence League — How Dare You Come To A Muslim Area?’ YouTube video (Sky News); *BBC News*, ‘Reid heckled during Muslim speech.’

Wintour and Malik, 'Hundreds of Britons caught trying to join jihadis, says foreign secretary.'

Payne, '250 Jihadis Back in Britain, Met Chief Warns.'

Crowcroft, 'UK Isis jihadis: Who are the British fighters waging war in Iraq and Syria for Islamic State?'

Grant, and Sharkov, ““Twice as Many” British Muslims Fighting for ISIS Than in UK Armed Forces.’

HnH, *Anjem Choudary and the al-Muhajiroun Network*, 'The Gateway to Terror.'

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 4.

Kettani, 'Muslim Population in Europe: 1950–2020,' 157.

Gourévitch, *La Croisade Islamiste*, 136; Laurence and Vaïsse, *Intégrer l'Islam*, 35.

Pew Research Center, 'Table: Muslim Population by Country.' However, as noted in footnote 15, p. 75, new projections suggest that the Muslim population of France could be up to or above 18% by 2050.

Wikipedia, s.v. 'Islam in France,' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_France.

Open Society Initiative for Europe. 'Muslims in Marseille Feel Abandoned by their City.'

Picard, 'Marseille gangs out of control?'; Lichfield, 'Marseille: Europe's most dangerous place to be young.'

BBC: Heart and Soul, 'Marseille: France's Muslim City'; Cities of Migration, 'From Hope to Fraternity.'

Savage, 'Europe and Islam,' 28.

Langevin, Masclet, Moizeau, and Peterle, *Educational Attainment*, 17.

Meurs, Pailhé, and Simon, 'The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration,' 777.

Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, and Manning, 'The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom,' F.10.

Langevin, Masclet, Moizeau, and Peterle, *Educational Attainment, Wages and Employment of Second-Generation Immigrants in France*, 7.

Molly Moore, 'In France, Prisons Filled with Muslims.'

Alexander, 'What is going wrong in France's prisons?'; O'Malley, 'France's Prison Population Estimated to be 70% Muslim.'

Wikipedia, s.v. ‘2005 French Riots,’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_French_riots; De Vries, ‘Paris attacks prompt fears France’s Muslim “no-go” zones incubating jihad’; Amghar, ‘Ideological and Theological Foundations of Muslim Radicalism in France,’ 27.

Sciolino, 'Paris suburb riots called "a lot worse" than in 2005'; King, 'Police say Paris rioters are armed as clashes escalate'; *Wikipedia*, s.v. '2007 Villiers-le-Bel riots,' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Villiers-le-Bel_riots.

Chrisafis, 'Paris riots sparked by police identity check on veiled Muslim woman.'

Wikipedia, s.v. ‘2014 Sarcelles riots,’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Sarcelles_riots;
‘Muslim UpRising all over Paris, French run for their lives,’ LiveLeak video.

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‘Muslim UpRising all over Paris, French run for their lives,’ LiveLeak video.

News Online from Australia and the World, ‘Shocking video shows hundreds of migrants brawling.’

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Horatius, 'Incidents durant la nuit de la Saint Sylvestre.'

Siegel, 'Radical Islam'; Khosrokhavar, 'The Mill of Muslim Radicalism'; Sage, 'France struggles to fight radical Islam'; The Clarion Project, 'Trend: Muslims Becoming Radicalized'; Neumann, *Prisons and Terrorism*.

Sage, 'France struggles to fight radical Islam in its jails.'

Fox News, 'Video of Paris gunman raises questions of affiliations in attacks.'

Samuel and Sawyer, 'Charlie Hebdo attack.'

Herridge, 'US officials scanning terror databases in search for Paris attack suspects.'

Fox News. 'Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula member claims group behind Paris terror attack.'

Astier, 'Paris attacks: Prisons provide fertile ground for Islamists.'

Dorman and Cortbus, 'Paris shootings.'

De Bellaigue, 'Are French prisons "finishing schools" for terrorism?'; *The Local*, 'France to isolate terrorists in special prison wings'; Scarborough, 'France cracks down on Islamic radicalism after Paris attacks.'

Pineau and Ponthus, 'Manuel Valls mobilise hommes'; Kern, 'The Islamization of France in 2015.'

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Franceinfo, 'Les revendications religieuses au travail ont doublé en 2015.'

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Turnbull and Keaton, 'French police escort suspect in beheading to his home.'

Scarborough, 'France cracks down on Islamic radicalism after Paris attacks.'

Taylor, 'Map: France's growing Muslim population.'

Le Parisien, 'Grigny: une cité sous le joug des petits caïds.'

Combes and Fleurot, ‘Amiens-Nord, une “zone de non-droit.”’

Agence France Presse, ‘Les Izards: “zone de non-droit” (Cohen).’

Europe 1, 'A vos yeux, Marseille est-elle devenue une zone de non-droit?'

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Bouclay and Lejeune, 'Trappes, cité perdue de la République.'

Guiot, 'Corbeil-Essonnes, une zone de non-droit parmi tant d'autres sous l'emprise de la racaille.'

Kern, 'European "no-Go" Zones: Fact or Fiction? Part 1: France'; Stainville, 'Dossier: L'enfer en France'; Villers, '« Les zones de non-droit » dans la République Française, mythe ou réalité?'; Scarborough, 'France's ethnic apartheid'; 'Native French under Attack in Muslim Areas,' YouTube video (CBN News); Ministry of the Interior, 'Dossier de presse conjoint du ministère de la Justice et du ministère de l'Intérieur.'

Le Monde, 'Manuel Valls évoque « un apartheid territorial, social, ethnique » en France.'

Larsson, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report — Sweden*, 8.

Pew Research Center, 'Table: Muslim Population by Country' and *The Future of the Global Muslim Population*. Also see footnote 5, p. 71, on recent projections that the Muslim population of Sweden may be over 30% by 2050.

Kettani, 'Muslim Population in Europe: 1950–2020,' 158.

Larsson, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report — Sweden*, 10, 5.

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The Baby Name Wizard: The Name Experts, 'Swedish Baby Names'; Statistics Sweden, 'Boy's Names 2015.'

European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), *Muslims in the European Union*, 53.

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The Local, 'Minister: immigrant "volume" too high.'

Wente, 'Sweden's Ugly Immigration Problem.'

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Carlqvist, 'Multicultural Sweden explodes in violence.'

Carlqvist, 'Muslimer kraftigt överrepresenterade i våldtäktsbrott.'

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Ahlberg, *Invandrades och Invandrades barns Brottslighet: En Statistisk Analys*, 41, 44, 99, 107.

Carlqvist and Hedegaard, 'Sweden: Rape Capital of the West.'

Swedish Nation Council on Crime Prevention (Brå), 'Brottslighet bland personer födda i Sverige och i utlandet,' 30–36, 40–42.

Andersson, ‘Two 10-year-old schoolgirls molested and a woman’s trousers ripped off’ (my emphasis).

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RT News, 'Sweden's 3rd largest city hit by multiple blasts'; Lane, 'INTERVIEW: Retired Swedish Police Chief Says Malmö Crime Skyrocketing Due To Uncontrolled Immigration, No Go Zones.'

Hökerberg, 'Utanförskapet växer i Sverige.'

Schachtel, 'European "No-Go" Zones Remain Unassimilated Hotbeds of Radical Islam.'

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See: Scholz, *The Public Health Dimension*; Burrows, 'Parts of Rome'; Hallett, 'Diphtheria'; Kern, 'Germany: Migration Crisis Becomes Public Health Crisis.'

Bartunek and Blenkinsop, 'Brussels New Year fireworks canceled over attack fears.'

[←1087]

Christys, 'Bars BANNED from showing Euro 2016 matches amid fears of terror attacks against fans.'

[←1088]

The Local, 'Swiss army chief warns of terrorism and unrest.'

[←1089]

Die Presse, 'Migration: Jeder Dritte befürchtet bürgerkriegsähnliche Zustände.'

[←1090]

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[←1091]

Batchelor, 'Ex-Brussels chief pushes for EU Army and tells leaders to work FASTER to create one.'

[[←1093](#)]

Presse Portal. 'POL-K: 160101-1-K/LEV Ausgelassene Stimmung — Feiern weitgehend friedlich.'

Troianovski, 'Germany Says 22 Asylum Seekers Are Among Those Sought for New Year's Eve Assaults.'

[←1095]

Osborne, 'Cologne sex assaults.'

[←1096]

Willgress, 'EU leaders insist there is "NO LINK,"' Holehouse, 'EU leaders: "No link."'

[←1097]

Kassam, 'EXCLUSIVE — EU Source Tells Breitbart London: “Brussels Won’t Admit Migrant Policy Caused Cologne.”’

[←1099]

Smale, '18 Asylum Seekers Are Tied to Attacks on Women in Germany.'

Schmoll, 'Polizei fühlt sich bei Migranten-Kriminalität gegängelt'; *Bild*, 'Ist die Polizei wirklich so machtlos?'; Karnitschnig, 'Cologne puts Germany's 'Lying press' on defensive'; *Sputnik News*, 'German Police Under Orders to Keep Refugee Crimes Off the Radar'; Lane, 'Cologne Police Reveal "Cover Up" Of New Year's Eve Rape Attacks Ordered By Government.'

[←1101]

Lane, 'Top German Journalist Admits Live On Air National News Agenda Set By Government.'

Sexton, 'It Took the Cologne Assaults to Break Through the German Media's Political Correctness on Immigration'; *The Local*, 'New Year sexual assaults in Frankfurt, police say.' Another trend is to trivialize European fears over migrant crimes, such as an April 2016 article written by Heather Horn for the *Atlantic* magazine titled 'Where Does Fear of Refugees Come From?' This article reports that 358 rumours of migrant crimes since 2013 focus on robbery and sexual assault and claims that fear of refugees (rumours and opinion polls) does not fit with actual data on migrant and refugee crimes. Using data from a report by Germany's Federal Criminal Police Agency (BKA) as mentioned above, it states that refugee numbers increased 440% in 2015 from the year before but refugee crime had 'only increased by 79 percent' in the same time period and 'stagnated' in the latter half of 2015 when most migrants arrived in Germany. First of all, an increase in refugee crime by 79% is in fact a significant increase and calculations of this percentage do not include the New Year's Eve sex assaults, or the migrant crimes from three large states that have the largest populations of immigrants, including NRW which is the most populous German state and where the Cologne incident took place, and also does not include unsolved criminal cases, as mentioned elsewhere in this work or crimes committed by regular non-European migrants. Second, police resources were over-stretched in the second-half of 2015 in relation to the sheer numbers of irregular migrants entering Germany and the criteria for arrest was narrowed due to this, thus the stagnation of documented refugee crime. Third, one-third of refugee crime is robbery, which confirms the first concern over refugee crime. In terms of refugee committed sexual assault, the article trivializes it, saying it amounts to 'only 1 percent of refugee-related crimes,' but this is a staggering amount equalling 1,688 cases, including over 450 rapes. In 2014, 47,000 sexual offenses in Germany were documented, as such, as an estimate, in 2015 sexual offenses committed by refugees roughly equalled 3.6% of all sexual offenses committed in Germany while they only represented around 1.3% (1.1 million) of the total population. In other words, refugees committed a disproportionate amount of sexual assaults in Germany in relation to the size of their population (and if the New Year's Eve assaults were included, this over-representation would be even higher). As such, concerns over this type of migrant crime fit with the data. This article does not address the various police, crime, and prison statistics that have consistently shown over the years that immigrants, particularly Muslims from Africa and the Middle East (the majority of regular and irregular non-European migrants in Europe), are over-represented as criminals, particularly in rape, in at least five European countries, which have been profiled in this book. It seems that the author of the piece, Heather Horn, is trying to side-step the real problem, i.e. the generation of real fear created by actual migrant behaviours and crimes, both between themselves and towards Europeans, by attempting to allay this fear by associating it with a few rumours and hoaxes.

[←1103]

Tyler Durden, 'Massive Coverup Exposed In Sweden As Media, Cops Hid Migrant Sex Attacks,' *Zero Hedge* (blog), 12 January 2016. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-01-11/massive-coverup-exposed-sweden-media-cops-hid-migrant-sex-attacks>.

Sikh24, 'Underage Sexual Grooming: Five Arrested in UK.'

See for example: Jütte et al., *How Safe Are Our Children?*; Norfolk, 'Police files'; McLoughlin, *Easy Meat*; House of Commons: Home Affairs Committee, *Child Sexual Exploitation*; Alexis Jay, *Independent Inquiry*.

[←1107]

McLoughlin, '*Easy Meat*,' 22 (my emphasis).

[←1108]

Norfolk, 'Police conspired to protect Rotherham child sex abusers.'

[←1109]

Luke, 'Northumbria Police'; Martin Evans, 'Rotherham child sex abuse: 300 new
"suspects."'

[←1110]

See for example: Tiggeloven, 'Child Prostitution in the Netherlands'; Reid, 'A feminist revolution.'

[←1111]

Schmoll, 'Polizei fühlt sich bei Migranten-Kriminalität gegängelt.'

[←1112]

Bunyan, 'Rochdale grooming trial'; 'Reality of Sexual Grooming Gangs in the UK (Interview with Andrew Norfolk by SAS),' YouTube video (S.A.S).

[←1113]

Gutteridge, 'MIGRANT SEX ATTACK "COVER-UP."'

[←1114]

Reid, 'How Europe's most liberal nation gagged its own people on migration attacks.'

[←1115]

Henderson, 'Swedish police banned from describing criminals anymore in case they sound racist'; Pirttisalo, 'Får interna direktiv: Ange inte signalement.'

[←1116]

Readhead, 'German police officer'; *The Local*, 'Cover-up claim over NYE mass sexual assaults'; Geppert, 'Germany's Secret Islamic Horror.'

[←1117]

Gutteridge, 'MIGRANT SEX ATTACK "COVER-UP."'

[←1118]

Lane, 'Cologne Imam: Girls Were Raped Because They Were Half Naked And Wore Perfume.'

[←1119]

Tran, 'Australian Muslim leader compares uncovered women to exposed meat.'

[←1120]

Boyle, 'Germans must ban ALCOHOL.'

[←1121]

Klages, Ciesinger, and Jansen, ‘Henriette Reker: Gewalttaten haben nichts mit Flüchtlingen zu tun.’

Eddy, 'Cologne Mayor's "Arm's Length" Advice on Sexual Attacks Stirs Outcry.'

[←1123]

Lane, 'Cologne Mayor.'

[←1124]

Mark S. Berger, 'Mener norske jenter frister til sex.'

[←1125]

‘Migrants sexually harass German School Girls — Mayor dismisses Grandfather: “Don’t provoke them.”’ YouTube video.

[←1126]

Perring and Stromme, 'It's not their fault, it's yours! Swedish GIRLS blamed for rise in migrant sex attacks.'

[←1127]

Waters, 'Europe's Rape Epidemic: Western Women Will Be Sacrificed At The Altar Of Mass Migration.'

[←1128]

Andersson, ‘Two 10-year-old schoolgirls molested and a woman’s trousers ripped off’ (my emphasis); ‘Swedish cops quit protecting women,’ YouTube video.

[[←1129](#)]

Ernst, 'The Big List of Muslim sex attacks gets bigger.'

[[←1130](#)]

Connolly, 'Cologne inquiry into "coordinated" New Year's Eve sex attacks.'

Ben-David, 'Europe's Shifting Immigration Dynamic.' A map by WomanStats Project shows the prevalence of rape across the world. When paired with where most immigrants, refugees, and illegals are coming from, which are Muslim-majority nations, one can see the extent of the problem. See: WomanStats Project, 'Weighted Relative International Rape Scale.'

[←1132]

Symons, 'Cologne attacks: "This is sexual terrorism directed towards women."'

Ibid. One just has to remember the violent gang rape of CBS reporter Lara Logan in Tahrir Square in Egypt, 2011, or the violent gang rape of a Dutch journalist by five perpetrators, again in Tahrir Square in 2013. See: Moisse, 'CBS Reporter Lara Logan'; Levy, 'Five men rape journalist, 22, in Tahrir Square: reports.'

Ernst, 'The Big List of Muslim sex attacks gets bigger.'

[←1135]

Michael White, 'Cologne attacks'; *Sputnik News*, 'Right-Wing German Gangs'; McCarthy, 'When Worlds Collide'; 'PVV: Geert Wilders MP — The Sexual Jihad On Europe,' Youtube video.

Wikipedia, s.v. 'Mass sexual assault in Egypt,' accessed May 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_sexual_assault_in_Egypt.

[←1137]

Wikipedia, s.v. 'Eve teasing,' accessed May 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eve_teasing; Aljenfawi, 'Migrants must adopt Europe standards of civilized conduct.'

Ahlberg, *Invandrades och Invandrades barns Brottslighet: En Statistisk Analys*, 41, 44, 99, 107.

[←1139]

Mark S. Berger, 'Mener norske jenter frister til sex.'

Hurd, 'Culture Crisis: Norway Tackles Muslim Immigration.'

[←1141]

Fogt, 'Hveranden voldtægtsdømt er udlænding.'

See: Directorate of Information, 'Arrests of Foreign Nationals by Nationality and Specified Arrest Areas'; Harper and Leapmann, 'Foreigners "commit fifth of crime in London"'; Zeronian, 'Women's Rights Groups Attack Study.'

[←1143]

RT News, ‘Europe faces “long period of terror” — German police official.’

[←1144]

Nachrichten.at, 'Experte erkennt klare Anschlagsgefahr in Österreich.'

Various countries either support or are members of the US-led coalition against ISIS and the Assad regime in Syria and supports various rebel groups. There are other anti-ISIS forces, such as the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, that are also fighting against various rebel groups, such as the Houthi rebels, as well as countries that are anti-ISIS and other Islamist groups but pro-Assad (e.g. Russia, Algeria, Iran). See: McHugh and Sender, 'Who Is Fighting ISIS?'; Wanderman, 'CIA fighting the Pentagon in Syria.'

Erlanger, 'A Quandary for Europe.' Civil war-like conditions happen nearly every year in France where immigrants use guerilla warfare tactics and weapons against police and destroy, through arson and looting etc., schools, police stations, shops, cars, and so on. This also happens in Sweden and other European nations. See chapter 9. In France there are around 100 Salafist enclaves like Belgium's Molenbeek according to Minister for Cities in France, Patrick Kanner. See: *Le Parisien*, 'Patrick Kanner.' According to Pieter Van Ostaejen, a Middle East historian, Daesh also wants a clash of civilizations. CBC suggests that the reason they want this 'clash' is for 'Revenge for what ISIS claims the West has done to Iraq and Syria. And the more ground ISIS loses there, the more the group lusts for bloodshed in Europe.' See: Arsenault and Gagnon, 'Why ISIS wants a "clash of civilizations."'

Bajpai, 'The Paris Attacks and the World Economy'; Newton-Small, 'The Cost of the Paris Attacks'; Mowat, 'Brussels attacks estimated to cost its economy €4 billion.'

Deloughery, 'Simultaneous Attacks by Terrorist Organizations.'

[←1149]

Dearden, 'Isis claims responsibility for Brussels attacks.'

[←1150]

Erlanger, 'A Quandary for Europe.'

[←1151]

Erlanger, 'A Quandary for Europe.'

[←1157]

‘CNN Guest: “White People Like Yourself” Can’t Understand Islamic Culture,’ YouTube video (CNN).

[←1158]

Erlanger, 'A Quandary for Europe,' (my emphasis).

[←1159]

Vidino, 'Islamism in Europe,' 1–2.

[←1161]

Ibid, 6.

[←1162]

Ibid, 7.

Stephen Brown, 'German Muslims must obey law, not sharia: Merkel.'

Euronews. 'Merkel insists migrants must learn German.'

Peters, 'Können Moscheen zum Ort der Integration werden?'

[←1167]

Mowat, ‘Germany plans new law to require migrants to integrate and learn language — or be deported.’

[←1169]

Ibid, 40–41. Also see: European Web Site on Integration, <http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/aboutus.cfm>.

[←1170]

Archick et al., *Muslims in Europe*, 40.

[←1171]

Ibid, 41.

[←1172]

European Commission, 'Delivering the European Agenda on Migration.'

[←1174]

Ibid, 34.

Dodd, 'Blair backs banned Muslim'; Beckford, 'David Cameron's religious adviser.'
Ramadan has previously been banned from the US and France for his links with terrorism.
French author Caroline Fourest has accused him of taquia, or double-talk. See: Fourest,
Brother Tariq; Dankowitz, 'Tariq Ramadan'; Le Quesne, 'Trying to Bridge.'

[←1177]

As cited in Archick et al., *Muslims in Europe*, 34.

[←1178]

Ibid, 35.

Mandaville, *Muslim Networks and Movements*; Jones, 'Intelligence agencies'; *Recruitment and Mobilisation*.

[←1180]

Kirkup, 'Yes, Muslims are different. No, we shouldn't accept that.'

[←1181]

Bingham, 'Britain "sleepwalking to catastrophe" over race: Trevor Phillips.'

[←1182]

See chapter 10.

See: Kassam, 'DATA: Young Muslims'; International Organization for Migration, *Compendium of Migrant Integration*; Papademetriou, *Europe and Its Immigrants*; Gsir, Mandin, and Mescoli, *Corridor Report on Belgium*; Seidle, *Comparative Research*; Hoßmann and Karsch, 'Germany's Integration Politics'; Somerville and Saggar, *Building a British Model of Integration in an Era of Immigration*.

[←1184]

See chapter 8.

Alexiev, *The Wages of Extremism*, 60–61, 74.

Mandaville, *Muslim Networks and Movements*, 6–8.

[←1187]

See chapters 8 and 9.

[←1188]

Economist, 'The War'; Richard Bernstein, 'A Continent Watching'; Laurence and Vaisse, *Integrating Islam*.

[←1189]

See chapter 10.

Maleckova, 'Impoverished terrorists: stereotype or reality?' 41.

[←1194]

Archick, et al., *Muslims in Europe*, 9, 39, 44; Archick, *U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism*.

As doctors, lawyers, and engineers for example, see: *Jewish Telegraph Agency*, ‘Belgian vice PM acknowledges street celebrations following Brussels attacks’; Bethune, ‘Why do so many jihadis have engineering degrees?’

Lane, 'Alleged Brussels Terrorist Was Star'; Dearden, 'Osama Krayem.'

Arsenault and Gagnon, 'Why ISIS wants a "clash of civilizations."'

[←1199]

Ibid.

[←1200]

See: Frontex, *Risk Analysis for 2016*.